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MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 
By J. S. TURNER 
From the Department of Mathematics, Iowa State College. 
Received for Publication November 30, 1927. 
Logic is the science of those laws of thought which apply to proposi-
tions; it is a syste¥n of rules for testing and correcting thought, rather 
than a description of the processes of thought. 
The science was created .by Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) ; it has developed 
along scholastic lines, with scarcely any essential changes. The essential 
feature ·of the scholastic method is this: Something, let us say X, is intro-
duced for discussion ; variouR kinds of X are named and defined, but the 
meaning of X is not indicated. This scholastic logic is ill-adapted to 
mathematical requirements. 
Mathematical logicians have tabulated the forms of reasoning used 
in mathematics, and they have demonstrated them from a few principles; 
by these means they have explained many logical difficulties. But in the 
treatment of the principles. the scholastic method is retained. We are 
told that "p denotes an elementary proposition", and "p is true or no.t 
true", thus there are several kinds of propositions; but we are not told 
the meaning of "proposition". 
There must be undefined terms, but there is no reason why there should 
be undefined logical terms. There are funda,mental ideas which we all 
possess. We can indicate the terms which denote these ideas by sug-
gestive descriptions. We can select these terms, whose meanings we know, 
as our undefined terms ; by means of them we can define all technical 
terms, including logical terms. 
The first section of this monograph describes the scope and explains 
the meaning of logic and mathematics. Sections II and III describe cer-
tain fundamental instinctive ideas, and show how other instinctive ideas 
are formed from them. Section IV describes the processes of definition 
and demonstration. Sections V and VI contain definitions of logical terms, 
and demonstrations of logical theorems. 
The reasoning used in mathematics seldQm involves more than the 
simple processes tabulated in section IV, and the theorems in sections V 
and VI. If this reasoning is to be expressed by formal logical theorems, 
further theorems are frequently required; these are to be found in other• 
works. 
A few articles, marked with an asterisk, may be deferred to a later 
reading. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
1. Common Sense. I am a being, or ego, capable of receiving sen-
sations, impressions, or stimuli, and of forming mental pictures, concep-
tions, or ideas, as a result of these sensations. I am situated in a body 
containing sense organs each capable of receiving a different sensation, 
* E. g. Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica. 
69 
INDEX 
Author Index 
Allen, Edward S., 253. 
Allison, James B., 243. 
Brandt, A. E., 229, 235. 
Brown, R. E. (with Henry Gilman and H. L. Jones), 317. 
Castetter, Edward F., 219. 
Fulmer, Ellis I., and Elnar Leifson, 159. 
Gilman, Henry, R. E. Brown and H. L. Jones, 317. 
Harlan, W. R., and R. M. Hixon, 313. 
Hixon, R . M. (with W. R. Harlan), 313. 
Hopkins, John A., Jr., 263. 
Irwin, M. R., 213. 
James, Lawrence H., 155. 
Johnson, Birger L., 105. 
Jones, H. L. (with Henry Gilman and R. E. Brown), 317. 
Knox, C. W. (with W. V. Lambert), 179. 
Lambert, W. V., and Knox, C. W., 159. 
Leifson, Elnar (with Ellis I. Fulmer), 159. 
Levine, Max (with E. E. Peterson and J. H. Buchanan), 31, 43. 
Levine, Max (with Gertrude Sunderlin and P. Mabel Nelson), 189, 289. 
Nelson, P. Mabel (with Gertrude Sunderlin and Max Levine), 189, 289. 
Paige, F. W., 117. 
Pammel, L. H ., 115. 
Petersen, E. E. (with J. H. Buchanan and Max Levine), 43. 
Petersen, E . E. (with Max Levine and J. H. Buchanan), 31. 
Platz, G. A., 137. 
Sunderlin, Gertrude (with Max Levine and P. Mabel Nelson), 289. 
Sunderlin, Gertrude (with P. Mabel Nelson and Max Levine), 189. 
Turner, J. S., 69. 
Weaver, Helen J. (with C.H. Werkman), 57. 
Werkman, C.H., and Helen J. Weaver, 57. 
Subject Index 
Absolutes, 95. 
Abstracts, 87. 
Acceleration of lipase activity, 145. 
Actinomyces, 300. 
Agaricaceae, 122, 125. 
Alcoholic fermentation, free energy de-
crease of, 159. 
Aleuria aurantia (Pers.), 118. 
Alkali, effect on viability of yeast 
spores, 31. 
Amanita cothurnata, Atk., 129. 
elongata Pk., 129. 
flavoconia Atk., 129. 
frostiana Pk., 129. 
phalloides Fr., 129. 
russuloides Pk., 129. 
velutipes Atk., 129. 
Amanitopsis vaginata F.r. var. alba., 
129. 
vaginata Fr. var. fulva, 130. 
vaginata Fr. var. livida, 130. 
volvata Pk., 120. 
Analytical demonstrations, 108. 
Analytical logic, 113. 
Anellaria separata Karst, 126. 
Armillaria mellea Fr., 130. 
Ascomycetes, 118. 
Asparagus, canning of, 194. 
Attention, 77. 
Auriculariaceae, 118. 
Autobasidiomycetes, 119. 
Available energy, 159. 
Axiom, 72. 
Bacillus cochlearius, 64. 
Bacteria, killing by sodium hydroxide, 
19. 
Bacteria thermophiles, 155. 
Beef, canning of, 208. 
Beets, canning of, 196. 
Being, 78. 
Boletinus porosus Berk., 121. 
Boletus a1Jinis Pk., 121. 
321 
badiceps Pk., 121. 
castaneus Bull., 121. 
322 INDEX 
clintonianus Pk., 121. 
edulis Bull., 121. 
edulis Bull., var. clavipes, 122. 
glabellus Pk., 122. 
luridus Schaetf., 122. 
separans Pk., 122. 
speciosus Frost, 122. 
sphaerosporus Pk., 122. 
Bovista pila B. & C., 134. 
plumbea Pers., 134. 
Calvatia craniformis Schw., 133. 
callata Bull., 133. 
cyathiformis Bose., 133. 
gigantea Ba.tech. 
Canning, home, 289. 
Canning, home studies in, 189. 
Cantharelleae, 122. 
Cantharellus aurantiacus Fr. var. pal· 
lidus, 122. 
cibarius Fr., 122. 
Caprinus atromentarius Fr., 125. 
comatus Fr. 125. 
domesticus Fr., 125. 
ebulbosus Pk., 125. 
fucescens Fr., 125. 
micaceus Fr., 125. 
niveus Fr., 125. 
squamosus Morg., 125. 
tomentosus Fr., 125. 
Carbonated beverages, acids in, 32. 
Categories, 99. 
Categorical logic 71, 99. 
Categorical proposition, 71, ·100. 
Cause, 73. 
Change, 83. 
Clamydosporee of Ustilago zeae 137. 
Class, 81 
Class concept, 82. 
Class percept, 82. 
Class units, 82. 
Claudopus nidulans Fr., 129. 
Clavaria cinerea Bull., 119. 
cristata Pers., 119. 
densa Pk., 119. 
formosa Pe.rs., 119. 
mucida Pers., 119. 
pistillaris Pers., 119. 
pyridata Pers., 119. 
stricta Pers., 119. 
vermicularis Scop., 119. 
Clavariaceae, 119. 
Clitocybe adirondackensis, 131. 
cartilaginea Burf., 131. 
catina Fr., 131. 
compressipes Pk., 131. 
decastes Fr., 131. 
eccentrica, 131. 
fumosa Pers., 131. 
illudens Schw., 131. 
infundibuliformis Fr., 131. 
laccata Fr., 131. 
Zaccata Fr., var. striatula, 131. 
maxima Fr., 131. 
media Pk., 131. 
multiceps Pk., 131. 
nebularis Fr., 131. 
odora Fr., var. anisearia, 131. 
ochropurpurea Berk., 132. 
phyllophilia Fr., 132. 
pithyophila Fr., 132. 
robusta Pk., 132. 
subzonalis Pk., 132. 
truncicola Pk., 132. 
Clitopilus abortivus B. & C., 129. 
caespitosus Pk., 129. 
orcella Fr., 129. 
prunulus Fr., 129. 
Clostridium nigrificans, 63, 155. 
tertium, 63. 
welchii, 63. 
Cockroach, effect of hydrocyanic acid 
on, 251. 
Coding of statistical constants, 229. 
Collybia acervata Fr., 132. 
alcalinolena Pk., 132. 
dryophila Bull., 132. 
platyphylla Fr., 132. 
radicata Fr., 132. 
velutipes Fr., 132. 
Common sense, 69. 
Complement, 100. 
Complementary class, 71. 
Compound, 95. 
Concept, 77. 
Conclusion, 71. 
Connection, 77. 
Conditions, 86. 
Conditions of objects, 91. 
Conditional class, 104. 
Conditional logic, 72. 
Conditional proposition, 71, 105. 
Consciousness, 77. 
Construct, 88. 
Contra-positive, 101. 
Correspondence, 85. 
Contrary, 101, 105. 
Contradiction, 93. 
Converse, 101. 
Correlary, 98. 
Cortinarius atkinsoni anus Kauff., 127. 
autumnalis Pk., 127. 
castaneus Fr., 127. 
elegantioides Clem., 127. 
squarrosus Clem., 127. 
Craterellus cornucopioides (L), 119. 
Crepidotus croceotinctus Pk., 128. 
dorsalis Pk., 128. 
fulvotomentosus Pk., 128. 
haerens Pk., 128. 
herbarum Pk., 128. 
malachius B & C., 128. 
mollis, Fr., 128. 
putrigens B & C., 128. 
sepiaris Pk., 128. 
Crucibulum vulgar e Tul., 134. 
Coupled implications, 109. 
INDEX 323 
Cucurbita pepo, 219. 
maxima, 219. 
moschata, 219. 
melanosperma, 219. 
perennis, 219. 
Cucurbita, species crosses in, 219. 
Cyathus striatus Hoff., 134. 
vernicosus (Bull.), 134. 
Dacryomycetaceae, 119. 
Daedalea confragosa Bolton, 121. 
Danyz bacillus, inheritance of resist-
ance to, 213. 
Definite class, 86. 
Definition, 72. 
Demonstration, 72. 
Denumerable, 86. 
Dictyophora ravenellii (B & C.), 133. 
Distance, 89. 
Distinction, 79. 
Economic phenomena, forecasting (),I'., 
163. 
Effects, 73. 
Entity, 78. 
Entoloma cylpeat·um Fr., 129. 
grayanum Fr., 129. 
griseum Pk., 129. 
niderosum Berk., 129. 
peckianum Berk., 129. 
rhodopolium Ff., 129. 
sericeum Fr., 129. 
strictius Pk., 129. 
Equal, 86. 
Essence, 79. 
Ethyl Beta-furylacrylate, 317. 
Evaporated milk, gas in, 1. 
Existence, 76. 
Fat inheritance in maize, 9. 
Favolus canadensis Klotzsch, 121. 
Flammula carbonaria Fr., 127. 
flavida Fr., 127. 
lubrica Fr., 127. 
polychroa Berk., 127. 
rigida Pk., 127. 
spumosa Fr., 127. 
Fleshy fungi from Webster County, 
Iowa, 117. 
Fames applanatus Pers., 120. 
everhartii E & G., 120. 
fomentarius L ., 120. 
fraxinophilus Pk., 120. 
Zobatus Schw., 120. 
pomaceus, 120. 
Forecasting of economic phenomena, 
263. 
Forecasting methods 268. 
Fowl typhoid, inheritance and resist-
ance to, 179. 
Free energy decrease, 159, 165. 
Furfural, 317. 
Galera tenera Fr., 128. 
vitaeformis Fr., 128. 
Gasteromycetes, 133. 
Geaster saccatus Fr., 134. 
triplex Jungh., 134. 
Germicidal efficiency of sodium hydrox-
ide, 19. 
Germination of corn smut spores, 137. 
Guepina spathularia Fr., 119. 
Hebeloma abidulum Pk., 127. 
fastibile Fr., 127. 
hiemale Bres., 127. 
illicitum Pk., 127. 
nesophalum Fr., 127. 
parvifructum Pk., 127. 
simile Kauff., 127. 
Helvella crispa Fr., 118. 
elastica Bull., 118. 
lacunose Afzel., 118. 
sulcata Afzel., 118. 
Helvellaceae, 118. 
Helvella.Ies, 118. 
Hirneola auriculata Berk., 118. 
Home canning, 289. 
Home canning, studies in, 189. 
Hybridization of Cucurbita, 219. 
Hydnaceae, 119. 
Hydnum coralloides Seo., 119. 
ochraceum Fr., 119. 
pulcherrimum B & C., 119. 
repandum Linn., 119. 
septentrionale Fr., 119. 
spongiosipes Pk., 119. 
Hydrocyanic acid ,toxicity of, 243. 
Hydrogen ion concentration and hydro-
lysis of sugar, 43. 
Hydrolysis of sugars, 43. 
Hygrophoreae, 125. 
Hygrophorus conicus Pk., 125. 
eberneus Fr., 125. 
eberneus Fr., var. unicolor, 125. 
fuscoalbus Fr. var. accidentales, 125. 
paigei Pammel, 115, 125. 
pratensis Fr. var. cinereus, 125. 
pratensis Fr. var. pallidus, 125. 
pudorinus Fr., 125. 
russula Fr., 125. 
tricholoma ru.9sula, 125. 
Hyphaloma aggregatu1n Pk., 126. 
candolleanum Fr., 126. 
capnoides Fr., 126. 
incertum Pk., 126. 
lachrymabundum Fr., 126. 
nitidipes Pk., 126. 
perplexum Pk., 126. 
populium Britz., 126. 
sublateritium Fr., 126. 
velutinum Fr., 126. 
Hypocreaceae, 118. 
Hypocreales, 118. 
Hypomyces lactifhwrum Schw., 118. 
Hypothetical logic, 71, 104. 
Hypothetical proposition, 71. 
Idea, 76. 
Immediate implications, 106. 
Implicate, 95. 
Implication, 71. 
324 INDEX 
Inconsistency, 93. 
Indices of spoilage, 292. 
Individual, 87. 
Inheritance in Cucurbita, 219. 
Inheritance in maize, 9. 
Inheritance of resistance to the Danysz 
bacillus, 213. 
Inocybe asterospora Quel., 127. 
fastigiata Bres., 127. 
fibrosa Bres., 127. 
rimosa Fr., 127. 
Intervals, 82. 
Irpex lacteus Fr., 119. 
pachydon, 120. 
tulipifera Schw., 120. 
Knowledge, 70. 
Lactarieae, 123. 
Lactarius controversus Fr., 123. 
insulas, Fr., 123. 
piperatus Fr., 123. 
subaulcis Fr., 123. 
torminosus Fr., 123. 
trivialis Fr., 123. 
vietus Fr., 123. 
volumes Fr., 123. 
Law, 72. 
Lemma, 98. 
Lentinus sulcat1is Berk., 122. 
Lenzites betulina Fr., 121. 
vialis Pk., 121. 
Lepiota acutaesquamosa Fr., 130. 
cepaestipes Fr., 130. 
clypeolaria Fr., 130. 
cristata Fr., 130. 
felina Fr., 130. 
friesii Lasch, 130. 
morgani Pk., 130. 
naucinoide Pk. var. squamosa, 130. 
procera Fr., 130. 
rubrotincta Pk., 130. 
Lipase, 145. 
Logic, mathematical, 69. 
Logical reasoning, 72, 92. 
Logical restriction, 94. 
Lycoperdaceae, 133. 
Lycoperdon constellatum Fr., 133. 
elongatum Berk., 133. 
exipuliforme Scop., 133. 
gematium Batsch, 133. 
glabellum Pk., 133. 
molle Pers., 133. 
pusillum Barsch., 133. 
pyriforme Schatt., 133. 
turneri var. typicum L., 133. 
wrightii var. separans B & C., 133. 
wrightii var. typicum L., 133. 
Major premise, 71. 
Marasmieae, 122. 
Marismius androsaceus Fr., 122. 
capillaris, 122. 
cohaerens Fr., 122. 
delectans Morg., 122. 
oreades Fr., 122. 
rotula Fr., 122. 
semihertipes Pk., 122. 
velutipes B & C., 122. 
wynnei B & BR., 122. 
Mathematical logic, 69, 75. 
Mathematics, 74. 
Mathematical philosophy, 76. 
Meat, canning of, 208. 
Member, 88. 
M erulius tremellosus Schrad., 120. 
Minor premise, 71. 
Monad, 79. 
Morchella conica Pers., 118. 
esculenta Pers., 118. 
semilibera DC., 118. 
Mushrooms from Webster County, Iowa, 
119. 
Mutinus bovinus Morgan, 133. 
Mycena atroalba Fr., 132. 
galericulata Fr., 132. 
haematopa Fr., 132. 
inclinata Fr., 132. 
leajana Berk., 132. 
parabolica Fr., 132. 
polygramma Fr., 132. 
Mycenas.trum spinulosum Pk., 134. 
Natural existence, 92. 
Natural space, 90. 
Natural time, 94. 
Nature, 92. 
Naucoria lignicola Pk., 128. 
Necessary conditions, 99. 
Nicotine adsorption (Bentonite) 313. 
Nicotine dust, testing of, 313. 
Nidulariaceae, 134. 
Noncontradictlon, 93. 
Nondenumerable, 86. 
Number, 84. 
Number-unit, 85. 
Objects, 90. 
Obverse, 101. 
Oxygen, relation to smut spoilage, 137. 
Omphalia olivaria, 132. · 
Paneolus campanulatus Fr., 126. 
papilionaceus Fr., 126. 
retirugis Fr., 126. 
solidipes Pk., 126. 
Panus conchatus Fr., 122. 
delabatus Pk., 122. 
rudis Fr., 122. 
Part, 88. 
Partial regression coefficient, 235. 
Perception, 77. 
Percept, 78. 
Personal space, 90. 
Personal time, 84. 
Persons, 91. 
Peziza badia Pers., 118. 
odorata Pk., 118. 
Pezizales, 118. 
Pezizaceae, 118. 
Pholiota adiposa Fr., 126. 
agericola Pk., retirugis, 126. 
albocrenulata Pk., 126. 
cerasina Pk., 126. 
hereroclita Fr., 127. 
howeana Pk., 127. 
johnsoniana Pk., 127. 
lutea Pk., 127. 
ornella Pk., 127. 
praecox Pres., 127. 
subsquarrosa Fr., 127. 
unicolor Fr., 127. 
Phallaceae, 133. 
Phallus impudicus Linn., 133. 
Philosophy, 73. 
Pleurotus corticatus Fr., 130. 
fimbriatus Fr. var. regularis, 130. 
mastrucatus Fr., 130. 
ostreatus Fr., 130. 
petaloides Fr., 130. 
sapidus Kalchb., 130. 
subariolatus Pk., 130. 
subpalmatus Fr., 130. 
ulmarius Fr., 130. 
Pluteus cervinus Fr., 128. 
cervinus Fr. var. albi.pes, 128. 
cervinus Fr. var. petasites, 128. 
granularis Pk., 129. 
longistriatus Pk., 129. 
salicinus Fr., 129. 
Polyporaceae, 120. 
Polyporus adustus Willd., 120. 
arcularius Batsch., 120. 
berkeleyi Pers., 120. 
brunnalis Pers., 120. 
cinnabarinus Jacq., 120. 
coruscans Fries., 120. 
cristatus Pers., 120. 
frondosus Dickson, 120. 
fumosus Pers., 120. 
gilvus Schw., 120. 
heteroclitus Fr., 120. 
hispidus Bull., 120. 
perplexus Pk., 120. 
picipes Fr., 120. 
radicatus Schw., 120. 
resinosus Schrad., 120. 
sessilis Mass., 120. 
spraguei B & G., 121. 
spumens Sow., 120. 
squamosus Hudson, 121. 
sulphureus Bull., 121. 
umbellatus Pers., 121. 
veruformis Pk., 121. 
vulgaris Lloyd, 121. 
Polystictus biformis Fr., 121. 
conchifer Schw., 121. 
hirsutus Fr., 121. 
pergameneus Fr., 121. 
versicoZor Fr., 121. 
sanguineus L., 121. 
Pork, canning of, 209. 
Position, 91. 
Postulate, 72, 98. 
Power series, 253. 
INDEX 325 
Power series with positive coemcients. 
253. 
Primary proposition, 71. 
Principle, 72. 
Problem, 90. 
Proof, 72. 
Properties, 86. 
Properties of objects, 91. 
Proposition, 93. 
Protobasidiomycetes, 118. 
Prussic acid, toxicity of, 251. 
Psalliota arvensis Fr., 132. 
campestris Fr. var. vaporarius. 
micromengetha Pk., 132. 
placomyces Pk., 132. 
rodmanii Pk., 132. 
silvicola Vitt., 132. 
subrufescens Pk., 132. 
sylvatica Schaeil., 133. 
Psathvra umbonata Pk., 126. 
Psilocybe cernua Fr., 126. 
foenisecii Fr., 126. 
Zarga Kaui!., 126. 
Puil balls from Webster County, Iowa, 
133. 
Pumpkins, 219. 
Rat, resistance to Danysz bacillus in-
fection, 213. 
Reality, 73. 
Reciprocal, 82. 
Reductio ad absurdum, 108. 
Regression coefficient, 235. 
Relation, 83. 
Relations, 82. 
Russula adusta Fr., 123. 
albella Pk., 123. 
aZutacea Fr., 123. 
amygdaloides Kauf., 123. 
aurantialutea Kaui!., 123. 
aurata Fr., 123. 
borealis Kautr., 123. 
brevipes Pk., 123. 
chamalleontina Fr., 123. 
citrina Gillet., 123. 
crustosa Pk., 123. 
decolorans Fr., 123. 
delica Fr., 123. 
emetica Fr., 123. 
foetens Fr., 124. 
fragilis Fr., 124. 
integra Fr., 124. 
integra Fr. var. rubra-tincta., 124. 
Zepida Fr., 124. 
lutea Fr., 124. 
mariae Pk., 124. 
nigricans Fr., 124. 
obscura Rom., 124. 
ochracea Fr., 124. 
ochraleucoides Kautr., 124. 
ochrophylla Pk., var. albipes, 124. 
ochrophylla Pk., 124. 
olivacea Fr., 124. 
pectinatus, 124. 
326 INDEX 
pusilla Pk., 124. 
roseipes Bres., 124. 
sanguinea Fr., 124. 
sordid.a Pk., 124. 
squalid.a Pk., 124. 
tenuiceps Kauff., 124. 
uncialis Pk., 124. 
viriscens Fr., 125. 
vitellina Fr., 125. 
Salts, effect of germicidal efficiency of 
sodium hydroxide, 19. 
Sarcoscypha coccinea (Scop.), 118. 
Sarcoscypha floccosa (Schw.), 118. 
Scale, 83. 
Schizophyllum commune Fr., 122. 
Science, 74. 
Sclerodermaceae, 134. 
Scleroderma cepa Pers., 134. 
Secondary proposition, 71. 
Secotium acuminatus Mort., 134. 
Sensate, 78. 
Separation, 77. 
Shigella gallinariiim, 180. 
Sirup concentration, the effect of yeast 
spores, 31. 
Sirups, preparation of, 31, 43. 
Sodium carbonate, effect on germicidal 
efficiency of sodium hydroxide, 19. 
Sodium chloride, effect on germicidal 
efficiency of sodium hydroxide, 19. 
Sodium hydroxide, germicidal efficiency 
of, 19. 
Sodium phosphate, effect on germicidal 
efficiency of sodium hydroxide, 19. 
Space, 90. 
Sphaeriales, 118. 
Spoilage indices in canned foods, 292. 
Spoilage in home canned foods, 289. 
Squashes, 219. 
Standard deviation, 235. 
Statement, 93. 
Statistical constants, 229. 
Stereum hirsutum, Fr., 119. 
oaksii, 119. 
rubiginosum, 119. 
sericeum Schw., 119. 
spadiceum Fr., 119. 
versicolor Sw., 119. 
Streptococci causing gas in evaporated 
milk, 1. 
Streptococci distend.ens, 5. 
Strobilomyces strobilace1is Berk., 122. 
Stropharia semiglobata Fr., i26. 
Subclass, 102. 
Sufficient conditions, 98. 
Sugars, hydrolysis of, 43. 
Sugar inheritance in maize, 9. 
Sulphur stinker spoilage, 57. 
Substance, 79. 
Superclass, 102. 
Sweet corn, canning of, 201. 
Sweet corn, inheritance in, 9. 
Sweet corn, spoilage of canned, 57. 
Swiss chard, canning of, 204. 
Syllogism, 71. 
Synthetic demonstration, 108. 
Temperature, effect on viability of yeast 
spores, 31. 
Term, 93. 
Thelephora schweinitzii, Fr., 119. 
Thelephoraceae, 119. 
Theorem, 98. 
Theory, 98. 
Thermophilic spoilage bacteria, 155. 
Things, 88. 
Time, 83. 
Tomatoes, canning of, 207. 
Toxicity of hydrocyanic acid, 243. 
Trametes milicae P & C., 121. 
peckii Kalchb., 121. 
rubescens Fr., 121. 
Tremella albida, 118. 
fuciformis Berk,, 118. 
intumescens Eng-Bot., 118. 
Zutescens Pers., 118. 
Tremellaceae, 118. 
Tricholoma album Schae:tf., 131. 
brevipes Fr., 131. 
cinerascens Fr., 131. 
grave Pk., 131. 
melaleucum Fr., 131. 
nobile Pk., 131. 
personatum Fr., 131. 
se;unctum Fr., 131. 
terreum Fr., 131. 
terreum Fr. var. fragans, 131. 
transmutans Pk., 131. 
Unit, 71, 78. 
Vitamin A, 145. 
Volvaria bombycina Fr., 128. 
gloicephala Fr., 128. 
hypopithys Fr., 128. 
speciosa Fr., 128. 
umbonata Pk., 128. 
Webster Counay, Iowa, fieshy fungi 
from, 117. 
Xylaria polymorpha Grev., 118. 
Xylariaceae, 118. 
Yeast spores, viability of, 51. 
Zero class, 102. 
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and am surrounded by existences, bodies, or natural objects, which cause 
these sensations. 
I can control my body by what I call the exercise of will, and can 
change my position so that I become surrounded by different objects; but 
I cannot so control surrounding objects. 
I can communicate my ideas to certain bodies which resemble my 
own, by means of language; and these bodies can communicate ideas to 
me. These ideas, I find, closely resemble mine, and I conclude that the 
bodies contain egos like myself. Such egos call themselves human beings, 
or persons. 
I also find that the sensations received by other persons closely re-
semble mine, and I presume that the same existences which cause my sen-
sations also cause theirs. We call these existences, taken as a whole, The 
World, or Nature. 
We call any group of sensations, with the associated ideas, an experi-
ence, or fact. We are :tb'le to remember our experiences, i. e., we have the 
faculty of reconstructing in the mind our ideas of experiences; and we call 
these memories, taken as a whole, Experience. We cannot reconstruct sen-
sations voluntarily, as we do ideas. 
When we receive impressions, we add to them certain ideas derived 
from experience; we obtain a perception of objects from a group of sensa-
tions, by adding separation, place, time, and other ideas. The added ideas 
react upon and quicken our sensations. 
We consider that those objects which produce any particular sensa-
tion have some characteristic or property in common, which underlies or 
causes this sensation. Thus we say that chalk, snow and sugar possess the 
property of whiteness; and, for want of separate words, we say that they 
cause the sensation of whiteness, and that this sensation causes the idea of 
whiteness. 
In recalling the idea of a property, the mind forms the picture of an 
object which possesses the property in question, but which is extremely 
indefinite in other respects ; such a picture is called an abstract idea. We 
employ abstract ideas in constructing new ideas, i. e. ideas which are not 
memories of experiences. This creation of ideas is called Thought. 
2. Knowledge. Though we cannot control objects as we do our own 
bodies, we can use our bodies to change the positions, shapes, etc. of ob-
jects ; in other wiords, we can "do things", or "take action". Many di-
verse actions are necessary to sustain the bodily existence which we call life. 
We often wish to know the consequences of an action without actually 
experiencing them. Now it is found that these consequences do not depend 
upon the time and place of the action, or on the person who performs it, 
but only upon the action itself, and the objects upon which it is exerted; 
hence, if we do not know them from our own experience, we may learn 
them from the experience of others. 
Knowledge of this experience is so useful that it has been collected in 
books. The amount of this printed knowledge is now so great that it must 
be arranged in an extremely methodical and compact form to facilitate 
reference; Logic and Mathematics play an important part in this arrange-
ment. 
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3. Categorical Logic. We can separate in our thoughts objects 
which possess a given property, from those which do not possess it. These 
objects are said to form a class, or category; thus we have the class of 
white objects, the class of living beings. A:ll objects which do not possess 
the given property constitute the cornplementary class. 
We can separate all objects in a given class, into a sub-class containing 
all objects of that class which possess a second property, and the comple-
mentary sub-class containing all objects of the class which do not possess 
this second property. Thus we can separate the class of living beings into 
plants and animals. 
Similarly many ideas have properties, and can be separated into 
classes and sub-classes. 
A unit is one object, or one idea. 
A primary or categorical proposition is a statement that some units of 
a certain class are contained in another class; ("some" denotes one or more, 
perhaps all). An example hi "The earth is a planet"; "The earth" and 
"a planet" are the terms; "The earth" is the •sitbject; and "is a planet" 
is the predicate. 
The Universe is the class which contains every unit. 
In certain cases, the truth of a categorical proposition ;may be in 
doubt; in such cases, we can test its truth by means of certain principles 
and processes which are derived from common sense. The discussion of 
these principles and processes constitutes Categorical Logic. 
The chief principle is Aristotle's Principle of Contradiction (his 
Dictum de omni et nullo), viz. "It is impossible for anything to possess a 
property, and also not to possess it." It follows that no unit can belong to 
a class, and also to the complrmentary class. 
The chief process is the syllogism. A syllogism consists of three 
propositions, such that the third is necessarily true if the first two are true. 
An example is : ''The earth is a planet; all planets move; therefore the 
earth moves.'' Here ''The earth is a planet'' is the major premise (or 
premiss), ''all planets move'' is the minor premise, and ''the earth 
moves'' is the conc!usion. 
One method -0f showing that a categorical proposition is true is to 
exhibit it as the conclusion of a syllogism whose premises are true ; other 
methods will be pointed out later. 
4. Hypothetical Logic. A conditional proposition is one which may be 
true ( i. e. in accordance with observation or conception) at one time and 
place, and false at another time and place; an example is "The sun is 
eclipsed". At a given time and place, such a proposition must be either 
true or false. 
A secondary, or hypothetical, proposition is a statement that the truth 
of one conditional proposition is always associated with the truth of an-
other; such a proposition is also called an implication. An example is: "If 
the sun is totally eclipsed, the stars appear". The first proposition, the 
truth of which is presumed (the sun is totally eclipsed), is called the 
*Sometimes, the subject is considered to be that which the grammatical sub-
ject denotes; and the predicate, the state or action which the grammatical predi-
cate denotes. 
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hypothesis; the proposition whooe truth is implied (the stars appear) is 
called the conclusion. 
Hypothetical, or conditional, logic investigates the truth or falsity of 
implications, by means of principles and processes which are derived from 
common sense, and which are analogous to those of categorical logic. Thus 
the Principle of the Excluded Middle (or, Excluded Third) is "It is im-
possible for a conditional proposition to be true, and, at the sa,me time and 
place, to be false". An example of a hypothetical syllogism in scholastic 
logic is: "If the sun is totally eclipsed, the stars appear; but the sun is 
totally eclipsed; therefore the stars appear". In Mathematics, a different 
kind of hypothetical syllogism is regularly used, illustrated by: "If the 
sun is totally eclipsed, the stars appear; if the stars appear, the earth re-
ceives some light; therefore if the sun is totally eclipsed, the earth receives 
some light''. In each case, the first two propositions are the premises, and 
the third is the concLusion. 
The discussion of hypothetical logic is continued in section VI. 
5. Logical Reasoning. In common sense reasoning, we often en-
counter opinions and ideas which are contradictory. We can remove 
most, if not all, of these contradictions, by securing agreement on the 
meaning of terms and on the truth of propositions. For this purpose 
terms are defined, and propositions are demonstrated. 
A definition of a word or phrase is a sta~ent of its whole meaning; 
this statement must consist of words or phrases which have already been 
defined, or are assumed to be generally understood. Since the succession 
of definitions cannot be unending, there must be undefined terms. These 
terms represent fundamental ideas, such as ''existence'', ''separation'' ; 
and all we can do toward explaining them is to give synonyms, and ex-
amples of their use. 
A definition can always be put in the for;m of a categorical proposition 
whose subject is the term to be defined; e. g. "Common sense is that judg-
ment in regard to first principles in which all men, in general, agree.'' 
When a definition is thus expressed, the converse of the proposition is true; 
e. g. "That judgment in regard to first principles in which all men, in 
general, agree, is common sense.'' Thus a definition may be regarded as 
two postulates (see below). 
In its simplest form, a demonstration, or proof, of a proposition is a 
syllogism whose conclusion is that proposition, and whose premises are 
either demonstrated propositions, or unproved propositions whose truth 
is asserted. But a demonstration is usually a succession of such syllogisms, 
the proposition to be pre>ved being the final conclusion. The propositions in 
a demonstration may be categorical propositions, in which case the dem-
onstration is essentially a definition; but they are usually implications. 
Since the succession <>f syllogisms cannot be unending, there must be 
unproved propositions; these are called postulates. A postulate is called 
an axiom if it is a part of common knowledge, e. g. "The halves of equal 
things are equal''; it is called a law, or principle if it is derived from ex-
periment and logical reasoning. 
A different kind of demonstration, called reditctio ad absurdum, will 
be described in section VI. 
When a branch of knowledge is entirely demonstrated from postu-
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lat.es, any contradictions which occur 1must arise from the postulates. If 
the postulates lead to a contradiction, they are said to be inconsistent; and 
they must be changed so that no contradiction arises, i. e. they must be 
made consistent. 
To illustrate the removal of an inconsistency by ,logical reasoning, 
consider the question ''What will happen if an irresistible force meets an 
immova:ble object?" An inconsistent answer is that the immovable object 
will be moved. The logical answer is that an irresistible force is one which 
no object can withstand; therefore if an irresistible force exists, an im-
mova'ble obj.ect is impossible. 
It will be seen that logical reasoning improves common sense by re-
moving inconsistencies, but that it is itself founded upon common sense, 
and therefore has no greater validity than that part of common sense 
which is free from inconsistencies. 
6. Philosophy. Philosophy may be described as the effort to extend 
and improve common sense by logical reasoning. 
Common sense is always growing; we learn by experience. A new 
idea is at first shadowy; the only tests of its soundness are personal opin-
ion, and the absence of contradictions with other ideas. It takes definite 
shape and gains general acceptance, i. e. inclusion in common sense, only 
after much discussion and thought. 
It is natural, then, that philosophers should differ among themselves. 
There are two main divisions of philosophers: the realists, who assert that 
external objects really exist, and that differences in sense impressions are 
due to real differences in dbjects; and the idealists, who assert that sensa-
tions and ideas are the only e.xi:stences. 
It seems strange, howi.ever, that reality should be emphasized. A phil-
osopher is concerned with logical descriptions and explanations of phe-
nomena; and their actual existence is merely a postulate which is irrelevant 
to these explanations. The difference between the two schools is wider 
than this. The realist spends much of his thought upon external objects; 
he meets with great difficulties, and his writings are often obscure. The 
idealist endeavors to explain aH that he is conscious of, without any refer-
ence to external objects; he is generally more successful, or at least more 
intelligible, than the realist. But philosophy is constantly progressing, 
hence a criticism jlilay not be permanent. 
The following •extracts present some idealistic opinions which are, 
or may soon become, common sense ideas : 
''An individua:l is not characterized by any sameness in the thing-in-
itself, but by the sameness in, or permanency of, a certain group of sense 
impressions; this is the basis of our identification". 
"Whenever a sequence of perceptions D, E, F, G is invariably pre-
ceded by the perception C, . . . . C is said to be a caiuse of D, E, F, G, 
which are then described as its effects. No phenomenon or stage in a 
sequence has only one cause, all antecedent stages are successive causes, 
and as Science has no reason to infer a first cause, the succession of causes 
must be carried back to the limit of existing knowledge,'' 
''Space is an order or mode of perceiving objects, but it has no exist-
ence if the objects are withdrawn,'' 
•Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Sc.fence. 
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''The space of our perceptions is finite, and varies from individual to 
individual with the range and complexity of his perceptions. .As it is just 
large enough for the perception of phenomena, so it is just small enough, 
by which we are to understand that it is not 'infinitely divisible'. The 
limit to its divisibility is the limit to our power of perceiving things apart. 
. . . . We may possibly conceive smaller divisions, but in doing this we have 
passed from . . . . the space of perception to the space of geometry." 
''We are not compelled to postulate a space outside self for phenomena, 
and spaces inside for memory thought and the psychical processes, but 
rather we must hold that the mode in which we perceive in these different 
fields is essentially the same, and that this 1mode is what we call space." 
''As space is one mode in which the perceptive faculty distinguishes 
external objects, so time is a second mode, . . . . As space marks the 
coexistence of perceptions at an instant of time, so time marks the succes-
sion of perceptions at a position of space.'' 
''When I can no longer carry back the sequence of phen<¥fiena, there 
time ceases for me because I no longer require it to distinguish an order 
of events." 
7. Science. Science is knowledge reduced to system. Scientists col-
lect and classify facts, which are discovered by observation and experi-
ment. They then endeavor to find postulates, or hypotheses, from which 
these facts can be logically deduced. They draw further inferences from 
these hypotheses, and test them by additional experiments. If these infer-
ences are verified in each of a large number of cases, the hypotheses are 
said to be established. An established hypothesis is called a principle, or 
natural law. 
Their object in this procedure is to secure economy of effort; the laws 
can be memorized, and the methods of drawing inferences can be learned. 
Knowledge in this form is more convenient than a large collection of iso-
lated facts. 
Some branches of knowledge have only reached the preliminary stage 
of collecting and classifying facts ; these are called descriptive sciences. 
The branches of knowledge in which principles hav·e been discovered from 
which many facts are inferred, are called exact or precise sciences. The 
sciences are always growing, hence no classification o.f them can be per-
manent. 
Scientists are always trying to discover more fundamental laws, i. e. 
laws frQJn which a greater number of facts can be deduced. Their ideal 
is a system of natural laws which will enable them to forecast the course 
of any possible experience. 
Science improves common knowledge by making it conform to natural 
laws. A reputed fact which is contrary to a natural law is rejected, unless 
it is attested and verified by competent observers, in which case the law is 
modified. 
Natural laws are a part of common sense, hence .Science is entitled to 
general acceptance; but Science has precisely the same ''certainty'' as 
common knowledge which is in accord with observation. 
8. Mathematics. There are differences of opinion as to the defini-
tion of Mathematics. It is custqmary to state that it is the science which 
treats of number and form; and that it is divided into Pure Mathematics, 
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which considers only number and form, and Applied or Mixed Mathe-
matics, which considers these in connection with other properties, such as 
mass and motion. 
According to what may be called the scientific view, Math~atics con-
sists of those sciences and parts of sciences in which all results are dem-
onstrated from principles. 
According to mathematical logicians, Mathematics is the demonstration 
of implications out of given postulates. This view is emphasized in Ber-
trand Russell's dictum: "Math~atics is the subject in which we never 
know what we are talking about, nor whether what we say is true.'' 
Each of these views is reflected in various branches of Mathematics. 
In Arithmetic we have a treatment of number, usually without demonstra-
tions; in Applied Mathematics, emphasis is placed upon facts and formu-
lae; postulational methods are chiefly used in topics where serious logical 
difficulties have appeared. 
A characteristic of Mathe.matics is the use of signs, or symbols, to de-
note words and operations. The pmpose of these signs is to present the 
subject more simply and clearly; but at first they have the opposite effect, 
and a great deal of time and effort is expended in learning to use them 
readily. 
Mathematical logicians are continually trying to detect and remove 
illogical elements in reasoning; to discover new methods of demonstration; 
and to extend the scope of known demonstrations by enlarging or other-
wise changing the meaning of the terms, in such a way that the demonstra-
tions will remain logically true. Pure mathematicians are chiefly con-
cerned with the discovery and demonstration of properties of numbers 
and geometric forms. Applied mathematicians are continually extending 
the applications of Pure Mathematics to other branches of Science. 
9. Mathematical Logic. The reasoning which is based upon conven-
tional logic enables us to r~ove most of the contradictions which arise 
in common sense reasoning; but it fails to remove the various differences 
of opinion which we have noticed, and there are certain contradictions 
which it does not explain: e. g. "Hephaestus the Cretan said 'All Cretans 
are liars' "; (from which we conclude that "All Cretans are liars" is 
true, and also false ; see §41) . 
These contradictions and differences of opinion arise from uncertainty 
as to the meaning of terms, and from postulates upon which there is no 
general agreement. Thus the principles of logic are expressed by means 
of terµns which are not explained, e. g. separation, class, things, time; con-
sequently there is a lack of complete agreement as to the meaning of these 
terms and the principles themselves. 
Various systems of Mathematical Logic secure a greater degree of 
agreement by revising the foundations of conventional logic. Now there is 
an instinctive reasoning which underlies conventional logic, and appears to 
be the sa.me for all human beings; there are certain fundamental ideas 
which we all possess, and thne is the principle that there must be n-0 in-
consistencies. Our purpose is to explain this instinctive reasoning, and to 
use it as the basis of a system of Mathematical Logic. 
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II. MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY 
10. Method. In this section and the next, we examine certain ideas 
which are usually regarded as fundamental. It is found that many of 
these ideas can be explained in terms of the rest, by means of definitions 
and postulates. Informal descriptions of the remaining fundamental ideas 
are given. Since all of the ideas discussed enter into the structure of 
language, these descriptions frequently employ ideas which are explained 
later. 
This examination is not merely a description of instinctive reasoning, 
for the latter, though reliable in familiar situations, repeatedly leads to in-
consistencies in abstract statements. It is a description of instinctive 
reasoning from which all observed inconsistencies have been removed; 
hence it is a species of Philosophy. Since its purpose is to improve the 
foundations of Mathematics, we call it Mathematical Philosophy. 
The examination is incomplete, for it is restricted to ideas (and exist-
ences) which enter into Logic, and not all of these are examined. More-
over to be complete it must reduce the number of fundamental ideas to 
the smallest possible number, and be entirely free from inconsistencies. 
There is no means of proving completeness in these respects. 
In the present section, certain ideas (and existences) are discussed 
which are usually neither defined nor explained. The treatment of these 
ideas which is adopted in this monograph is explained as precisely as 
possible. In the following section, many ideas are defined of which im-
perfect explanations are usually given. 
11. Some Fundamental Ideas. There are certain ideas which appear 
to be possessed instinctively by everybody. The following remarks do not 
explain these ideas, but they may help the reader to recognize them; i. e. 
to discover, in each case, which of these ideas is denoted by a certain word 
or phrase. 
Let us begin with the statement "I am". I possess a certain state or 
condition which I call consciousness, and a certain mental faculty which I 
call attention. I can direct attention to myself, or elsewhere. When I 
direct it to myself, I say "I am". 
''I'' is the subject of this sentence; it is a word which denotes an 
existence. It indicates a particular kind of existence, a person, but here 
we attend to the general idea. 
''am'' is the verb; it is a word which indicates that an act of atten-
tion is now followed by a perception. Its form, or inflection, indicates 
first person, singular number and present tense; these may be disregarded 
here, since separation, person, number and time are discussed later. 
If I direct my attention elsewhere, I may become conscious of some.. 
thing, or not. In the former case I say "something is there", in the latter, 
"nothing is ther.e". But in the former case my thought would better be 
represented by "I am conscious of something there, and perhaps I can be-
come more fully conscious of it''; and in the latter case by ''I a,in not con-
scious of anything there, and it is useless to continue the act of attention". 
In the sentence "something is there", "something" is the subject; it 
represents an idea, or existence : ''is'' is the verb; for comment, see ''am''; 
"there" is a word which indicates the direction or place of the act of at-
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ten ti on, and therefore limits (modifies) ''is'' ; direction and place are dis.-
cussed later. 
In the sentence "nothing is there'', "nothing" is the subject; it is a 
word which is used when some act of attention has failed; it does not 
represent an existence. 
We proceed to develop these remarks into postulates. In the first two 
postulates, "subject" and "predicate" have the meaning stated in the 
footnote to §3. 
I. An existence is the most comprehensive ( i. e. least restricted) sub-
ject. (Every grammatical subject, except nothing and its synonyms, de-
notes an existence.) 
An illdicates singular number, but for the present thls limitation is 
disregarded. Synonyms for "an existence" are anything, something. 
II. Exists is the ,most comprehensive predicate. 
The inflection indicates singular number and present tense, but here 
the number and tense are disregarded. Synonyms for "exists" are is, 
is in existence. 
III. An existence exists. 
IV. Nothing does not exist. 
The sentence "nothing is there" appears to be a contradiction of IV, 
but it does not denote an inconsistency; see section IV. 
Consciousness usually involves sensations and perceptions; synonyms 
are immediate knowledge, awareness. 
Attention is directed consciousness; synonyms are regard, particular 
notice. 
Whatever we are conscious of, exists; but it is neither affirmed nor de-
nied that whatever no one is conscious of, does not exist. 
"An existence," "consciousness", "attention", are fundamental ex-
istences. (See §§35, 36.) 
12. Separation and Connection. Separation is usually performed 
instinctively; to direct our attention to it, let us consider some examples: 
Perception of separation; I attribute sensations to something which 
is not myself; I p.erceive that ''that which causes sensations'' is separate 
from myself. Concept of separation; I regard "me" and "not me" as 
separate. Act of separation; I can separate an orange into slices. Faculty 
of separation; I can change an indefinite perception into a perception of 
objects. This separation is usually influenced by experience; when I see 
a shelf of books, I infer from experience that the books are separate ob-
jects. Absence of separation; occasionally, in strange surroundings, I feel 
bewildered through failing to recognize individual objects. 
Connection is the contrary of separation. 
Let us consider the postulate ''A separation changes an existence into 
several (i. e. separate) existences". This postulate has no meaning unless 
we can distinguish between "an existence" and "several existences". To 
make this distinction we admit the following fundamental existences : 
External separation; i. e. separation from other existences. 
External connection; i. e. connection with other existences. 
Internal separation; i. e. separation into other existences. 
Internal connection; i. e. no separation into other existences. 
We postulate that these existences are distinct. 
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We also coll!sider particular kinds of existences. "Being" and 
''entity'' are usually regarded as synonyms for existence; here we assign 
special meanings to them. 
Def. 1. A being is externally separated (E.g. a cloud). 
Def. 2. An entity is internally connected. (E.g. a mountain.) 
We could also introduce terms to denote ''an existence which is exter-
nally connected" and "an existence which is internally separated"; but 
we do not require precisely these ideas; part and class, which are discussed 
later, are modifications of them. 
Existence is simply that which exists. It does not involve the idea of 
separation. It may be separated into other existences, or not; it may be 
connected with other existences, or not. Internally, a being may be either 
separated or connected; externally, an entity may be either separated or 
connected. 
Now external separation will not enable us to distinguish between "a 
being", and " several beings"; a being which is internally separated is 
several beings. The distinction cannot be made unless the being is inter-
nally connected. Similarly internal connection will not enable us to dis-
tinguish between "an entity", and "entities"; the distinction cannot be 
made unless the entities are externally separated. Hence the only cases of 
the proposed postulate which have both meaning and utility are: 
V. Internal separation changes an entity into several beings. 
VI. External connection changes several beings into an entity. 
Def. 3. A unit is an existence which is internally connected, and ex-
ternally separated. 
Thus a unit is both a being and an entity. 
When particular attention is paid to a being or an entity, it is fre-
quently converted into a unit. Thus if I try to estimate the height of a 
mountain, I usually think of it as separated from the rest of the earth 
by a conceptual surface. 
Va. Internal separation changes a unit into several units. 
VIa. External connection changes several units into a unit. 
13. Percepts, Sensates and Concepts. We distinguish whatever we 
are conscious of, into sensations and conceptions. We distinguish sensa-
tions according to the organs through which they are sensed, and we dis-
tinguish conceptions into ideas of sensations, and ideas created by thought 
(see §1). Perceptions are sensations to which remembered ideas are 
added. 
Now perceptions, sensations and conceptions involve time and other 
ideas, hence we cannot regard them as fundamental. We therefore intro-
duce percepts, sensates and concepts. 
A percept is perceived. It differs from a perception in that it does 
not involve the idea of time; if an orange is perceived yesterday and today, 
there are two perceptions, but only one percept. A perception cannot exist 
apart from sense organs and mental faculties; but it is neither denied nor 
affirmed that a percept cannot exist apart from them. A percept is re-
membered. 
A sensate is "sensed" (i.e. known by an impression on a sense organ). 
It differs fr.om a sensation in that it does not involve the idea of time. It 
differs from a percept in that no ideas derived from experience or mental 
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faculties (except distinction from other sensates, and absence of distinc-
tion into sensates) are added. It is neither affirmed nor denied that a sen-
sate cannot exist apart from &ense impressions. A sensate is remembered. 
Thus "redness" is a sensate, and no assertion is made about it except 
that it is sensed and remembered, that it is not resolved into sensates, and 
that it is distinguished from all other sensates, e. g. whiteness, sound, 
weight. 
vVe shall use "concept" to denote the .idea (mental picture) of a per-
cept, sensate, or mental faculty; and "conception" to denote any other 
mental picture, e. g. an atom, a fairy. A concept satisfies all the definitions 
and postulates of ithe original existence, except that it is conceived; the 
statement of the definitions and postulates for particular concepts will 
therefore be omitted. 
VII. Whatever I am conscious of, is a sensate, or a concept, or a com-
bination of these. 
VIII. A unit is a percept or a concept. 
A perception always involves a sensation, and usually involves differ-
ent sensations; hence we shall say that: 
IX. A percept possesse5 a sensate, and may possess distinct sensates. 
For example, I can see the shape and color of a book, and I can feel 
its weight; so I say that the book possesses the scnsates form, color a~d 
weight. 
14. Distinction. If several beings possessed an internally connected 
sensate, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the beings would be in-
ternally connected; and if an entity possessed externally separated sen-
sates, it would seem that the entity must be internally separated. Thus if 
a ball is white and round, and if whiteness is externally separated from 
roundness, it would seem that the ball must be several beings. 
We avoid this difficulty by postulating that sensates and concepts of 
sensates are distinguished, and not separated. Thus we have the funda-
mental existences external distinction and indistinction, and internal dis-
tinction and indistinction. 
Def. An essence is externally distinguished. 
Def. A substance is internally indistinguished ( i. e. unresolved). 
Post. Internal distincti.on changes a substance into distinct essences. 
Post. External indistinction changes distinct essences into a substance. 
However, substances and essences, as here defined, are logical abstrac-
tions; practically, we iffiay identify an essence and a substance with a 
monad. Moreover, the distinction of sensates depends upon acuteness of 
perception, and is seldom reversed. 
Def. 4. A monad is externally distinguished, and internally unre-
solved. 
X. Internal distinction changes a monad into distinct monads. 
XI. External indistinction changes distinct monads into a monad. 
XII. A sensate is a monad. 
A monad is not a unit, but it can be converted into (regarded as) a 
unit by being thought of as ~xternally separated and internally connected. 
Separation is closely associated with the faculties of perceiving space 
and time. Distinction is closely associated with immediate sense impres-
sions. 
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41 15. General Classes. It is not easy to frame a definition from which 
all the statements made about classes can be demonstrated. 
First, a class contains. This implies that it is an existence which is 
internally separated. The existences which it contains are externally sepa-
rated, hence they are beings. The class may be 
(A) externally separated, or ( B) externally connected; 
a contained being may be 
( C) internally separa.ted, or (D) internally connected. 
Secondly, we know whether beings are, or are not, contained in a 
class. If the class is perceived, this knowledge is obtained from sensates; 
the sensates must be possessed by the beings, or the class, or both. If the 
class is conceived, the knowledge is obtained from concepts of sensates. 
Thirdly, it is supposed that a class can be distinguished from a being 
which it contains. This distinction can only be made by means of sensates 
(or concepts of sensa;tes), and the percepts (.or concepts) (A), ( B), 
(C), (D). 
Fourthly, there are classes which contain classes. 
Now suppose that a class is not externally separated; then it is the 
Universe. Each of the a:bove requirements is satisfied, except that there 
is no class of classes. 
Next suppose that a class is externally separated, and that every con-
tained being is internally connected. Then the class is a being, and the 
contained beings are units. Each of the above requirements is satisfied, 
except the fourth; there is a contradiction between ''a class contains only 
units", and "a class contains classes". 
Finally, suppose that a class i's externally separated, and that some 
contained being is not internally connected. Then this being, like the 
class, is externally separated and internally separated. There is no defini-
tion or postulate which provides a distinction between the class and the 
contained being; if they po~sess the ,same sensates, there is no means what-
ever of distinguishing them. "Clas.s" and "contained being" are alterna-
tive terms. This conception of class is associated with fallacies which arise 
from the supposition that the class can be di1stinguished from such a con-
tained being. 
We can introduce a po&tulate to exclude the possibility that a class 
;may contain a being which possesses exactly the same sensates as the class 
itself. A cla;ss which is defined by the following postulates fulfills each 
of the above requirements : 
(I) A class is a being, or several (i. e. separated) beings. 
(II) There is a means of knowing (i.e. a criterion) whether any par-
ticular being is, or is not, a being of the class. 
(III) This criterion i1s a sensate (or sensates) possessed by the beings 
of the class, or the class, or both. 
(IV) The criterion is not identical with all the sensates possessed 
by a being of the class. 
Def. A being which is a being of the class is contained in the class. A 
being which is not a being of the class is not contained in the class. 
However, there are ·other requirements; e. g. 
(R) If A contains B an.dB contains C, then A contains C. 
(R) implicitly contains the first four requirements, from which (I), 
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. . . . , (IV) were derived. Evidently, (R) cannot be demonstrated from 
(I), . . . , (IV); to prove that A contains C we require that A can be 
distinguished from C, and from every being contained in C. 
If we replace (III) and (IV) by 
(III') This criterion is a sensa,te (or sensates) possessed by each of 
the beings of the class, 
(IV') The criterion distinrguishes the class from every being except 
itself, 
we can prove (R), the dEµnonstration being similar to that of §45. 
Now (I), (II), (III), (IV) do not provide an adequate definition of a 
class, because we cannot demonstrate (R) from them. Also (I), (II), 
(III'), (IV') define only a restricted type of class; for (III') excludes 
numbers, which satisfy (R). 
In conclusion, we have derived a comprehensive definition of a class 
from the statement "A contains B", where A and Bare distinct; we s·hall 
call an exi·stence which satisfies this definition a general class. We reject 
the case in which A is the same as B because inconsistencies may creep in if 
there are distinct terms, not defined to be equivalent, to denote the same 
existence. We have not found a definition, from which (R) can be dem-
onstrated, which includes all general classes for which (R) is true. 
16. Classes. We shall define a class by the following postulates: 
XIII. A class is several ( i. e. separated) units. 
XIV. There is a means of knowing (i. e. a criterion) whether any 
particular unit is, or is not, a unit of the class. 
''Two'' is a class, for it is several (viz. two) units, and the criterion 
is simply that we perceive, or imagine, the units. The ocean is not a class 
of drops of water, 'Since the drops are not separated. The winning tickets 
in a lottery do not form a class before the "draw" takes place, because 
there is no means of knowing that they are winning tickets. A class is 
usually a number of things, and the criterion is usually a property, or sev-
eral properties. 
This definition does not exclude the possibility of a class of classes. 
To see this, consider the cl81Sses "all white cats", and "all white cats with 
blue eyes". The fatter class satisfies the criterion "white cat", but since 
it is not a unit we make no assertion as to whether it is contained in the 
former cl81SS, or not. A class cannot be identical with a contained unit; 
for the class is not a unit. 
Def. 5. A unit of a class is contained in the class. A unit which is 
not a unit of a class is not contained in the class. 
A unit, with a criterion, can enter into processes which involve classes, 
as if it were a class. Such a unit is called a unit class; it is defined by XIII 
and XIV, except that "several units" is replaced by "a unit". The cri-
terion of a unit class should not be identical with all the sensates possessed 
by the unit, for the class would then be identical with its unit. 
Def. 6. The class which contains every unit is called the universal 
class. 
This is the only class which is not externally separated. 
'.j 
Def. 7. A set is a class in which the criterion is simply that the units 
are perceived (or conceived). 
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17. Class-units. . 
Def. 8. A class-unit is a unit which is derived from a class by concep-
tually connecting its units. 
A unit class is a class-unit. 
Def. 9. A class-concept is a class-unit which is conceived; a class-
percept is a class-unit which is perceived. 
Thus from "a collection of diff.erent books" we derive the class-unit 
a library; this is a class-concept if it is conceived, a class-percept if it is 
perceived. Unless it is a unit class, a class-unit is a construct ( §24), not 
an individual; thus a library is not a book. . 
The na.me of a claiss is frequently identical with that of the correspond-
ing class-unit; e. g. in "a hundred is ten tens", "hundred" denotes a 
class; but in "a thousand is ten hundreds", "hundreds" denotes class-
units. , 
*18. Relations. 
Def. 10. A relation is some mode of existence, and some kind of sepa-
ration or distinction: "(Something) exists, in some manner, separated (or 
distinguished), in some manner, from (something)". E. g. "is near", 
"occurs before". 
A description of the manner in which existences are separated or dis-
tinct, indicates certain ways in which they are connected or indistin-
guished; thus "occum before" relates one event to other events. 
"a is related to b" may be denoted by "aRb ". The relation R indi-
cates certain properties or conditions ( §23) of a and b. If a or b does not 
possess these properties or conditions, aRb involves an inconsistency. 
''Is the same as'' i1s r.egarded as a relation. It is called the identical 
relation. 
Def. 11. A relation is reciprocal (or rnutual) provided that, if 
aRb is true, rthen bRa is also true. E. g. "is a neighbor of." 
The statement bRa must be true for every a and b for which aRb is 
true. Thus ''is a brother of'' is not a reciprocal relation. 
Def. 12. A relation R is transitive provided that if aRb and bRc are 
true, then aRc is true. E. g. "occurs after". 
R is intransitive provided that if aRb and bRc are true, then aRc 
is not true. E.g. "is the father of". 
If, in aRb, we do not wish to express b, we may replace the verb of the 
relation by "possesses", or "has'', and the mode of separation, together 
with b, by a relative state. Thus "a occurs before b" may be replaced by "a 
possesses priority". However, b is sometimes expressed with relative states, 
e. g. "a has priority over b ". If we do not wish to express a we may, in some 
cases, change '"exists" into "has" and replace the mode of separation, to-
gether with a, by a relative being. Thus "a is a brother of b" may be 
replaced by "b has a brother". But a is sometimes expressed wi,th rela-
tive beings, e.g. "Jane has a brother, John". Relative states and relative 
beings aTe not relations in the sense defined above. 
19. Intervals. We distinguish sensates into sights, sounds, flavors, 
etc. We further distinguish sights inrto distances and colors; sounds, into 
noises and notes. 
Now we perceiv·e certain similarities in colors. We distinguish them 
into red, yellow, blue, etc., and we perceive greater similarities between 
'1 
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various yellows than between red and yellow. Thus we distinguish inter-
vals between colors, and we can distinguish betwoeen a large interval and a 
small interval. To some extent, we can also distinguish equal intervals; 
e. g. that the interval between orange and yellow is about equal to that 
between yellow and a certain shade of green. 
It is therefore possible to select certain standard colors, and to relate 
any other color to them by noting its intervals from them; this device helps 
us to remember unusual colors. Moreover, people can agree upon a set of 
standard colors which will be the same for all; and it becomes possible to 
describe any color so that any normal person can recognize it. A standard 
color is a "monad", since it is distinguished from other colors and from 
all other sensates, and is not resolved into colors; hence a standard color can 
be regarded as a unit, and a set of standard colors can be regarded as a 
class. 
What has been stated of colors also applies to other sensates. 
XV. An interval is a distinction, or a separation. 
Def. 15. A scale is a set (or class) of similar sensates, to which other 
similar sensates are related by means of intervals. 
Def. 16. The relation of a sensate to a scale is ("is" and) the set of 
intervals between the sensate and the standard sensates; or a sufficient 
number of these intervals to determine the rest. 
A large interval is one whfoh can be distinguished easily; a small 
interval is one which is distinguished with difficulty; equal intervals are 
those which are distirrguished with equal difficulty. These terms iim.ply a 
reference to the method of estimating or measuring the intervals. We can 
assert that two intervals are 0xactly equal only when the equality is a con-
sequence of definitions or postulaJtes. 
XVI. Let (AB) denote the interval between the sensates A and B. 
Then if (AB) and (BC) are both small, (AC) is small, or moderate. Also 
if (AB) is small and (BC) is large, (AC) is moderate, or large. 
III. MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY (Continued) 
20. Change and Time. We can hardly imagine a state of affairs from 
which change (alteration, traru;ition) is enrtirely absent. Life is impoo-
sible without physical changes, and thought is impossible without changes 
in ideas. , 'I "'1.J1 !~ ~~ 
We can think of changes of number, form, position, etc., but not of 
change itself. We try to represent all kinds of change by motion, which is 
change of position. A chamgo is something which enables us to distinguish 
a perception from a percept. 
Although we experience so much change in ourselves, our prevailing 
perception is persistence, which is the absence of change. Our vital changes 
are, normally, almost unnoticed; most objects appear at rest. Hence the 
the totality of our perceptions may be d€Scribed as persistences, separated 
by occasional chang.es. We try to represent persistence by rest, which is 
the absence of motion. 
We recognize a siiccession in our perceptions of rest and motion ; rest, 
then certain mortions, then rest, then other motions, and so on. The power 
of the mind to recognize this succession is called the time faculty. Our 
memories retain, to a considerable extent, not only our perceptions, but also 
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their order; thus the tiime faculty also operates in memory. Objects which 
appear in the same perception are said to appear at the same time. Objects 
persist, i. e. they appear in a succession of perceptions, but the successive 
perceptions may differ in ce:rtain respects. 
Life processes, such ais acts of attention, sleeping and waking, provide 
us with a succession of changes and persistences to which our perceptions 
are related ; ithis succession may be called personal time. A successfon of 
many changes and persistences is a long time; of few, a short time. The 
perceptions of an object can be Telated to personal time, by noting that they 
last for a long time, or a short time; or that they occur at the same time, 
as a meal, etc. 
When people compare experiences, they often find that their personal 
times disagree. Hence, instead of these, they use a sucC€8Sion of changes 
and persistences which is the same for all, such as days, months and years ; 
for times sho:rter than a day, they use hours, minutes and seconds (which 
are derived from the daily motion of the sun). This successioo forms a 
natural time, to which all perceptions can be related. 
Def. 15. Personal time is a succession of changes and persistences 
to which the perceptions and ideas of a person are related. 
Def. 16. Natural time is a succession of changes and persistences 
chosen by general agreement, to which all perceptions and ideas can be 
related. 
Thus time is a scale. 
Def. 17. Each change and persistence in time is called an instant. 
(See remarks following Def. 24.) 
XVII. An instant is a unit. 
That instant (or moment) which is perceived is present time, or now. 
Remembered time is personal past tiii:ne; the concept of time derived from 
historical records is historical past time. Anticipated time is future time. 
Only present time is perceived; past and future time are conceived. 
Any instant A of past time is said to have occurred before the present 
instant B, and B is said to occur after A; A and B are said to occur at 
different ti.mes. l£ A occurs before C and C before B, C is said to occur 
between A and B. The successive instants which occur between A and B 
are called the period from A to B. There are successive periods during 
which similar sequences of perceptions occur; e. g. days and years; by 
studying one such period we can foretell, to some extent, the course of 
events during a recurrence of that period. 
Change, and succession, are fundamental existences. 
21. Number. When I examine a unit, e. g. an orange, I can fix my 
attention on the facts that it is externally separated and internally con-
nected, and abstract (i.e. ignore) its other properties. 
Def. 18. One is a unit from which everything is abstracted except 
that it is separated externally, and connected internally. 
Def. 19. A number is one, or several ones. 
Numbers have names, and are denoted by symbols, called numerals; 
the names of certain numbers, with the corresponding Arabic numerals, 
are as follows : 
One is denoted by 1. 
Two is one, and one more; it is denoted by 2. 
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Each of the numbers three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, is one 
more than the preceding; they are denoted, respectively, by 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 9. 
We can recognize certain numbers with a single act of perception. 
Unless they are arranged in some special manner, we cannot recognize 
numbers beyond six, or seven, in this way; to recognize nine, we say or 
think, six and one make sew:n, and seven and one make eight, eight and 
one make nine. Hence, as a rule, the idea of succession enters into the 
recognition of particular numbers; but this idea does not enter into the 
perception of numbers. 
In the succession 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . a number which is written before 
another is less than the other: and one which is written after it is greater. 
This sequence of numbers can be continued indefinitely. Numbers greater 
than nine are denoted by combinations of the Arabic numerals. Thus 
Ten is nine and one more; it is denoted by 10. 
Eleven is ten and one more; it is denoted by 11. 
The numbers of this sequence are definite numbers. 
There are also indefinite numbers. Few means less than, and many 
means greater than, some unmentioned number. Fewer means less than, 
and more means greater than some specified number. When applied to num-
bers, some means "one or more"; several (in this monograph) means "two 
or more"; all means every one of a class; the rest means the units not sub-
tracted, or not previously mentioned; most means ''some, iffiOre than the 
rest", or "the greatest of three or more numbers". 
''Two ,men'' is an example of a concrete number. Here the process of 
abstraotion has not been carried so far as "two". 
A more cQmprehensive definition of "one" can be given: "One is a 
being, or an entity, from which eviery sensate is abstracted except that it 
can be distinguished from other existences". Hence we obtain more com-
prehensive definitions of 2, 3, . . . ; thus w.e can speak of "two classes", 
"two mountains". This extension requir·es us to verify that the number 
can be distinguished from an existence which it contains, or in which it is 
contained; e.g. we should not speak of "two twos", if the "twos" are "two 
twos"; see §15. The extension is seldom required. If the term "a num-
ber of classes" is used, "several classes" or "a number of class-units" win 
uually express the intended m{)3.ning more correctly. In the proposition 
"two twos make four", the "twos" are class-units. 
22. Correspondence. 
Def. 20. A correspondence is a reciprocal relation between units of 
one class, and units of another class. 
Def. 21. A one to one correspondence is a correspondence in which 
one and only one unit of one class corresponds to one and only one unit of 
another class. 
Def. 22. If a unit A and another unit B are in one to one correspond-
ence, A and B are said to form a couple (or pair). 
XVIII. If the classes A, B, and also B, C, are in one to one corre-
spondence, then A, C are in one to one correspondence. 
XIX. If A, B and B, C are couples, then A, C is a couple. 
Def. 23. A number-unit is a unit which is obtained from a number 
by conceptually connecting its units. 
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Thus from ''two'' we obtain a pair or dyad; from ''three'' we obtain a 
triad. A number-unit is a cfass-unit. The conceptual connection is simi-
l'ar to that of the letters of a printed word (see end of §33). As a rule, 
a number and the number-unit derived frQill irt aire denoted by the same 
term; the words "two", "three", etc., and the symbols 2, 3, . . . are 
used to denote number-unirts, as well as numbers. 
Def. 24. If we can show how to assign a one to one correspondence 
between the units of a class and the number-units denoted by 1, 2, 3, . . . 
(or these symbols themselves), the class is denumerable; otherwise it is 
non-denumerable. 
We can show that a class is denumerable by describing a process by 
which some unit is paired with 1, some other unit with 2, . . . no unit 
of the class remaining unpaired. If an instant is defined to be a second, or 
the time of an event, or the part of a second which precedes or follows or 
lies between two events, the class of instants in a day will be denumerable; 
for the instants, as they occur, can be paired with 1, 2, 3, . . . 
The unit paired with 1 is called the first, that paired with 2 is the 
second, that paired with 3 is the third, and so on. First, second, third, etc., 
ar.e called ordinal numbers. The process of assigning ordinal numbers to 
the units of a class is called ordering the class. If the process terminates, 
the class is finite,· otherwise it is infinite. 
Def. 25. Two numbers are equal if there is a one to one correspond-
ence between their units. 
Def. 26. A definite class is a class to which no unit is added, and from 
which no unit is removed. 
If a unit is added to, or removed from, a definite class, that definite 
class is destroyed and a new one is created. 
XX. A definite class is finite. 
The letters of the word ''group'' form a definite class; they can be 
paired with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 as in the figure. The succession, or 
g r o u p sequence, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . has the property that if it termi-
1 2 3 4 5 nates the last symbol denotes the number of symbols; thus 
since 5 is the last symbol used in ordering g-r-o-u-p, there 
are five symbols, and consequently (Def. 25) five letters. 
If we assume that the ordinal nUIIllbem of any two units can be inter-
changed, we can prove that the number of units in any definite class is 
the ·same, no matter how the units are ordered. The process of discovering 
the number of units in a definite class is called counting the class. 
23. Properties and Conditions. Our instinctive knowledge of the 
properties and conditions of percepts is rather intricate. 
Def. 27. An instantaneous percept is a percept which is perceived 
only for an instant. E. g. a flash of lightning; a collision. · 
Def. 28. A persistent percept is a percept which is perceived at (or 
during) several instants. 
A persistent percept is usually a thing ( §25), or a class of things. 
Def. 29. The sensates of an instantaneous percept are called its 
properties. Likewise those sensates of a persistent percept which can be 
sensed whenever the percept is perceived, are called its properties. 
"Can be sensed" means "is sensed if the attention is properly di-
rected". It means rather more than "exists", and rather less than "is 
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sensed". It is considered that a property can be sensed by every person 
with normal senses; i. e. eve1-y property is natural (Def. 48), not merely 
personal. 
Def. 30. A sensate of a persistent percept which can be sensed during 
at least one instant, and which cannot be sensed during at least one other 
instant, is called a condition of the percept. 
Usually, a condition is natural; but some conditions are not natural, 
being sensed by a limited number of persons. Thus a total eclipse of the 
sun is perceived by some persons with normal sight, but not by others; 
hence, if ''total eclipse'' is regarded as a condition of the sun, it is not a 
natural, burt; a personal condition. 
Extensions or modifications of Defs. 29, 30 are given in §§ 24, 28. 
Def. 31. A percept is said to possess properties; a persistent percept 
is said to be in (or possess) conditions. 
Def. 32. A.n essential property of a percept is one which enters into 
its definition or postulates. 
Def. 33. If a persistent percept loses an essential property ( i. e. if the 
property can no longer be perceived), the percept is destroyed (ceases to 
exist). If it gains or loses a property which is not essential, it is changed 
( irnproved, or dama.ged). 
Def. 34. A percept in which certain properties are perceived and 
others ignored (abstracted), is an abstraction. 
Thus "a red object", "a human being", are abstractions. 
Def. 35. A percept from which no sensate is abstracted is concrete. 
E. g. this orange; that man. 
XXI. In a concrete persistent percept it is possible to sense new 
sensates (i.e. sensates which have not previously been sensed). 
Def. 36. A percept is said to be equal, or equivalent, to another, if 
every property possessed by either of them is also possessed by the other. 
Def. 37. The statement that two persistent percepts are the same, or 
identical, means that a persistent percept perceived at one instant, and a 
persistent percept perceived at another instant, are one persistent percept. 
In this connection, ''one'' and ''two'' sometimes have the extended 
meaning described at the end of §21. 
It is difficult to define "fact" and "event". We do not assert that 
the two following postulates include the whole meaning of these terms. 
XXII. The perception or conception that a percept possesses a pro-
perty, or that a persistent percept sometimes possesses a condition, is a 
fact. E. g. "a diamond is hard"; "the lightning was brilliant"; "a mon-
key eats nuts". 
XXIII. The perception or conception of ''a persistent percept dur-
ing the continuance of a condition of the percept", or of "a persistent per-
cept during its creation or destruction" is an event. E. g. "the sun was 
eclipsed"; "the death of Socrates". 
The concepts of persistent percepts, properties, conditions, are called 
persistent concepts, conceived properties, conceived conditions, respectively. 
24. Individuals, Constructs and Parts. 
Def. 38. An individual is a unit percept which possesses the property 
of being connected internally, and also the property of being separated ex-
ternally. E. g. "myself ". 
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Def. 39. A construct is a unit percept which is merely conceived to be 
connected internally, and which possesses the property of being separated 
externally. E. g. "a (printed) word". 
Def. 40. A part is a unit percept which is merely conceived to be 
separated externally; and which either possesses the property of being 
connected internally, or is conceived to be connected internally. E. g. a 
mountain, a syllable. 
If an individual is separated into parts, these parts will no longer be 
the individual. But if one of the parts possesses all the essential properties 
of the original, it is considered to be the orginal. E . g. if a slice is cut from 
a loaf of bread, we consider the part which remains to be the loaf. The 
individual is considered to be destroyed if none of the parts possesses all 
the essential properties. 
If a construct (e. g. a watch) is separated into parts, the parts (col-
lectively) are usually considered to be the construct in a changed condi-
tion. If the parts are put together so that they appear to be as they were, 
the same construct is obtained. If new parts are added, or if any parts are 
removed, tlli3 new conetruct is cOillsidered to be the original if it retains all 
the essential properties of the original and does not acquire new essential 
properties; but if there is any change in essential properties, it is regarded 
as a new construct. 
A part is always part of an individual or construct. It seldom pos-
sesses all the essential properties of the original, for in such cases it is 
usually identified with the original. If a part is actually separated ( i. e. 
if irts external separation becomes perceived), it is still regarded as a part, 
if its properties enab1e us to reconstruct the concept of the original. 
In some cases, if a part possesoos a property or condition it is consid-
ered that the entire unit possesses it; thus if a knife has a sharp edge, we 
say that the knife is sharp. In orther cases, a property or coodition of a 
part is nort regarded as a property or condition of the whole. Thus if one 
blade of my penknife is sharp, and the orther blunt, I do not say that the 
penknife is sharp, but that one blade is sharp. In such cases, we suppose 
the unit to be separated into parrts such that the properties are possessed, 
or not possessed, by each of them. 
The word "part" is sometimes used with a meaning which is differ-
ent from that described above. We shall use the word "member" to indi-
cate rthis other meaning. 
Def. 41. A member is a percept which is externally distinguished, 
and which either possesses the property of being connected internally, or is 
conceived to be connected internally. E. g. A man's head ; a horse's mane; 
an angle of a triangle. 
25. Things. It might be supposed that a "thing" can be distin-
guished from a ''percept'' by means of properties or conditions. To show 
that this is not the case, let us consider two examples. 
When I see a rainbow, I "sense" that it has a certain form, and vari-
ous colors ranging from red outside, to violet inside. The sensates ''a 
certain form", "red", violet", etc., are distinguished in the sensate "rain-
bow"; the percept "rainbow" may include the ideas that the form is arch-
like, that the colors are due to the refraction of light in passing through 
raindrops, and that I have seen similar rainbows. There is one percept 
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"r~inbo~" ;. it ·may-persist for a considerable time, and it is recognized 
by its sensates. The rainbow is not "a thing". 
At intervals of about 76 years, Halley's comet can be seen, on cleair 
nights, during several months. It is recognized by it.s period, its retrograde 
path amOIIlgst the stars, and its yellowish tail, which attains a length of 
over 90 degrees. The motion amongst the stars, and the fol'jIIl and color of 
the tail, are sensatffi which are distinguiBhed in the sensate " Halley's 
comet"; the percept "Halley's comet" includes the idea that it moves in 
an elliptical orbit. Halley's comet is "a thing". 
A thing differs from a sensate or percept in this respect; we do not 
say what happens to sensates or percepts when they are not perceived; 
but we make assertions about things when they are not perceived. 
XXIV. A thing is a unit persistent percept. 
XXV. A thing illlay appear more than once, and at each recurrence it 
is r ecognized by its sensates. 
XXVI. If a thing existed at any instant, it is asserted that it now 
exists, and that it has existed at every intermediate instant; unless its 
destruction has been observed, or is presumed for some reason other than 
non-perception. 
It is from things that we instinctively derive our ideas of distance and 
position. Thence we derive the idea that a thing has a definite position 
at any instant during its existence. We are then led to the assertion that 
certain existences, previously regarded as nothing more than persistent 
percepts ( e. g. comets), are things. 
To explain the meaning of distance on the basis of instinctive reason-
ing, we require some postulate (XXVI) which distinguishes things from 
persistent percepts and does not involve the idea of distance. Whatever 
is asserted to be a thing, must satisfy <this postulate. All that the arguµient 
requires is that there should be some postulate which serves this purpose; 
perhaps a more suitable one could be devised. 
That a thing is a unit is not necessarily an essential property, for its 
unity may be merely a concept. 
26. Distance. Distance is an interval between sensates; but it is 
something more definite than this. If I perceive an unknown phenomenon 
at a certain distance, and place my hand upon it, I expect to experience 
the sensation of touch. A child, seeing a beam of light in a dusty room, is 
surprised because it cannot feel the beam. If no distance is perceptible be-
tween two things, we say that they "touch", or "are in contact"; we do 
not necessarily imagine that they feel each other, but we imagine that a 
person could feel both of them, at the same time. 
XXVII. Distance is an interval between things, or between exist-
ences which are conceived to be things. 
XXVIII. If there is no distance between a person and a thing, the 
person can feel the thing. 
XXIX. If there is no distance between two things, .and if a person 
can reach them, he can feel both of them at the same time. 
Having now explained the meaning of distance, we can use distance 
to explain the meaning of space. 
Since there is no postulate which restricts the meaning of "exist-
ences'', or "feel" (except that "to feel" is "to sense by touch"), the 
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above postulates give no assistance in demonstrations relating to distances. 
The postulates for "distance" and "thing" which give assistance in dem-
onstrations, involve the idea of position. We therefore introduce two defi-
nitions which have logical significance. 
Def. 42. Distance is an interval which is consistent with the defini-
tions and postulates of §27. · 
Def. 43. Objects are unit percepts (or concepts) which can be related 
by means of distances. 
XXX. A thing is an object. 
Def. 44. Two objects are said to be in contact when there is no dis-
tance between them. 
27. Space. I perceive that many things have the property that the 
distance between any two of them remains the same; e. g. the ground, 
houses, roads, mountains, etc. I say that these things are at rest, and that 
they form a class. At any instant, I can observe the distances of any thing 
not in the class, from things in the claJSS. If these distances remain the 
same, I say that the thing is at rest; if they are changing, I say that it is 
in motion. I call this class of perceived things, possibly including all the 
things at rest, a place. I also form a concept of this place. 
When I move away, I observe other things which maintain invariable 
distances. I say that these form a class of things at rest, and that this new 
class of perceived things is a place. 
I remember the former place, and some intermediate things and dis-
tances. Usually, these intenmediate distances remain the same, and I imag-
ine a conceptual place which contains the concepts of the separate places 
and the intermediate things and distances. Whenever I move to a different 
place, I extend my conceptual place to include the concepts of the sepa-
rate places and distances between. This conceptual place, together with 
the place which I now perceive, may be called personal space. 
When people compar·e experiences, they usually find that their per-
sonal spaces disagree. The lack of agreement arises from differing estimates 
of distances, and from the circumstance that different people have visited 
different places. Hence distances are measured, and places are described; 
and the measurements and descriptions are printed in atlases, guide-books, 
etc.. Thus a space is obtained wihich is the same for all; this may be called 
natural space. 
We can observe the distances between the parts of a thing; with the 
help of these distances, we derive the abstractions size and form. On ac-
count of the size of things, there is an indefinitene,ss in measurements of 
distances between them; hence, in measurement, things are replaced by 
points, lines, etc. These objects are discussed in works on geometry. 
Def. 45. Personal Space is a class of objects perceived or conceived 
by a person, which maintain unchanging distances, and to which all other 
objects perceived or conceived by the person are related by means of dis-
tances. 
Def. 46. Natural Space is a class of objects selected by general agree-
ment, which maintain unchanging distances, and to which all other objects 
can be related by means of distances. 
Hence space is a scale ( §19). 
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Def. 47. The position of an object is a relative state (§18) which 
is derived from a sufficient number of distances, from the object to ob-
jects of the space, to determine all such distances. 
XXXI. At least three distances are required to determine the posi-
tion of an object. 
XXXII. An object has a position in space at each instant at which 
it exists. 
XXXIII. An object cannot have different positions at the same in-
stant. 
l£ I press against a thing, I may move it, or change its form; but I 
cannot place my hand in the same position as the thing. Hence I con-
clude that 
XXXIV. Two things cannot have the same position at the same in-
stant . 
. 28. Properties and Conditions of Objects. l£ I take an object to dif-
ferent places, I do not, as a rule, perceive any change in its sensates; but 
the following instances show that such changes may occur. 
(1) The times of oscillation of the same pendulum are different at 
different places. 
(2) The direction of a magnetic compass changes very slowly at a 
given place, but it varies greatly at different places. 
(3) l£ the sun is eclip~ed at one place, it will at the same time be 
·visible at other places. 
Hence it is conceivable, according to Defs. 29 and 30, that a sensate 
may be a property, and also a condition; for it is possible that the sensate 
can be sensed whenever the object is perceived, in some places, but that it 
cannot be sensed, at certain ttmes, in other places. To prevent this pos-
sibility, we replace Def. 29 by : 
Def. 29a. A property of an object is a sensate which can be sensed 
whenever and wherever the object is perceived. 
If a condition of an object continues for some time, it is necessary to 
state the place in which the condition is possessed; for it may not be pos-
sessed throughout that time if the object moves away from that place. At 
a given instant, however, an object has a definite position, hence no change 
in Def. 30 is r equired. 
If we have a persistent percept or concept which is not localized (e. g. 
a cl:ass), or a sensate which does not depend upon the position of its per-
cept ( e. g. unity), we do not mention its position. Thus in such cases mi 
do not use Def. 29a. 
Some sensates depend upon the distance of the observer from the ob-
ject, the time of day or year, etc. In these cases we observe changes in a 
set of objects. T.o note properties and conditions of one object, we must 
compare observations made with "the same conditions ' '; i. e. with the same 
relations of the object to the other objects upon which the sen.sates depend. 
29. 'Persons. I can perceive and form conceptions of time and space 
without reference to the experience of other people; but I modify my time 
and space to make them agree with the time and space adopted by other 
people. This procedure can be reconciled with the opinion that my knowl-
edge is entirely derived through my sensaites and ,mental faculties, because 
my sensates and mental faculties, aind other people, have not been defined. 
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It is only necessary to assert certain postulates about persons ( i. e. people). 
XXXV. A person is a thing which moves itself, and other things, 
as I do. Usually, it can speak and write. 
XXXVI. Its actions, including speech and writing, convey ideas 
to me. 
Its form, and many other properties and conditions, are similar to 
mine. The ideas which it conveys to me are similar to mine, or are such 
as I can form. These similarities lead me to assert that 
XXXVII. It has consciousness, sensations, mental faculties, and 
thoughts similar to mine; and its actions, including speech and writing, 
are expressions of its thoughts. 
Its reactions lead me to assert that 
XXXVIII. My actions, including speech and writing, convey my 
ideas to it. 
XXXIX. The percepts which we all perceive ( i. e. other persons and 
myself) are identical; e. g. there is one sun, which gives light and warmth 
to all of us. This requires that we identify certain fundamental existences, 
e. g. separation, succession, distinction, intervals. 
XL. We modify our personal spaces and times, so that they ·agree, 
and then assert that there is one space, and one time. 
Def. 48. To indicate that an existence is said to be the same for all 
normal persons, we call it a natural existence. 
Def. 49. The totality of all· natural existences is called Nature (or 
"the external world"). 
Now "a person" is consistent with my description of "a percept". 
When I say that my sensate of redness, for example, is the same as that of 
some other person, I do not contradict any former statement; I simply add 
a new postulate. Since these postulates introduce no inconsistencies, they 
are admissible ( §39). 
IV. LOGICAL REASONING 
30. Method. In their development, philosophy and logic are inter-
mingled. The philosopher accepts certain statements as true, being 
guided by logical reasoning. The logician applies tests to decide whether 
statements are true or false. These tests are statements, of special types, 
which in the first instance-being a part of common sense-are generally 
admitted to be true; but which are subsequently modified, as a result of 
philosophical examination. Thus, as a result of certain philosophical ideas 
being incorporated in common sense, the bases of logic are modified, and in 
consequence logical reasoning and philosophy are changed. The effort to 
eliminate all contradictions results in many changes in philosophy and logic 
alternately, these changes tending to finer distinctions in thought, and more 
explicit definitions and postulates. 
In exposition, when the changes have been effected, there is some ad-
vantage in placing philosophy before logic, because it can be expressed 
in less technical language. Thus we present philosophy in sections II and 
III, logical reasoning in the present section, and logic in the two follow-
ing sections. 
The argument of this chapter is as follows: There are two types of 
errors which arise m reasoning; viz. those which arise from confused 
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thought, and those which arise from language which expresses thought iill-
exactly. The errors ca.n be corrected by exercising greater care than in 
section I in setting do·wn the types of reasoning which are asserted to be 
correot, and in defining the processes of definition and demolliltration. 
31. Inconsistencies. An inconsistency is a confusion of thought; 
e. g. the Irishman's dream that he was walking about, naked, with his 
hands in his pockets. The following are common types of inconsistencies : 
(A) An object which is assumed to be the same at all times and 
pl:aces, a.nd for all people, is also assumed to be different at different times 
and places, or for diff erenrt people. 
(B) Objects w·hich are assumed to be different at different times and 
places, or for different people, are assumed to be the same. 
( C) A sensate which is sensed by a given person at a given time and 
place, is assumed not to be sensed by that person at that time and place. 
(D) A sensate which is not sensed by a given person at a given time 
and place, is assumed to be sensed by that person at that time and place. 
The fundamental principle of logical reasoning is: 
XLI. There must be no inconsistencies. 
32. Terms and Propositions. 
Def. 50. A term is a word or phrase (or symbol) which denotes an 
existence. 
A term is itself an existence, and in certain cases there are terms 
which denote terms. It is assumed that a term can be distinguished from 
the existence which it denotes. 
Every noun, except "nothing" (and its synonyms), denotes an exist-
ence, and is therefore a term. However, ''nothing'' is subject to the same 
logical operations as a term, hence we agree to regard it as such. 
Def. 50a. A term is a word or phrase (or symbol) which denotes an 
existence; moreover, "nothing" (with its synonyms) is a term. 
Def. 51. A proposition is a set of terms which denotes an alleged 
fact, or event. (See XXII, XXIII.) 
Def. 52. A proposition is said to be true if it denotes a fact or event, 
false if it does not. 
Def. 53. A statement is a proposition, or several propositions. 
33. Contradictions. 
Def. 54. A contradiction is a statement which is presumed to denote 
an inconsistency. 
Def. 55. A non-contradiction is a statement which is presumed to 
denote a consistency. 
A statement of the type "A is B" is a contradiction if A and B stand 
for terms which are presumed to denote different existences, and "is" de-
notes (and is presumed to denote) "is equivalent to". Thus "a cameleop-
ard is a giraffe'' is a contradiction to a person who knows what a giraffe 
is, but believes that a cameleopa;rd is a leopard with a hump on its back. 
A staltement of this type is a non-contradiction if A and B stand for terms 
which denote (and are presumed to denote) the same existence, and ''is'' 
denotes (and is presumed to denote) "is equivalent to". 
If there were no uncertainty about the meaning of statements, every 
contradiction would denote an inconsistency, and every non-contradiction 
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would denote a consistency. But since different terms may denote the same 
existence, and since the same te:qm may denote different existences, there 
are contradictions which do not denote inconsistencies, and non-contradic-
tions which denote inconsistencies. Thus the statement "two is different 
from too", when heard, is usually a contradiction, because "two" and 
"too" are assumed to denote the same existence; but it would not denote 
an inconsistency unless it were assumed that the existences denoted by 
"two" and "too" are the same. Similarly, the stateiment "two is the same 
as too", when heard, would usually be a non-contradiction, but it would de-
note an inconsistency. 
A statement of the type "A is not A" is a non-contradiction if "lis 
not" denotes (and is presumed to denote) "is no.t equivalent to", and A 
stands for a term which denotes (and is presumed to denote) first one 
existence, and then a different existence. It is a contradiction if "is not" 
denotes (and is presumed to denote) "is not equivalent to" and if both 
A's are presumed to denote the same existence; but it does not necessarily 
denote an inconsistency, because the presumption that both A's denote the 
same existence may be false. 
A type of statement which frequently arises in Logic, is ''A is B and 
A is not B", where both A's-and both B's-are presumed to denote the 
same existence, and each ''is'' is presumed to have the same meaning. Such 
a statement is a contradio1Jion, but there are various cases in which it does 
not denote an inconsistency. First, the verb "is" may be used with, or with-
out, reference to number, time and place; "the sun is eclipsed" and "the 
sun is not .eclipsed" will be oonsistent (i. e. will denote a consistency) if 
the former "is" is unlimited, and the latter refers to "here and now". 
S econdly, a teljlll may denote either a percept or a concept; "a printed 
word is internally connected'' and ''a printed word is internally sepa-
l'l8/ted" are consistent if connected denotes a concept and separated denotes 
a percept. Thirdly, there is a distinction in thought between the concept 
of a percept, and the concept of a concept; the concept of a printed word 
is internally separated if separated denotes the concept of a percept, but 
internally connected if connected denotes the concept of a concept. 
It is necessary to restrict the choice of ter:rns in such a way that it can 
easily be recognized whether a statement denotes a consistency, or an in-
consistency. 
34. Logical Restriction. Any proposition can be supposed to re-
strict the meaning of every term contained in it; because some meanings 
of any term would be inconsistent with the proposition. Thus ''motion is 
change of position'' can be supposed to restrict the meaning of each of the 
words "motion", , "position". On the other hand, it can be 
supposed that the meaning of some of these words is determined in some 
other manner, and that the proposition merely restricts the :meaning of the 
rest. If the meanings of "is", . . . , "position" are otherwise deter-
mined, the proposition merely restricts the meaning of '\motion". 
We shall say that an existence is logically restricted if the term which 
denotes it is involved in a proposition which restricts, or partally explains, 
the meaning of thrut term. Otherwise expressed, an existence is logically 
restricted if it is restricted, i. e. partially explained, through being in-
volved in a fact or event. 
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Likewise, an existence is logically unrestricted if the term which de-
notes it is not involved in any proposition which restricts the meaning of 
that term. Or, an existence is logically unrestricted if it is not restricted 
through being involved in a fact or event. 
35. Absolutes. We have explained number, time, space, persons, etc. 
by means of existence, consciousness, separation, distinction, succession, 
sensates, concepts and mental faculties. 'rhe latter are our fundamental 
existences; we have made no statement about them which can be used in 
logic, except that they can be distinguished from one another. The list of 
fundamental existences is incomplete, for we have only "considered those 
which necessarily enter into logic. 
If the fundamental existences should differ in different persons, no 
one would be aware of the fact; for no contradiction would arise in the 
exchange of ideas. Thus if an object which gives me the sensation of red-
ness, gives another person the sensation which I would call yellow, but 
which he calls red, we will not be aware that our sensations are different. 
Again, if the fundamental ideas and memory should change alike in the 
same person, he or she would not be aware of any inconsistency. 
We assume, however, that the fundamental existences do not vary; 
for otherwise there would be inconsistencies, though undetected, in thought 
and in the exchange of ideas. We express this assumption by stating that 
the fundamental existences are absolutes. 
Def. 56. An absolute is an existence which is logically unrestricted 
except through being distinguished from all other existences; but it is 
assumed to be the same, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever it is 
sensed or conceived. 
With the progress of Science, the number of absolute sensates is con-
tinually being reduced. Geometry reduces sizes and forms to points and 
positions. Physics reduces sounds, and attempts to reduce nearly all other 
sensates, to motions of particles (or, of late, to singularities of space). 
36. Implicates and Compounds. 
Def. 57. We shall use the term implicate to denote an existence which 
( 1) is distinguished from all other existences, ( 2) is logically restricted in 
some other manner, (3) is not a combination of a!bsolutes, (4) is assUJJl.ed 
to be the same at all times and places, and for all persons. E. g. thing, 
person. 
(The followiing round-about method of expressing (2) ,may be moce 
easily understood: The term which denotes an implicate is inwlved in 
one or ;more postulates, not of the type "A is different from B", which 
restrict the implicate.) 
Def. 58. A compound is wholly composed of absolutes or implicates, 
or both. E. g. a white person. 
(The teI'lffi which denotes a compound, can be defined.) 
When facts or events are discovered which restrict absolutes, the 
latter become impliicates, or compounds. Thus we have regarded certain 
colors as absolutes; but in Physical Optics, they are compounds. 
37. Definitions. 
XLII. We can denote each absolute, and each implicate, by a dis-
tinctive term. (See Note, below.) 
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Def. 59. An undefined term is a term which denotes an absolute or 
an implicate. 
If an undefined term should be ambiguous (e. g. in the manner de-
scribed in §33), the ambiguity can be removed by an adjective or phrase 
(or pre-deter.::nined convention). Thus "separation" may denote either a 
percept or a concept; but ''perceptual separation'' denotes a single exist-
ence. Then, just as compounds are formed from absolutes and implicates, 
compound terms can be formed from undefined terms. Thus it is possible 
to denote each ·existence by one and only one term. 
The description of a compound by mealllS of undefined terms is usually 
very inconvenient, hence this description is usually replaced by a word or 
conv·enient phrase. 
Def. 60a. Let B denote a description of a compound by means of un-
defined terms, and let A denote the word or phrase which may replace B ; 
then ' ' A is equivalent to B '' is a definition of A. 
Thus we see that it is often desirable to have more than one means 
of denoting the same existence. But employing the same term to denote 
different existences leads to confusion. 
XLIII. Every term (except "nothing" and its synonyms) should 
denote one and only one existence. 
An example of Def. 60a is ''A peninsula is a piece of land almost sur-
r ounded by wiater". This type of definition applies only to compounds. 
An [mplicate is, or can be regarded as, a unit. It may be abstract, 
e. g. a person, or concrete, e. g. John Smith. An abstract implicate pos-
sesses no property or condition except those which are implied by the postu-
lates which resti,j_ct it. A concrete implicate usually possesses further 
properties ood conditions. Thus a concrete persistent percept possesses 
known properties, and new properties can always be discovered in it (see 
XXI). Hence such a percept is a concrete implicate, but the postulates 
which restrict it have not all been formulated. 
Def. 60b. The postulates which restrict an abstract implicate may be 
called a definition of the implicate. 
Def. 60c. The concrete implicates which satisfy these postulates (of 
Def. 60b) constitute a class. These postulates may likewise be called a 
definition of the class. 
Def. 60d. If we can find several classes A, B, 0, . . . such that a 
concrete implicate c is the only unit which is contained in all of them, 
"c is contained in A, B, 0, . . . " is a definition of c. 
Cor. If we can find several abstract implicates A', B', 0', 
such that a concrete implieate c is the only unit which is an example of 
each of them, '' c is an example of A', B', C', . . . '' is a definition of c. 
Thus a particular book in a library is defined in the catalogue by mea.ns 
of the name printed on each book of the ed:ition, the author's name, the 
place and year of publ1ication, etc. 
Note. Concrete :i.mplicartes are so numerous that it is impossible to 
denote each of them by a distinctive term, unless a definition is so regarded. 
This occa.Bions no difficulty in the defilllition of a compound, for a compound 
is abstract (since it has no unknown property or condition) and is there-
fore formed from absolutes and abstract implicates. 
A concrete implicate can usually be defined in various ways. To some 
extent, the same is true of abstract implicates and compounds. Two defini-
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tions are said to be equivalent if they define the same existence. (See 
Def. 64.) 
If all terms are chosen iin the way described in this article, and all 
definitions are the same (or equivalent) for everyone, every contradiction 
will denote an inconsistency, and every non-contradiction will denote n 
consistency. There may still be iinconsistencies, for our judgment in re-
gard to which existences are absolutes etc. may be at fault. 
38. Demonstrations. In §5, we stated that a demonstration is a 
syllogism, or a succession of syllogisms. It is true that a demonstration 
can always be presented in this form, but essential1y, it is a process of select-
ing and restating propositions which are asserted to be true, so as to obtain 
an assertion of the truth of a desired proposition. It is not necessarily 
expressed in syllogisms. 
The selection, or sequence, of propositions is directed by the principle 
that there must be no inconsistencies. We assert that the following propo~ 
sitions are true, and that any statement which is inconsistent with them is 
false; they aiSsist us in selecting propositions, and in restating them. 
XLIV. A percept must possess a property, or not possess it. 
XLV. A percept cannot possess a property, and also not possess it. 
XL VI. Either there is, or there is not, a percept which possesses a 
given property. 
XL VII. It is impossible that there should be, and also not be, a per-
cept which possesses a given property. 
XL VIII. At a given instant, a persistent percept must either possess 
a condition, or not possess it. 
XLIX. At a given instant, a persistent percept cannot possess a con-
dition, and also not possess it. 
L. Either there is, or there is not, a persistent percept which pos-
sesses a given condition at a given instant. 
LI. It is impossible that there should be, and also not be, a persistent 
percept which possesses a given condition at a given instant. 
In place of percept, property, condition in the above postulates, we 
may write concept, conceived property, conceived condition. If a condition 
is not natural (Def. 48), XL VIII, . . . LI must be restricted either to 
the persons who can perceive the condition, or to those who cannot per-
ceive it. 
Lil. If a sensate is possessed during any time and in any place, it is 
possessed during any part of that time, and in any part of that place. 
Lill. If a sensate is sensed, and distinguished into other sensates, 
these sensates are sensed. 
E. g. if a percept possesses a property a, and if a is resolved into a', a'', 
then it possesses the properties a', a". 
LIV. If several sensates are sensed, and if they are "indistinguished" 
into a single sensate, this sensate is sensed. 
The restating of propositions is effected by means of the following 
principles: 
LV. Any term can be replaced by a term which denotes the same 
existence. 
L VI. Any proposition can be replaced by a proposition which de-
notes the same fact or event. 
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.As an example of LV, suppose that a percept A does not possess the 
property a. Then we ·Say that A "does not possess the property a", or 
that it "possesses the property not-a". The terms in quotation marks have 
the same mea.nmg, and either of them can replace the other. Si,milarly, 
''possesses the property a'' can replace or be replaced by ''does not pos-
sess the property not-a". 
39. Postulates. Since every demonstration must begin with a pro-
position, there must be undemonstrated propositions. 
Def. 61. .A postulate is an unproved proposition which is assumed to 
be true. 
The truth of some postulates, e. g. those in Sects. II & III, and in §38, 
is asserted. Other postulates, e. g. ''Gravitation is propagated instantane-
ously", are merely assumed to be true; to assume that such a postulate is 
false is not inconsistent with our logical background . 
.An exact science ( §7) contains propositions which are demonstrated 
from logical postulates, and Natuml Laws. The logical po.stulates are the 
same for all sciences, and are asserted to be true. The Natural Laws are 
peculiar to the science, and are merely assumed to be true; they form a 
"set of postulates". 
Def. 62. .A consistent set of postulates is a set of postulates which 
does not lead to an inconsistency. 
L VII. .A set of postulates must be consistent. 
If the set is not consistent, the postulates cannot all be true; some of 
them must 'be altered, until the inconsistencies are removed. 
The postulates of a set should also be independent; i. e. no one of the,m 
should be demonstrable from the rest. Moreover, the individual postula.tes 
should not be redundant; i. e. no part of any postulate should be demon-
strable from the rest of the set. 
Def. 63. .A theory is a set of set of postulates, together with a set of 
propositions demonstrated from them. 
Def. 64. Two propositions are said to be equivalent if either of them 
can be demonstrated from the other. 
Def. 65. Two sets of postulates are said to be equivalent if each set 
can be demonstrated from the other. 
L VIII. If we have a set of true postulates, and if we can prove that 
this set and another proposition lead to an inconsistency, the proposition 
is false. 
40. Various Definitions. 
Def. 66. .A theorem is a proposition (usually an implication) which 
is to be demonstrated. 
Def. 67. .A corollary of a proposition is another proposition which 
can easily be demonstrated from it. 
Def. 68. .A lemma is a proposition which is required for the demon-
stration of some other proposition. 
Def. 69. .A problem is a proposition in which either the hypothesis 
or the conclusion is to be discovered; when a problem is solved, it can be 
stated as a theorem. 
Def. 70. Sufficient conditions, or conditions sufficient for the truth 
of a proposition, are propositions from which that proposition can be 
demonstrated. 
MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 99 
Def. 71. Necessary conditions, or conditions necessary for the truth 
of a proposition, are propositions which must all be true, if the given 
proposition is to be true; i. e. if we a~ume that any one of these proposi-
tions is false, w.e can prove that the given proposition is false. 
*41. Explanation of an Inconsistency. Let us consider the proposi-
(A) "Hephaestus the Cretan said 'All Cretans are liars' ". This propo-
sition does not introduce an inconsistency unless we associate with it the 
implied proposition (B) "Whatever a Cretan says about Cr:etans is true". 
The inconsistency is obtained in the followiing way. 
Because Hephaestus is a Cretan ( C) "AH Cretans are liars" is true; 
for it is a statement made by a Cretan, about Cretans. But since Hephaestus 
is a Cretan, ( C) includes the statement "Hephaestus is a liar"; and since 
Hephaeustus is a liar, his statement ( C) is false. Hence ( C) is both true 
and false, which is inconsistent with the principle that a statement cannot 
be true, and also false. (See §47.) 
We shall assume, as seems to be intended, that ( C) is a categorical 
proposition. Then "are" is unlimited in time, and ( C) is a:lways true, or 
always false (§47). Now the term "liars" may be interpreted in either of 
two ways. A liar may be a person who (1) lies whenever he makes a state-
ment, or (2) sometimes lies and sometimes does not lie when he makes a 
statement. 
If ( C) is false then, since this is a statement of a Cretan about Cretans, 
( B) is false. 
If ( C) is true, there is no inconsistency unless Hephaestus told a lie 
when he said ( C) ; in this cruse, a Cretan made an untrue statement about 
Cretans, that is (B) is false. 
Either there is no inconsistency, or (A) contradicts (B). In the latter 
case, we have inconsistent postulates; not a contradiction of a logical prin-
cipl·e. 
V. CATEGORICAL LOGIC 
42. Categories. 
Def. 72. A category is a number of units, each of which possesses a 
stated property, or stated properties. 
A category is a class. In the rest of this chapter we always write 
"class" with the meamng of category. 
The distinction 1between "a property" and "properties" is not essen-
tial in the definitiQIIl of a class; a property may be distinguished into 
several proper:ties, or several properties may be merged into a property. 
The definition of a sub-clruss, however, requires several properties. 
Def. 73. A unit which possesses the stated property, or stated pro-
perties, is contained in the class. 
Def. 74. A unit which does not possess the stated property, or each of 
the stated properties, is not contained in the class. 
Theorem I. Every iinit is either contained in a class, or not contained 
in the class 
For every unit must either possess the stated property, or not possess 
it (XLIV). Hence, by Defs. 73 & 74, every unit is either contained in the 
class or not oontained in the class. 
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Theorem II. A unit cannot be contained in a class, and also not con--
tained in the class. 
For a unit cannot possess a property, and also not possess it (XLV). 
Def. 75. The complement of a class is a number of units, each of 
which does not possess the stated property, or each of the stated properties. 
Theorem III. The complement of a class is a class. 
For each unit of the complement posseoos the following property: 
''The stated properties of the units of the original class cannot, each of 
them, be perceived (or conceived) in it". Thus the complement is a num-
ber of units, each of which possesses a 1s1Jated property ; that is, it is a class 
(Def 72). 
Cor. 1. Every unit is contained in a class, or in the complementary 
class. 
For every unit either possesses the stated property of the class, or it 
does not posRess it (XLIV). That is, it possesses either the stated property 
of the da,ss, or that of the complement. That is, (Def. 73), it is contained 
in the class, or in its complement. 
Cor. 2. A unit cannot be contained in a class, and also in the com-
plementary class. 
Fm a unit cannot possess the stated property of the class, and also not 
possess it (XLV). That is, ~t cannot possess the stated property of the 
class, and also that of the complement. That is, it cannot be contained in 
the class, and also in its complement (Def. 73). 
Def. 76. Two classes are said to be identical if their stated properties 
are the same. 
A unit class is identical with the unit which it contains if, and only if, 
the stated properties of the class are identical with the properties of the 
unit; hence (XXI) a unit class is not identical with a concrete persistent 
unit. 
Theorem IV. The complement of the complement is a class which is 
identical with the original class. 
For it is a number of mrits each of which possess<lS the stated pro-
perties of the original class. 
Def. 77. Two classes are said to be equivalent if they contain the same 
units. 
Two equivalent classes a.re not necessarily identical, since their stated 
properties may be different. 
In Mathematical Logic, classes are denoted by lettel'S. If a class is 
denoted by A, its complement is denoted by not-A. By Theorem IV, the 
complement of not-A is A. 
The symbol '' - '' is used to denote either identity or equivalence. 
The symbol " ( " is used to denote "is contained in", and " ) " is used 
for "contains". 
43. Categorical Propostions. 
Def. 78. A categorical proposition is a statement that some or all 
units of a class are contained in another class. 
Def. 79. A categorical proposition is true if each of the units indi-
cated possesses the stated properties of the second class. 
If the properties of the second class are properties of the first class, 
the proposition is said to be true in itself,· e. g. "All equilateral triangles 
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are isosceles". The proposition "All horses are animals" is true in itself 
if, and only if, the definition of ''horses'' includes every property stated 
in the definition of "animals". Thus it may not be evident whether a 
proposition is true in itself, or not; for a definition may be variously stated, 
and need only include sufficient properties to distinguish whatever is de-
fined from all other existences. 
Of categorical propositions which are not true in themselves, some are 
asserted to be true, e. g. certain logical postulates (see §39) ; and others 
are merely assumed to be true, e.g. "Every even positive integer is the sum 
of two pr~mes". When possible, the latter are demonstrated. 
It may be said that Def. 78 does not include such a pl'oposition as 
"Honesty is a policy". But "Honesty" is a monad (§14), since it is dia-
tinguished from other existences; it can therefore be regarded as a unit, 
and a unit is a kind of class. Likewise a policy must have some properties 
by which it is recognized as a policy, hence policies can be regarded as a 
class. Thus ''honesty'' is a unit which is contained in the unit class 
"honesty", and also in the class "policies". 
In scholastic logic, it is customary to represent units by letters, and to 
call classes, or parts of classes, terms; the terms of the proposition ''All 
horses are animals'' are ''All horses'' and ''animals''. Terms are distin-
guished into the types universal affirmative, universal negative, particular 
affirmative, particular negative; these are respectively represented by ''All 
A's'', "AH not-A's'', "Some A's", "Some not-A's". Propositions al'e 
distinguished into like-named types, each type including two varieties; 
e. g. the two varieties of universal affirmative propositions are represented 
by" All A's are B's", and" All A's are not-B's". 
Def. 80. The converse of a proposition is obtained by interchanging 
its classes. Thus the converse of ''Some A's are B's'' is ''Some B's are 
A's". 
Def. 81. The obverse of a proposition is obtained by replacing each 
class by its complement. Thus the obverse of "Some A's are B's" is 
''Some not-A's are not-B's.'' 
Def. 82. The contra-positive (or negative converse) of a proposition is 
obtained by replacing each class by the complement of the other. Thus the 
contra-positive of "Some A's are B's" is "Some not-B's are not-A's". 
The following theorems can easily be verified : 
Theorem V. Any proposition is the same a.s the converse of its co'l'lr 
verse. Likewise it is the same as the obverse of its obverse; and it is the 
same as the contra-positive of its contra-positive. 
Theorem VI. In any proposition, the contra-positive of the converse 
is the obverse. Likewi,se the contra-positive of the obverse is the converse. 
Def. 83. The contrary of a categorical proposition is obtained by re-
placing ''all'' by ''some'' (or ''some'' by ''all'') in the first term, and by 
replacing the second class by its complement. 
Thus the contrary of "All A's are B's" is "Some A's are not-B's". 
Def. 84. A categorical proposition is said to be false, if its contrary 
is true. 
Thus a universal categorical proposition is false if some ( i. e. one or 
more) units of the first class are not contained in the second class·. A par-
ticular categoricaJl proposition is fa1se if every unit of the first class is not 
contained in the second class. 
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Theorem VII. If a categorical, proposition is truet its contrary is false. 
Proof. Every categorical proposition is identical with the contrary 
of its contrary. Hence if a categorical proposition P is true, the contrary 
of the contrary of Pis true; i. e. (Def. 84) the contrary of P is false. 
44. Sub-classes. 
Def. 85. Let A represent the class whose units possess the property 
(or properties) a; B, the class whose units possess the property b; and AB 
the class whose units possess the properties a and b. Then AB fa said to 
be a sub-class of A, and also of B. 
Cor. 1. Every unit of AB is contained in A, and also in B. 
Cor. 2. If b is the same 'cUI a, AB is identical with A, and with B; thus 
every class is a sub-class of it...<:elf. 
Here an inconsistency would arise if it were· assumed that AB is dif-
ferent from A. But since A and AB are defined, the inconsistency would 
be evident. 
Def. 86. If A is a sub-class of B, B is said to be a super-class of A. 
The symb-01 " ( "is used to denote is a sub-class of, and " ) " is used 
for is a super-class of. 
Def. 87. Let A denote the class whose units possess the property a, 
and let not-B denote the class whose units posse,ss the property not-b; i. e. 
(see L V) do not possess the prop.arty b; also let A .. not-B denote the class 
W:hose units possess the properties a and not-b. Then A.not-B is a sub-class 
of A (Def. 85) ; it is called the complementary sub-class of AB with re-
spect to A. 
Ex. 1. Every unit of A is contained ,in AB, or in A.not-B. 
Ex. 2. A unit of A cannot be contained in AB, and also in A.not-B. 
Ex. 3. If A is a sub-class of B, and C is another class, AC is a sub-
class of BC. 
The app'lication of some of ,the theorems of this chapter is restricted by 
the condition that ,the classes referred to, must exist. It is usually con-
sidered desira1ble to extend the definition of a cla.ss, so that these theorems 
can always be applied. 
If a unit which possesses certain properties does not exist, we can rep-
resent the fact by the statement: ''There are no (or zero) units which pos-
sess the stated properties". Now we can regard "zero" as a number, and 
''Zero units which possess certain stated properties'' as a class. 
Def. 88. A zero class is zero (or no) units, with a stated property, 
or stated properties. 
LIX. All zero classes are equivalent. 
45. Theorem VIII. If A is a sub-class of B and B is a sub-class of 
C, then A is a sub-class of C. (See §47.) 
The demonstration of this theorem is made some-
what clearer by means of a diagram. Let the class C 
be represented by the interior of a circle C; the class @ 
B, by the interior of a circle B lying within C; and 0B C 
the class A, by the interior of a circle A lying within A 
B. Also let any unit of A be represented by a point .p 
P lying within the circle A. The theorem itself is 
represented by the statement that every point P with-
in A, lies in the interior of 0. 
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Proof. Every unit of the class C possesses some property (or pro-
perties) c. Because B is a sub-class of C, every unit of B possesses the pro-
perty c, and also some property b (Def. 85). Because A is a sub-class of 
B, every unit of A possesses the properties b and c, and also some property 
a. Thus every unit of A possesses the property c, and is therefore con-
tained in C. 
This theorem may be stated in symbols, thus: "If A ( B and B ( C, 
then A ( C. 
Cor. 1. If A ) B and B ) C, then A ) C. 
Cor. 2. If an A's are B's, and all B's are C's, then all A's are C's. 
Note. The equivalence of propositions, like that of classes, is denoted 
by'' '';thuswewriteA(B-B)A. 
Cor. 3. If A = B and B - C, then A - C. · 
For since A = B, A ( B and A ) B (Def. 77). Similarly B ( C and 
B) C. Since A (Band B ( C, therefore A ( C (Theorem VIII). Similarly 
A ) C ( Cor. 1). Thus A ( C and A ) C; therefore A _ C (Def. 77). 
The type of categorical syllogism which is most frequently used in 
mathematics, is that given in Cor. 2; this is Theorem VIII, stated in an-
other way. The various types of true categorical syllogisms which are 
listed in works on logic, can be demonstrated similarly. 
The major premise of a syllogism is sometimes called a maxim. 
46. Theorem IX. If A ) B, then not-B ) not-A. 
This relation is represented in the figure. The 
clases A and not-A are represented by the interior 
and exterior, respectively, of the larger circle; and 
the classes B and not-B, by the interior and exterior 
of the smaller circle. We observe that if the interior 
of the larger circle contains the interior of the 
smaller, the exterior of the smaller circle will con-
tain the exterior of the larger. 
Proof. If A ) B, then A contains every unit of B; hence, by Theorem 
III, Cor. 2, not-A does not contain any unit of B; i. e. every unit of not-A 
is not a unit of B. Therefore, by Theorem III Cor. l, every unit of not-A 
is a unit of not-B; that is, not-B contains every unit of not-A; that is, 
not-B ) not-A. 
Cor. 1. If not-B ) not-A, then A ) B. 
Cor. 2. A) B _ not-B ) not-A. 
Cor. 3. Every universal categorical proposition is equivalent to its 
contra-positive. 
Cor. 4. (A - B) = (not-A = not-B). 
Cor. 5. It follows from §37, that every definition can be expressed 
in the form A - B. Renee every definition is equivalent to its con-
verse, obverse and contra-positive. 
47. Demonstrations. Theorems VIII and IX de-note facts about 
classes; they are statements that if some categorical propositions are true, 
then certain other categoricaJl propositions are true. They could equally 
well be expressed in the form ''Because . . . , therefore . . . ''; 
they would then be assertions 1Jhat some categorical propositions are true, 
and that consequently certain other propositions (whose truth was doubt-
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ful) are true. This is one method of demonstrating conditional propo-
sitions. 
Another method, which is based upon Theorem XIV, requires the fol-
lowing propositions: 
Theorem X. A universal categorical proposition1must be true or false. 
Theorem XI. A universal categorical proposition cannot be true wnd 
false. 
Proof. Let the proposition be A ( B; and let the stated properties of 
the classes A and B be a, b, res~ctively. Then 
A ( B is tru.e means every unit of A is in B (Defs. 79, 73) ; and there-
fore no unit of A is in not-.B (Theorem III, Cor. 2) ; hence no unit pos-
sesses a and also not-b (Def. 72) ; which means that no unit possesses 
a.not-b. (For a and not-b, taken together, form a property; and this pro-
perty is denoted by a.not-b.) 
Similarly, A ( B is false means some unit possesses a.not-b. 
Now there is, or ther'e is not, a unit which possesses a.not-b (XLVI) , 
hence A ( B is true or false. 
And there cannot be a unit which possesses, and also does not possess, 
a.not-b (XLVII), hence A ( B cannot be true and false. 
Cor. A particular cate~orical proposition is either true or false, and 
it cannot be ·both true and fals(j. 
Let the proposition be "Some A's are B's" ( 1) 
The contrary of (1) is "All A's are not.B's" (2). 
Since (2) is a universal categorica·l proposition, it is either true or 
false, and it is not both true and false. 
Hence (Def. 84 and Theorem VII), (1) is false or true, and is not 
both false and true. 
Def. 89. A unit categorical proposition is a statement that the unit 
of a unit class possesses a stated property, or stated properties. 
The contrary of the unit proposition "The unit A is contained in B" 
is '"I'lhe unit A is contained in not-B". Each of these is a universal pro-
position, since ''The unit A'' includes every unit of the class A. 
VI. HYPOTHETICAL LOGIC 
48. Conditional Classes. 
Def. 90. A conditional class is a number of units, each of which pos-
sesses stated properties or conditions. 
There are many special cases, which cannot be treated in detaiil. We 
shall state these cases, and indicate the necessary modification of the stand-
ard treatment. If there are stated conditions, some of these may be per-
sonal, not natural. In such cases the persons who perceive the conditions 
must be indicated. Again, conditions may depend upon time, or upon 
both time and place. If they depend upon time only, ther references to 
place in the standard treatment must be omitted. In some cases, the class 
itself may be considered only throughout a limited time, or time and place. 
In the standard case, a class is considered throughout every time and place; 
to adapt it to other cases, the time, or time and place, must be indicated. 
Units which possess the stated properties or conditions may be created or 
destroyed. This fact does not affect the truth of the theorems in this 
chapter; the theorems contain the necessary assertions as to existence. 
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If only properties are stated, the conditional class is a category. If 
conditions are stated, it will be impossible to roll w'het);ler a unit is con-
tained in the class unless a time and place are mentioned, throughout which 
the unit possesses, or does not possess, the conditions. This is always pos-
sible, because at a given instant a unit either possesses or does not possess 
a stated condition (XLVIII). If the condition depends upon the place, the 
unit is an dbject and its position at a given instant is determined 
(XXXII). 
LX. A conditional class exists at every time and place. 
The category "All men'', with the restriction '"Dhis class exists only 
on the earth, during the present geological period'' is not a conditional 
class. But ' ' All men who live upon the earth during the present geological 
period'', with no restriction, is a conditional class which exists, but con-
tains no units, at times and places not included in the criterion. 
We obtain a sufficient account of conditional classes from §42, by re-
placing "category" (or "class") by "conditional class at a given time 
and place.'' 
49. Conditional Propositions. 
Def. 91. A conditional proposition is a statement that some or all 
units of a conditional class are contained in another conditional class. 
Thus ''The stars are shining'' is a statement that the units of the con-
ditional class "The stars" are now contained in the cla&s of " shining" 
units, hence it is a conditional proposition. 
If the conditional classes are categories, the proposition is a categorical 
proposition. 
A conditional proposition which is not categorical refers to a given 
time and place, or to given times and places; without such a reference, it 
has no definite meaning. 
Def. 92. A conditional proposition is true at a given time and place 
if each of the units indicated is contained in the conditonal class at that 
time and place. 
The account of categorical propositions in Sect. V applies to conditional 
propositions at a given time and place; hence we give only an abbreviated 
treatment of the latter. 
Def. 93. The contrary of a conditional proposition is obtained by 
replacing "all" by "some" (or "some" by "all") in the first term, and by 
replacing the conditional class by its complement. 
Thus the contrary of ''All men are h.appy'' is ''Some men are not 
happy". 
Def. 94. A conditional proposition is said to be false at a given time 
and place, if its contrary is true at that time and place. 
It follows from §47, that: 
Theorem XII. At a given time an.<J, place, a conditional proposition 
must be true or false. 
Theorem XIII. At a given time and place, p, con(litional proposition 
cannot be both true and false. 
Def. 95. A unit conditional proposition is a st~tement that the unit 
of a unit conditional class is contained in a given conditional class. 
Def. 96. A class of conditional propositions is a number of unit con-
ditiona:l propositions, each of which is recognized in some manner. (E. g. 
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the units of each proposition may be contained in a given category; ex-
amples occur in implications). 
50. Immediate Implications. First let us consider the statement 
(A) Wb.en the actors are performing well, the spectators are pleased. 
Since no place is mentioned, we infer that the statement refers to any 
place. It informs us that 
(B) The actors perform well at certain times, 
and that 
( 0) During any good performance, the spectators a.re pleased. 
Let us now consider the statement 
(D) If the actors are performing well, the spectators are pleased. 
This statement informs us that at times when the actors perform well 
(which times may, or may not, exist), the spectators are pleaised; it has pre-
cisely the sa.me meaning as (0). Thus (B) and (D), taken together, have 
the same meaning ais (A). 
Now (D) is an immediate implication. It can be expressed in the forms 
(E) "The actors are performing well" ~mplies "the spectators are 
pleased'', 
(F) "The spectators are pleased" is implied by "the actors are per-
forming well". 
Def. 97. An immediate implication is a statement that times and 
places at which one conditional proposition is true, are times and places at 
which some other conditional proposition is true. 
Thus an immediate implication is simply a statement that a conditional 
proposition is true throughout various times and places. The circum-
stance that these times and places are determined by the truth of some 
other conditional proposition is of secondary importance. 
By ''times and places'' we mean one or more intervals of time, at 
each instant of which one or more places are considered. Thus the times 
and places at which there are floods are the times of the floods, together 
with the areas which are flooded at each instant of these times. 
In hypothetical logic, conditional propositions are usually denoted by 
letters. Thus any immediate implication can be represented by ''If X is 
true, then Y is true" The symbol " ·) · " is used to represent irnplies, and 
" ·(-"is used for is irnplied by. Thus any immediate implication can be 
be represented by X ·) · Y, or by Y · ( · X. 
Def. 98. The i,mmediate implication X ·) · Y is true, if Y is true at the 
times and places at which Xis true. 
"X ·) · Y" is understood to mean "X ·) · Y is true", unless the con-
trary is stated. 
If there is no time and place at which X is true, then X ·) · Y. 
Def. 99. The immediate implication X ·) · Y is false, if the contrary 
of Y is true at some time and place at which X is true. 
Def. 100. An example in which the contrary of Y is true at a time 
and place at which X is true, is called an example to the contrary of 
X·)·Y. 
In the implication "If Xis true, Y is true", it may happen that" Xis 
true" includes "Y is true" ; e· g· "If a triangle is equilateral, it is 
isosceles". Such an implication may be called true in itself. 
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Def. 101. Two implications are said to be equivalent, when either of 
them can be demonstrated from the other. 
Thus X ·)· Y is equivalent to Y ·(·X; this is denoted by X ·)· Y _ 
Y·(·X. 
The processes of conversion, obversion and contra-position are the same 
for implications as for categorical propositions, except that instead of re-
placing a class by its complement, we replace a conditional proposition by 
its contrary. Theorems V & VI also apply to implications. 
51. Various Theorems on Immediate Implications. 
Theorem XIV. If X ·) · Y and X is a trrue categorical proposition, 
then Y is a true categorical proposition. 
Proof. "X is a true categorical proposition" means "X is true at 
all times and places"· "X is true at all times and places" and "X ·) · Y ", 
together, have the same meaning as "Y is true at all times and piaces"; 
i. e. they have the same meaning as "Y is a true categorical proposition". 
Theorem XV. If X ·)· Y and Y ·)· Z, then X ·)· Z. 
Proof. Let T denote the times, with the associated places, at which 
X is true. Then '' X ·) · Y'' has the same meaning as '' Y is true throughout 
T". Also "Y is true throughout T" and "Y ·)· Z" together assert that 
Z is true throughout T (see LII); i.e. X ·)· Z. 
Cor. 1. If X ·)· Y and Y ·)· Z, and if Xis a true categorical propo-
tion, then Z is a true categorical proposition. 
Cor. 2. If there are times and places at which X is true and Y is true, 
and if Y ·) · Z ,· then there are times and places at which X is true and Z is 
true. 
We now require the two f.ollowing postulates: 
LXI. The times and places T throughout which any conditional pro-
position is considered, can be separated into times and places T;, 
( i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ) such that the proposition is true throughout T 1, or 
false throughout T ;,. 
LXII. If a conditional proposition is true throughout each of the 
times and places T, ( i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ) into which T is separated, it is true 
throughout T. 
Theorem XVI. An imm ediate implication miist be true or false, and 
it cannot be both true and false. 
Let the implication be "Every unit of the conditional cl~ss A pos-
sesses the property or condition b throughout the times and places X''; and 
let Y denote the condirbional proposition ''Every unit of the conditional 
class A possesses the property ·or con di ti on b ". 
Proof. T can be separated into times and places Tt throughout which 
b is either possessed or not possessed (LXI). Throughout each Tt, Y is 
either true or false, and is not both true and false (Theorems XII & XIII) . 
If Y is false in any T "' the implication is not true ( i. e. does not satisfy 
Def. 98), and is faftse ( i. e. satisfies Def. 99). If Y is true in every Tt, it is 
true in T ( LXII ) , and the im p•lic:a ti on is true, and is not false. 
Theorem XVII. If X ·)· Y, thoo the contrary of Y -)· the contrary 
of X . 
This theorem informs us that the assertion X ·)· Y is true (which 
assertion may or may not be made) necessarily leads to the assertion that 
the contrary of Y ·) · the contrary of X is true. 
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Thus from the assertion that ( 1) if X is true, then Y is true, we are 
to prove that (2) if the contrary of Y is true, then the contrary of Xis true. 
Proof. Suppose that the implication (2) is false; i. e. (3) there is 
some time and place at which the contrary of Y is true, and Xis true. It 
follows from (3) and (1) that there is some time and place at which the 
contrary of Y is true, and Y is true, (Theorem XV, Cor. 2). This is in-
consistent with Theorem XIII. Hence the supposition ( 3) is false (L VIII). 
Hence (2) is true (Theorem XVI). 
Illustration. ''If the actors are performing well, the spectators are 
pleased; hence if s0ime of the spectators are not pleased, some of the actors 
are not performing well". 
Cor. 1. The case in which X and Y are unit conditional propositions 
has special interest. From the implication ''If the unit A possesses the 
property or condition b, then the unit C possesses the property or condition 
d" we can infer that "If C possesses not-d, then A possesses not-b ". 
E. g. ''If a given plane rectilineal figure bas 10 sides, the sum of its angles 
is 16 right angles"; hence "If the sum of rthe angles of the figure is not 16 
right angles, it does not have 10 sides". 
Cor. 2. If the contrary of Y ·)·the contrary of X, then X ·) · Y. 
Cor. 3. X ·)· Y _ the contrary of Y ·)·the contrary of X. 
52. Demonstrations. Theorems XIV, XV, XVII are statements that 
if certain implications are rtrue, then certain other implications (or cate-
gorical propositions) are true The purpose of a demonstration is usually 
to arrive at the assertion that some implication or categorical proposition 
is true. Hence rthese theorarns are commonly used in the form ''Because 
. . . , therefore . . . ". 
The advantage of demonstrating categorical propositions by means of 
implications (other than Theorems VIII & IX) is chiefly due to the fact 
that there are unproved implications whose truth is asserted. Thus in 
arithmetic we have "If unity is repeatedly subtracted from any positive 
integer, it will ultimately be reduced to zero". In elementary text-books, 
they are usually disguised. We can .make use of these asserted implica-
tions by introducing them into Theorems XIV, XV & XVII. 
A synthetic demonstration is one which proceeds from the hypotheses 
to the conclusion ( §4) ; it therefore involves syllogisms of the form "be-
cause X ·)· Y and Y ·)·Z, therefore X ·)·Z. 
An analytical demonstration is one which proceeds from the conclu-
sion to the hypotheses; henco it involves sy~logisms of the form "because 
Z · ( · Y and Y · ( · X, therefore Z · ( · X' '. This method is frequently used, 
in cases where the conclusion is known, as a means of discovering synthetic 
demonstrations. In mathematics, however, there se~s to be a tendency to 
employ "analytic" as a synonym ·of "admirable"· 
The merthod of demonstration known as reductio ad absurdum consists 
in taking the contrary of a proposition which it is desired to prove, as a 
postulate; and constructing a demonstration-in which all the hypotheses 
excepting this postulate are asserted to be true----which ends in a contra-
diction. We conclude (LVIII) that this postulate is false; hence the pro-
position must be true. The contradiction may be either a proof that the 
added postulate is false, or a proof that one of the other hypotheses is 
false. The proof of Theorem XVII is an example of this method. 
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53. Implications in General. It js d,ifficult to give a general defini-
tion of an implication Immediate implications are the simplest, and they 
are those which are ordin'arily empl~yed. There is another variety in which 
the conclusion is true, not throughout tiro.es and ,phi,ces T in which the 
hypothesis is true, but throughout .times and places u which becomes known 
when T is known; these ,may be called def erred .implications. In a third 
variety, which may be called coupled implications, ther,e is a one to one 
correspondence between the un~ts of the conditional claase.s involved in the 
hypothesis and the conclusion. Imme.dfate implications frequently, and 
def erred imp'lications usually, are coupled. W.e shall not discu$1J deferred 
implications which are no,t coupled. 
54. Coupled Implications. .An example of an implication which is 
of the first and third varieties is 
(1) "If teams are winning, their supporters are happy". 
Hence, each team has its group of supporters. Regarding (1) as of the first 
variety, we obtain by contra-position 
"If some supporters are not happy, some teams are not winning". 
But because it is of the third variety, we can also infer 
(2) "If all groups of supporters are not happy, all ieams are not 
winning''. 
In an implication which is not coupled, such a univenml inference 
cannot be drawn; e. g. from 
''If the actors are performing well, the spectators are pleased'' we 
cannot infer 
''If all of the spectators are not pleased, all of the acto:i:s are µot per-
forming well". 
It is easy to explain wihy the inference (2) can be made. In a coupled 
implication we have two classes of unit conditional propositions (Defl!. 
95 & 96). Thus 
(3) "If this team is winning, its supporters are happy" is an impli-
cation in which each conditional proposition is a unit prqposition, since a 
team and its group of supporterll are .each class-units; and (1) is an impli-
cation in which "teams are winning", "supporters are happy", are 
classes of unit conditional propositions. 
We can, in fact, call (3) a unit implication, and (1) a class of im-
plications. 
From ( 3) we infer that 
"If the :11uppor.tera are not happy, the team is .not winning". Thia is 
a unit implica.tion, and the clai;is of unit implicatiQns in which it is con-
tained is (2). 
It will be observed that (1) is a mo:r:e .effective implication than (3), 
because the more general the implication, the more probable it beeomel! 
that the conclusion depends upon the stated hypothesis, and not upqn some 
extraneous circUjlllStances. .An implication in which there is only one in-
stance of the hypothesis does not incllcate any 8'11,Ch d,ependence. 
In the coupled implication ''If A }\ai;i the condition b at times and 
places S, then Chas the condition d at times and places T", w~ can ob,tain 
a class of conditional propositions in the hypothesis, (I) by varying A, re-
quiring that the A's shall be contained in a certain category, Qr (II) by 
varying b, requiring that the b 's l!hall be referred to the same scale ( § 19), 
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or (III) by varying both A and b. With each unit proposition of the 
hypothesis is coupled a unit proposition of the conclusion; and with each 
time and place at which the former is true is coupled a time and place at 
which the latter is true. The following are examples of coupled implica-
tions which involve classes of eonditional propositions: 
''If epiployees work in a factory during the week, their wages are paid 
in the office on the following Saturday". 
"As a man grows older, he grows wiser". 
Def. 102. Let X, denote a unit conditional proposition of the class 
X, and let SH denote a space-time interval, i. e. an interval of time and a 
place, sueh that throughout this interval X • is either true or false; also let 
Y, denote a unit conditional proposition of the class Y, and T" a space-
time interval throughout whi<:h Y, is either true or false. Then the coupled 
implication X ·) · Y is defined by the following postulates: 
(I) Each proposition X, is coupled wiith a proposition Y,. 
(II) Each interval SH is coupied with an interval T•f· 
(III) J,t is stated that if X, is true in the interval S,J, Y, is true in 
the interval T'f. 
There is no criterion for the class X, except that its units must be 
conditional propositions So far as the definition is concerned, the x. may 
be chosen arbitrarily. The X, determine the Y ,, and the totality of these 
is Y. 
55. Coupled Implications (continued). 
Def. 103. A coupled implication is said to be true, if the statement 
in (III) is true. 
Def. 104. A coupled implication is said to be false, if any X, is true 
in any interva1l SH, and the corresponding Y, is false in the corresponding 
interval T 'i· 
Def. 105. A proposition X,, considered in an interval S,1, is cal.led 
an instance (or case) of X. 
Def. 106. An example in which a case of X is true and the corre-
sponding case of Y is false, is called an example to the contrary of the im-
plication. 
Suppose that X, denotes" The unit A, has the condition b, ". The con-
trary of x. is" The unit A, has the condition not- b0"; this can conveniently 
be denoted by not-X,. Thus the contrary of X, i. e. the class of proposi-
tions not-X, can be denoted by not-X. Hence the obverse of X ·)· Y wil'l 
be denoted by not-X ·) · not-Y, and its contra-positive will be denoted by 
not-Y ·) · not-X. Theorems V, VI apply to coupled implications. 
Theorem XVIII. If X ·)· Y, not-X, is coupled with not-Y •. 
Proof. X, is the contrary of not-X,, and not-X, is the contrary of 
X,, hence X, and not-X, are coupled (Def· 22). Similarly Y, and not-Y. 
are coup·led. Also x, and Y, are coupled, by hypothesis; hence not-X.1 and 
not-Y, are coupled (XIX). 
Cor. If not-X, is false throughout S,1, not-Y, is false throughout T, 1• 
Also if not-X, is true throughout S1,1, then not-Y, is either true or false 
throughout T'f. 
To prove Theorem XV a we require the two following postulates: 
LXIII. Suppose that X ·) · Y (or Y ·) · X), and that X, is considered 
during an interval or intervals S, in which X, is sometimes true and some-
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times false Then S 1, can be separated into intervals S iJ (j = 1, 2, 3, . . . ) 
such that (1) X1, is either true or false throughout each SiJ, and (2) each 
S 1,1 is coupled with an interval TH throughout which Y, is either true or 
false. The intervals T" constitute an interval or intervals T,, in which 
Y 1, is considered, and T1, corresponds to s., 
LXIV. Suppose that X ·)- Y, and that X, is considered during inter-
vals Si, S' ,, to wlhich correspond intervals T1,, T';, respectively in which Y;, 
is considered. Then if S'i is a part of s,, T';, is a part of Ti; and if T';, is 
a part of Ti, S', is a part of S1,. 
If the implications are immediate, LXIII reduces to LXI, and LXIV 
has no significance. 
To prove T:heorem XVIa we require the postuiates: 
LXV. Either (1) each uni·t A;, of the class A possesses the property 
or condition b;, -Of the scale b throughout the interval T,, or (2) some unit 
A i of the class A does not possess bi throughout T,. 
LXVI. It is impossible that (1) and (2) of LXV should both be true. 
'l'\hese are extensions of XLVIII and XLIX. 
56. Theorem XVa. If X ·)· Y and Y ·)· Z, then X ·)· Z. 
Proof. (1) Let X i denote any proposition of X. Then X ·)· Y deter-
mines Y., the proposition of Y which is coupled with X,; and Y ·)· Z 
determines z,, the proposition of Z which is coupled with Y,. The classes 
X, Y and Y, Z are in one to one correspondence. Hence X, Z are in one 
to one correspondence, and z, is coupled with X, (XVIII, XIX). Thus 
(I) of Def. 102 is satisfied. 
(2) Let X1, be true in the interval SiJ. Then X ·) · Y determines an 
interval T1,1, which is coupled with SH, in which Y, is true; and Y ·) · Z 
determines an interval u," whic'h is coupled with TiJ, in which z, is true. 
Hence U;,1 is coupled with SiJ. Thus (II) is satisfied if X, is true in SH; 
and we can assert that if X1, is true in S1," then z, is true iri U;.r 
(3) Let X1, be false in Sil· 'l'\hen X -)· Y informs us that Y, is either 
true or false in TiJ. If Y, is true in T,1, then Y ·)·Z informs us that z, is 
true in UiJ· But if Y, is false in any part of T1,1, TH can be separated into 
intervals TiJk such that (a) Yi is either true or false throughout each T,,k, 
(b) TiJk is coupled with an interval Silk throughout which Xi i•s either true 
or false, ( c) T iJk is coupled with an interval U iJk throughout which Z • is 
either true or false (LXIII). Then U,,k is coupled with S,,k (XIX). 
Moreover, by LXIV, S,1k is a part of S"; and because X1, is falBe 
in SiJ, it is false in s,,k (LXII). Thus if X, is false in SH, 
siJ can be separated into intervals s.,k throughout which x. is false, and 
to each Sifk corresponds a U,1k throughout which Z1, is either true or false. 
Therefore if X -)· Y and Y ·)· Z, X ·)· Z is a coupled implication, and 
it is true. 
Cor. 1. If X ·( · Y and Y ·(· Z, then X ·(· Z. 
Cor. 2. Let it be asserted that X ·)· Y and Y ·)· Z. Then the theorem 
can be stated "Because X ·)· Y and Y ·)· Z, therefore X ·)· Z". 
Note. If X ·)· Y, Y -)· Z are immediate implications, the intervals 
T,1, U,1 coincide with SiJ, and X ·)· Z is an immediate jpiplication. This is 
the type of inductive syllogism which is regularly used in mathematics. 
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57. Theorem XVIIa. If X ·)· Y, then not-Y ·)· not-X. 
Proof. X ·) · Y informs us that all the defining postulates of 
not-Y ·) · not-X ,are satisfied, except (III). 
If X ·) · Y, then each true case of X corresponds to a tn;i.e case of Y; 
hence a true case of X does not correspond to a false case of Y; hence a 
false case of X corresponds to each false case of Y; .hence a true case of 
not-X corresponds to each true case of not-Y. Hence ,if X ·)· Y, the state-
ment in (III) of the Def. of not-Y ·)·not-Xis true. 
Cor. 1. If not-Y ·)·not-X, then X ·)· Y. 
Cor. 2. X·)·Y _ not-Y·)·not-X. 
Cor. 3. Any coupled implication is equivalent to its ,contra-positive. 
Note. This theorem is very frequently employed in mathematics. 
E.g. "If a point lies on a curve, its coordinates satisfy the equation of the 
curve"; hence "If the coordinates of a point do not sa.tisfy the equation of 
a curve, the point does not lie on the curve". 
58. Theorem XVla. A coupled implication must be true or false, 
and it cannot be both true and f aJ,se. · 
Proof. Let the implica.tion be X ·)· Y. It is asserted that X ·) · Y is 
an implrication, hence there are propositions x, of the class X which are 
either true or fa'lse throughout intervals s,J, and propositions y, of the 
class Y, which are either true or false in intervals Tii; moreover the pro;po~ 
sitions Y, are coupled with X,, and the intervals T;,1 are coupled with S;,;. 
Let S, denote the totality of the intervals S,1 in which X, is true, T, the 
totality of the T,1 which correspond to these S,1• If X ·)· Y is true, every 
proposition Y, of the class Y is true throughout T,. This statement can 
be expressed in the for;m "Every unit A, of the class A possesses the pro-
perty or condition b, of the scale b throughout the intervals T;,". 
By LXV, either every unit A, of the class A possesses .b1 throughout 
T., in which case (Def. 103) X ·)· Y is true; or some unit A, of the class A 
does not possess b, th1•oughout T,, in which case some unil.t A, possesses 
not-b, throughout some part Tii of T, (see LXI, LXII), whence (Def. 104) 
X ·) · Y is false. Similarly it follows from LXVI that X ·) · Y cannot be 
true and false. 
Ex. Prove Theorem XVIIa by means of XVIa. 
59. Theorem XIVa. If X ·)· Y, and if X, is a true categorical pro-
position, then Y, is a frue categorical proposition. 
Proof. Suppose that Y, is false illl. the space time interval Tii, and 
let S,1 be the interval of X, which corresponds to TiJ. Since X, is a true 
categorical proposition, X, is tr11e in SH; therefore, since X ·)·Y, Y, is true 
in the interval T ;,1 (Def. 102). llence Y, is both true and false in the in-
terval T,1, which is inconsistent with Theorem XIII. Hence there is no 
interval in which Y, is false; i. e. Y, is a true categorical proposition. 
Cor. If X ·) · Y, and if X is a class of true categorica:l propositions, 
then Y is a ela:ss of true {lategorical propositions. 
A.n example of 'I'heormn XIV a is ''If a triangle is equilateral, it is 
equiangular; but ABC is an equilateral triangle, therefore ABC is equi-
angular". 'l'he syllogisms discussed in scholastic logic are usually of this 
type. 
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60. Demonstrations. As with immediate implications, the effective-
ness of coupled implications is chiefly due to the fact that there are coupled 
implications whose truth is asserted without demonstration: E. g. "If 
(any) two lines are straight and equrul, they can be made to coincide." 
Mathematical demonstrations are often presented in the informal 
manner described in §38. We may wish to express some part of such a 
demonstration in a formal manner, to make use of an inductive theorem. 
To do this it is sometimes necessary to separate the statement into several 
parts. Thus the statement ''The bisector of the vertical angle of an 
isosceles triangle bisects the base at right angles'' is equivalent to the three 
following propositions: ''There is a straight line which bisects the vertical 
angle of an isosceles triangle", "If a straight line bisects the vertical angle 
of an isosceles triangle, it bisects the base", "If ~ straight line bisects the 
vertical angle of an isosceles triangle, it is at right angles to the base". 
It is natural to enquire whether we can extend hypothetical logic by 
employing implications which inV'Olve implications (other than Theorems 
XIV, XV, XVII, which are "true in themselves"). The necessary logical 
processes can he developed, but there do not appear to be any implications 
involving implication:s whose truth is asserted without demonstration. 
Hence such a theory would not enable us to demonstrate categorical propo-
sitions or ordinary implications which could not be demonstrated without 
this theory; (for no additional hypotheses would be introduced). 
61. Analytic Logic. The fundamental principles and processes of 
categorical logic are expressed by Theorems VIII to XI of Sect. V, and 
those of inductive logic by the theorems of Sect. VI. We can assert that 
these are true, and investigate whether more comprehensive definitions of 
class, number, implication, etc. are consistent with them. We can also in-
vestigate whether other logical theorems can be demonstrated from these 
prindpfos and processes. These investigations, and the resulting theory, 
constitute one •branch of Analytic Logic. 
The discussion of analytic logic is beyond the scope of this monograph. 
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A NEW SPECIES OF HYGROPHORUS 
By L. H. PAMMEL 
From the Department of Botany, Iowa State College. 
Accepted for publication December l, 1927. 
Some years ago Mr. F. W. Paige of Webster County, Iowa, came to the 
writer to determine several species of fleshy fungi for him. Comparatively 
few could be recognized and identified. It was suggested to Mr. Paige 
that he make a thorough study of this group of plants in Webster County, 
Iowa, and by the means of vari-Ous books which had 'been suggested and by 
exchanging specimens these species could be determined. Mr. Pajge be-
came an industrious student of this group of plants. He coUected some 
four hundred species, and many of these were tested as to their edible 
qualities. The contribution immediately following gives a summary of his 
results. The collection of fungi made by Mr. Paige has been presented to 
Iowa State College, likewise his collection of flowering plants made in 
Alaska, and Webster County, Iowa. 
One of the fungi cotlected has 'been found to be a new species of 
Hygrophorus. It has been named in honor of Mr. Paige. 
Hygrophorus plJligei, n. sp. 
PILEUS 3-10 cm. broad, expanded-plane, and frequently repand and 
irregular. Egg-yellow, viscid, not at all virgate. FLESH thick, firm, 
thin on margin. Pallid. GILLS arcuate-decurrent, thick, subdistant, 
yellowish attenuate at both ends, pruinose. STEM 3-8 cm. long, sub-
equal or tapering downward, attenuated at base, often curved, rigid, 8-16 
mm. thick above, at first with an appressed, glaucous silkiness, glabrescent, 
innately fibrous and shining, solid refuscent within and without. SPORES 
narrowly ellipticlanceolate to ovate, smooth, 7-9 x 4 micr., white. ODOR 
none. TASTE mild. 
· Gregarious. On the ground among fallen leaves in frondose woods. 
October. After heavy frosts. 
Type deposited in herbarium, Department of Botany, Iowa State 
College. 
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A LIST OF FLESHY FUNGI FROM WEBSTER COUNTY, IOWA 
By F. W. PAIGE' 
From the Department of Botany, Iowa State Oollege. 
Accepted for publication December 1, 1927. 
The fleshy fungi are least known of the flora of the State of Iowa. It 
seemed to me desirable that a study should be made of this group of a 
limited area in the state. I, therefore, began a study of these plants about 
ten years ago. I have been intensely interested in the coUection and study 
of the same. 
Webster County affords unusual opportunities for the study of sapro-
phytic fungi of central Iowa. The county is intersected by the most im-
portant stream in Iowa, the Des Moines River, and numerous small creeks, 
like the North and South Lizard Creek, Prairie Creek, Deer Creek, Badger 
Creek, Brushy Creek, Holiday Creek, S6ldier Creek, Mill Creek, Skiller 
Creek, and East and West Buttrick Creek. 
The Des Moines has cut a deep valley, as have the other streapis, in 
many cases with precipitous bluffs covered with trees; in some cases with 
small, narrow, box-like canyons that end rather abruptly on the prairie or 
timbered flats. The woods at the Sanitarium hav.e been particularly valu-
alble for the collection of these fungi. There is also prairie adjacent to 
Fort Dodge, but this is generally poor for the collecting of fleshy fungi. 
The lowlands along the Des Moines consist of such trees as the Ameri-
can elm (Ulmus arnericana), cotton wood (Popultus deltoides), soft maple 
(Acer saccharinurn), boxelder (Acer negundo), black willow (Salix nigra), 
almond leaved willow (Salix amygdaloides), sandbar willow (Salix fluvia-
tilis), bfack walnut ( J uglans nigra), green ash ( Fraxinits lanceolata), and 
other types. 
The vegetation of the upland woods consists of the basswood ( Tilia 
americana), white ash (Fraxinus arnericana), butternut (Juglans cinerea), 
slippery elm (Ulrnus f.ulva), corky bark elm (Ulmus racernosa), hard maple 
(Acer nigrum), hop horn-bean (Ostrya virginiana), •blue beech or ironwood 
(Carpi nus caroliniana), moosewood (Direa palustris), Washington thorn 
or redhaw ( Crataegus punctata), choke cherry (Prunus virginiana), black 
cherry (Prilwus serotina.), wild crab (Pyrus ioensis), American plum 
(PrunilS arnericana), pin cherry (Prunus pennsylvanica), hazelnut (Cory-
lils americana) , white, rnd and bur oaks ( Quercus alba, Q. rubra, and Q. 
rnacrocarpa), shellbark hickory (Cary a ovata), and pignut hickory (Cary a 
cord if orrnis). All of these trees have a relation to the mushrooms and 
toadstools found in this area. 
In the identification of the species I have been in correspondence with 
numerous authorities on the subject, and have consulted freely the works 
in the appended list. 
In the arrang(lment of the groups I have followed the best American 
authorities on the subject, and the general outline of arrangement of 
groups is that of Engler and Gilg, Sylla:bus der Pflanzenfamilien, 7th ed., 
pp, 37-67. 
'In the preparation of this paper I am indebted to Dr. L. H. Pammel of Iowa 
State College for many suggestions and for looking over the manuscript, 
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ASCOMYCETES 
PEZIZALES 
Pezizaceae 
Aleuria aurantia (Pers.) Fuckel. Rare. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
Peziza ba<Zia Pers. Quite common. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
odorata Pk. Rare. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
Helotlaceae 
Sarcoscypha coccinea (Scop.) Sacc. Rare. Of reddish color. Fort Dodge. 
March and later. 
floccosa (Schw.) Sacc. Rare. Fort Dodge. July. 
HELVELLALES 
Helvellaceae 
H elvella crispa Fr. Rare. In woods north of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Edible. 
elastica Bull. Olson's Park, Fort Dodge. Middle June. Edible. 
lacunosa Afzel. Olson's Park, Fort Dodge. Edible. 
sulcata Afzel. Rare. Olson's Park, Fort Dodge. Middle June. 
Morchella conic.a Pers. Common. In upland woods. Gypsum Hollow. 
Fort Dodge. Latter part of May. Edible. 
esculenta Pers. Very common. On white ash. Fort Dodge. May. 
Edible. 
semilibera D . . c. Not common. Only few were found. Fort Dodge. 
May. Edible. 
HYPOCREALES 
Hypocreaceae 
Hypomyces lactifluorum Schw. Quite common on various mushrooms, 
especially on Lactarius. Woods. Fort Dodge. 
SPHAERIALES 
Xylarlaceae 
Xylaria polymorpha Grev. Common on wood, especially oak. Olson's 
Park, Fort Dodge, and Dolliver Memorial Park, Web-
ster County. 
var. On woods. Not common. Found especially on rotten logs. 
Fort Dodge. 
PROTOBASIDIOMYCETES 
Auriculariaceae 
Hirneola auriculata Berk. Not common. Only specimen found. In woods. 
North of Sanitarium. Fort Dodge. 
Tremellaceae 
Tremella albida. Rare. In woods. At Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
fuciforrnis Berk. Rare. Found in only the one place. In woods 
north of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
frondosa Fr. More or less common. In woods. 
intumescens Eng-Bot. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
lidescens Pers. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
A LIST OF FLESHY FUNGI FROM WEBSTER COUNTY, IOWA 119 
AUTOBASIDIOMYCETES 
Dacryomycetaceae 
Guepiwia spathularia Fr. Rare. In Fort Dodge. 
Thelephoraceae (None of this genus is edible.) 
Stereum hirsutum Fr. In w.oods. Fort Dodge. 
oaksii C. G. Lloyd. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
rubiginosum C. G. Lloyd. Rare. Fort Dodge. 
serice,um Schw. Rare. Fort Dodge. 
spadiceum Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Common. 
versicolor Sw. Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Thelephora schweinitzii Fr. Very cQmmon in woods. Sanitarium and 
Olson's Park, Fort Dodge. 
Oraterellus cornucopioides (L) Pers. Rare. In woods in open places. 
Fort Dodge. 
Clavariaceae 
Olavaria cinerea Bull. Not common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, 
Fort Dodge. Latter part of June. 
cristata Pers. Not common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Middle July. Edible. 
densa Pk. More or less common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, 
Fort Dodge. Latter part of June. Edible. 
formosa Pers. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Latter 
part of September. Edible. 
mucida Pers. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
pistillaris L. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Latter part 
of September. Edible. 
pyxidata Pers. Not common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, 
Fort Dodge. Midle August. Edible. 
stricta Pers. In woods. North of sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Not 
common. Edible. 
vermicularis Scop. Not common. In wood!l. North of Sanitarium, 
Fort Dodge. Middle August. Edible. 
Hydnaceae 
Hydnum coralloides Seo. Very rare. In woods. Dolliver Memorial Park, 
Webster County; also on the Muffs west of Fort Dodge 
one Inile. 
ochraceum Fr. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
pulcherrimum B & C. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. Very beau-
tiful fungus. Early August. 
repandum Linn. Ran. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
septentrionale Fr. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle Sep-
tember. 
spongiosipes Pk. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. 
lrpex lacteus F r . Common . On small dead limbs of oak, ash, basswood, 
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etc. In woods. North of .Sanitarium, Fort Dodge, and 
Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster County. 
pachydon C. G. Lloyd. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
tulipifera Schw. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Polyporaceae 
M erulius tremellosus Schrad. Common on old wet logs. Near Big Springs 
west of Des Moines River and in woods Dolliver Park, 
Webster County, in wet places. 
Fomes applanatus Pers. Common on wood such as oak, elm, Dolliver Mem-
orial Park, Webster County, Olson's Park, Fort Dodge, 
and Wildcat Cave, Webster County. 
everhartii E & G. Not common. Woods. Fort Dodge. 
fomentarius L. Common. In woods. Fort. Dodge. 
fraxinophilus Pk. Not common. Found on ash. In woods. Fort 
Dodge. 
lobatus Schw. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
pornaceus C. G. L'l.oyd. Common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Polyporus adustus Willd. Very common. Found on dead wood. In 
woods, Fort Dodge. 
arcularius Batsch. Quite coIIljIIlon. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
berkeleyi Fries. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
brumalis Pers. Not common. In woods. North of Fort Dodge. 
cinnabarinus Jacq. Very common. On cherry and oak. In woods. 
North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
coruscans Fries. Not coIIljIIlon. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
cristatus Pers. var flavo-virens. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
f rondosus Dickson. This species is not common. Large and more or 
less bushy in appearance. 
fumosus Pers. Quite common. On dead wood. Fort Dodge. 
gilvus Schw. Common. On rotten wood. Fort Dodge. 
heteroclitus Fr. Rare. North of Fort Dodge in low woods on Des 
Moines River; also in Olson's Park. On ground. The 
fungus has rhizomes w·hich are CO\T!lmonly mistaken for 
roots. 
hispidus Bull. Rare. In wood. Fort Dodge. 
perplexus Pk. Rare. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
picipes Fr. Found on old logs. Rather plentiful. In woods. North 
of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
radicatus Schw. Fairly common. Has a long stipe resembling a 
root. Fort Dodge. 
resinosus Schrad. Found in big ravine north of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Common. 
sessilis Mass. Not COIIljIIlOn. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
spumens Sow. Found only once. In woods. Fort Dodge. (This 
species was sent to Dr. Murrill for identification.) 
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spraguei B & G. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
squamosus Hudson. Not very common. In woods, Fort Dodge. 
sulphureus Bull. Common; on oak and ash. Dolliver Memorial 
Park, Webster County, and Fort Dodge. 
umbellatus Pers. Large bushy mushroom. Not common. In woods. 
North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
veriiformis Pk. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
vulgaris Lloyd. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Polystictus bif orrnis Fr. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
conchifer Schw. '.I1his is a small fungus aJbout the size of a ten cent 
piece in the shape of a shell. More or less common. 
On dead wood. In Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster 
County, and woods north of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
hirsutus Fr. On dead wood. Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster 
County. 
pergameneus Fr. This is a sma:ll fungus found in great quantities 
on dead logs. Of more or less purplish color. Fort 
Dodge. 
versicolor Fr. This is the most cqmm-0n of the group. On dead 
wood. Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster County. 
sanguineus L. Not common. On dead wood. Fort Dodge. 
Trametes milicola P & C. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
peckii Kalchb. (synonym for 1'. hispida). More or less common. 
Fort Dodge. 
rubescens Fr. Common. In woods on different species of trees. 
Fort Dodge. 
Daedalea confragosa Bolton. Very plentiful. On live trees. Gypsum Hol-
low, Fort Dodge, and Dolliver Memorial Park, Web-
ster County. On willows especially. 
unicolor Bull. Common on stumps. Sanitarium north of Fort Dodge. 
Favolus canadensis K1otzsch. Cwnmon. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Lenzites betulina Fr. Not common. In Gypsum Hollow, Fort Dodge. 
vialis Pk. Quite plentiful. On rotten stumps. Gypsum Hollow and 
at Fort Dodg.e. 
Boletinus porosus Berk. More or less common. In woods north of Sani-
tarium, Fort Dodge. 
Boletus affinis Pk. Not common. Woods. Fort Dodge. August. Edible. 
badiceps Pk. Not common. Found in Snell's woods, Fort Dodge. 
castane'Us Bull. One of the sman species of Boletus. Not common. 
In woods. Fort Dodge. Late June. Edible. 
clintonianus Pk. Not common. In woods. North of Fort Dodge. 
Edible. 
edulis Bull. Common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge, in deep ravine. One of the large species. Late 
August. Edible. 
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edulis Bull. var. clavipes. Quite common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Early July. Edible. 
glabellus Pk. Small. In W1oods. Fort Dodge. Early September. 
luridus Sciliaeff. Not common. Woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. 
Very poisonous. 
separans Pk. Not common. Snell's woods. Fort Dodge. August. 
Edible. 
speciosus Frost. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
sphaerosporus Pk. In woods north of Sanitarium. Nearly as large 
as B. edulis. The only Boletus with round spores. This 
species is rather plentiful. Middle June. Not very 
agreeable to eat. 
Strobilomyces strobilace;us Berk. A very characteristic fungus standing 
out by itself. Quite common. Fort Dodge. 
Agarlcaceae 
Cantharel leae 
Cantharellus aurantiacus Fr. var. pallidus. Wildcat Cave, Webster County. 
Somewhat rare. Middle of June. Edible. 
cibarius Fr. Wildcat Cave, Webster County. Very rare. Middle 
of July. Edible. 
Marasmieae 
Schizophyllum commune Fr. Common on branches of oak, maple and ash. 
Dolliver Memorial Park and Fort Dodge, north of 
Sanitarium. 
Pawus conchatus Fr. Common. In Fort Dodge. 
delabatus Pk. Not as common as P. conchatus. 
rudis Fr. Common. Fort Dodge. 
Lentinus sulcatus Berk. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Marasmius androsaceus Fr. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early 
September. 
capillaris Morg. Very common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early 
August. 
cohaerens Fr. Fairly common. In woods. In vicinity of Fort Dodge 
and in Fort Dodge. Early July. 
delectans Morg. Rather rare. Iri. woods. Fort Dodge. Late July. 
oreades Fr. In Olson's Park, Fort Dodge. One of the common fairy 
ring mushrooms. Numerous in lawns. Middle Octo-
ber. Edible. 
rotula Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Prettiest of our mushrooms. 
Pure white in color. July first. 
semi'hirtipes Pk. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle 
October. 
velutipes B & C. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late 
August. 
wynnei B & BR. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle October. 
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Lactarieae 
Lactarius controversus Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. 
insuW,s Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. 
piperatus Fr. In woods. Snell's addition to Fort Dodge. Not 
common. Early July. Edible. 
subdulcis Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. Edible. 
torminosus Fr. In woods. Snell's addition to Fort Dodge. Late 
August. Poisonous. 
trivialis Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Late 
August. Suspected of being poisonous. 
vietus Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early August. The properties 
are somewhat fiery, but the pungency disappears in 
cooking. 
volemus Fr. Not common. In woods. Snell's addition to Fort 
:i;>odge. Late June. Edible. 
Russula adusta Fr. Very common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, also 
Olson's addition and Snell's addition to Fort Dodge. 
Early September. 
albella Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Not com;mon. Middle June. 
alutacea Fr. Common in woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge, 
and elsewhere in Fort Dodge and Webster County. 
Middle June. Edible. 
amygdaloides Kauff. Not common. Occurs in oak woods, c1ay soil, 
especially white oak woods. Early July. Edible. 
aurantialutea Kauff. Not common. In woods. North of Sani-
tarium, Fort Dodge. Early Sept!¥Jlber. Edible. 
aurata Fr. More or less common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, 
Fort Dodge. Small mushroom, late August. Edible. 
borealis Kauff. Not common. Found several times in woods north 
of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Middle August. Edible. 
brevipes Pk. Very common. In Olson's Park, Fort Dodge. One of 
the short stemmed mushrooms. Early September. 
chamaeleontina Fr. Abundant and in many different types. Ex-
treme'ly varia'ble in color and varies in size from one 
to two inches in diameter. Everywhere in the woods 
in and near Fort Dodge. Latter part of June. Edible. 
citrina Gillet. In woods. Two miles north of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Conspicuous because of a bright yellow color 
and its large size. The pileus is sometimes five inches 
across. Latter part of August. 
crustosa Pk. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Latter part 
of June. Edible. 
decolorans Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Early 
September. Edible. 
delica Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Edible. 
emetica Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Not un-
common. Only found in woods. 
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foetens Fr. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. 
fragilis Fr. In woods. Wildcat Cave, Webster County. Not com-
mon. Early September. Edible. 
integra Fr. CQmmon. Fort Dodge and Olson's Park. Latter part 
of June. Edible. 
integra Fr. var. rubro-tincta. In woods. North of Sanitarium, 
Fort Dodge. Usually found in day woods and plants 
occur on slopes of hills. Edible. 
lepida Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Not com-
mon. Edible. 
lutea Fr. Rare. In woods. North of Sanitarium and in Fort Dodge. 
Late July. Edible. 
rnariae Pk. Not uncommon. In woods. Nort.h of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Medium size mushroom, velvety on top. 
nigricans Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge, and Snell's addition to Fort 
Dodge. Edible. 
obscura Rom. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. More 
common than the lepida. Latter part of July. Edible. 
ochracea Fr. Not common. In Snell's woods, Fort Dodge. Edible. 
ochraleucoides Kauff. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Edible. 
ochrophylla Pk. var. albipes. Common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
One of the large mushrooms of a yellowish color. Sep-
tember 10th. This is one of the best species of the 
genus to eat. 
ochrophylla Pk. Common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Edible. 
olivacea Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle July. Edible. 
pectiriatus Fr. Coonmon. In woods. Near .Sanitarium, Fort Dodge, 
and Wildcat Cave, Webster County. Late August. 
pusilla Pk. Not common. Found only a few times in woods in Fort 
Dodge. Middle August. Edible. 
roseipes Bres. Common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge, and Snell's Woods. Edible. 
sanguinea Fr. Rare. Only one specimen found. In woods. North 
of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Red on top and more or 
less shiny: Late September. 
sordida Pk. Not coonmon. In woods, especiaHy clay soil, where the 
white oak ( Quercus alba) occurs. Latter pa11; of June. 
squalida Pk. Very common in spring. In Olson's Park, Fort Dodge, 
and Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster County. After 
middle of June. This is suspected of being poisonous. 
tenuiceps Kauff. This species is not common. In woods Fort Dodge. 
Early September. Edible. 
uncialis Pk. In Fort Dodge. Common, but not as common as some 
of the other species of Russula. After middle of June. 
Edible. 
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virescens Fr. In clay woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Edible. 
vitellina Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Not 
common. Late September. 
H ygophoreae 
Hygrophorus conicus Pk. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Rare. 
Middle of June. Suspected of being poisonous. 
eberneus Fr. Found at Merrill's Ford, vVebster County, and in Fort 
Dodge. 'rhere are two forms of this. Another small 
form wa:s found north of Sanitarium in woods. This 
is not common. Edible. 
eberneus Fr. var. unicolor. In woods. Fort Dodge. Not as com-
mon as H. eberneus. Edible. 
fuscoalbus Fr. var. occidentalis. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late 
September. 
paigei Pammel. In woods. . Fort Dodge. Grows in groups and 
comes up abundantly after frost. 
pratensis Fr. var. cinereus. In woods. North of SanitariU;IIl, Fort 
Dodge. Not common. Early October. 
pratensis Fr. var. pallidus. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Not common. Middle October. 
pudorinus Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late September. Edible. 
russula Fr. (Tricholoma russula). Not common. Always found in 
woods. I have only found it in one place and that was 
north of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge, in a deep ravine. 
Early Sept~ber. Edible. 
Agariceae 
Coprinus atramentarius Fr. Black mushroom. Not common. Not as large 
as C. comatus and larger than C. micaceus. Summer. 
Edible. 
comatus Fr. One of the common mushrooms. Generally found in 
lawns and parks in cities. Fort Dodge. Spring and 
fall. Edible. 
dornesticus Fr. Said to be very common, but I have not found it so. 
Found in dead wood and cellars especially. Fort 
Dodge. 
ebulbosus Pk. Good sized mushroom. Fairly co.mmon in places at 
base of old stumps. Fort Dodge. Summer. 
fucescens Fr. Small species. Common in lawns an.d open spaces in 
woods. Fort Dodge. Summer. Edible. 
micaceus Fr. A common, small, yellow mushroom, found on dead 
stumps of elms in cities. Spring and summer. Edible. 
nivens Fr. Small white mushroom. Very aibundant. Sca'les come 
off readily. Late September. 
squamosus Morg. Little mushroom. Fairly common. White ~cales. 
Fort Dodge. Early June. Edible. 
tomentosus Fr. Not common. In Fort Dodge. 
126 F. W. PAIGE 
Paneolus campanulatus Fr. A rather rare species. Fort Dodge. 
papilionaceus Fr. Common. Fort Dodge. Sma:ll with long stem. 
P,lentiful in manured soil. Summer. Suspected of 
being poisonous. 
retirugis Fr. Fail'ly common. Fort Dodge. Found in manure piles. 
Summer. Suspected of being poisonous. 
solidipes Pk. Fort Dodge. Good sized mushroom on long stem. Cap 
several inches high. Common on manure piles. Sum-
mer. Edible. 
Anellaria scparata Karst. Not a stable mushroom. Found near cattle. 
Rather rare. Found only once. Southeast of Fort 
Dodge. 
Stropharia semiglobata Fr. Not common. A small iffiUShroom. Fort Dodge. 
Hypholoma aggregatum Pk. More or less common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
candolleanum Fr. Very rare. On1ly found in Olson's Park, Fort 
Dodge, in open spaces. 
capnoides Fr. A rare fungus. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late 
August. 
incertum Pk. Very common. In woods. North of F'ort Dodge. 
Edible. 
lachrymabundum Fr. Quite common. Abundant along the side of 
roads in open spaces. Fort Dodge. Middle September. 
nitidipes Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Not common. Late Sep-
temlber. 
perplexum Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Usu-
ally around 'base of old stumps. Edible. 
populium Britz. Much ilike H. sublateritiuni. Early July. 
sublateritium Fr. More or less common. In woods. For-t Dodge. 
Res~bles H. perplexum. Early October. Edible. 
velutinum Fr. More or less common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Along gutters. Late September. Edible. 
Psathyra umbonata Pk. This occurs in Fort Dodge. Not common. This 
fungus should he cultivated. 
Psilocybe cernua Fr. Common. More so than P. larga. Late October. 
foenisccii Fr. Common. In wloods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. 
larga Kauff. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late September. 
Pholiota adiposa Fr. Very common. In woods. North of Sanitariuµi, 
Fort Dodge. 
aggericola Pk. retirugis. Found in rotten wood. North of Sani-
tarium. Middle October. 
albocrenulata Pk. Only found in woods in the hollows of red oak 
trees. Woods at Fort Dodge. Middle August. 
cerasina Pk. Rare. On dead logs and rotten wood. In woods north 
of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. One clump fifteen to 
twenty specimens. Late September. 
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heteroclita Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. 
howeana Pk. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. 
johnsoniana Pk. Found at Fort Dodge. Quite common in woods. 
Late September. Edible. 
lutea Pk. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early July. 
ornella Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Not very common. Late July. 
praecox Pers. Not common. Numerous only in spring. Near Wild-
cat Cave in timber. Edible, but not very good. 
subsquarrosa Fr. On logs. Merrill's Ford, Fort Dodge. One of 
the best of our mushrooms. 
unicolor Fr. Not common. Woods. Fort Dodge. October. 
Cortinarius atkinsonianus Kauff. Found in timber in soil with a good deal 
of humus. Woods at Fort Dodge. Edible. 
autumnalis Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Early October. 
castaneus Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Early 
June. 
elegantioides Kauff. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Early October. 
squarrosus Olem. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Middle July. 
Inocybe asterospora Quel. In woods at Fort Dodge. Early August. 
fastigiata Bres. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Rare. 
Late September. 
fibrosa Bres. Common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Middle July. Poisonous. 
rimosa Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle August. 
H ebeloma abidul;um Pk. Around Fort Dodge. Early October. 
f astibile Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. September. 
hiemale Bres. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late October. 
tllicitum Pk. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle Sep-
tember. 
nesophaeum Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge and Webster County. Late 
October. 
parvifructum Pk. Not common. In woods, Fort Dodge. Middle 
October. 
sinapizans Fr. One of the largest of the genus. Rare. In woods. 
Fort Dodge. Late June. 
simile Kauff. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early October. 
Flammula carbonaria Fr. Found at Merrill's Ford, Fort Dodge. Small 
mushroom with slimy surface. Middle of July. Edible. 
flavida Fr. Woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Very rare. 
Edible. 
lubrica Fr. This is one of the greasy mushrooms and is covered with 
slime. In woods. North of Sanitariuµi, Fort Dodge. 
Middle July. Edible. 
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polychroa Berk. In woods. North of Sanitarium and in Olson's 
Park, Fort Dodge. Early August. 
rigida Pk. A very rare species. In woods. North of Sanitarium, 
Fort Dodge. Late September. Edible. 
spumosa Fr. Rare. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Middle October. 
Galera tenera Fr. A &mall mushroom found in woods. North of Sani-
tarium, Fort Dodge. 
vitaeformis Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Middle June. 
Na'ucoria lignicola Pk. On dead w,ood. Rather rare. Fort Dodge. Late 
July. 
Crepidotus croceotinctus Pk. Quite common. On wood. Not very good 
to eat. 
dorsalis Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Not 
very good to eat. 
fulvotomentosus Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early June. 
haerens Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Early 
August. Non-poisonous. 
herbarum Pk. In woods. North of Fort Dodge, near Sanitarium. 
Early October. Not very good to eat. 
malachius B & C. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early June. 
mollis Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early October. 
putrigens B & C. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Late September. Not poisonous. 
sepiaris Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late June. 
Volvaria bombycina Fr. Not common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, 
Fort Dodge. Beautiful large mushroom found on rot-
ten logs. Locality has disappeared. Middle July. 
Edible. 
gloicephala Fr. A few specimens on west side of Des Moines River 
in open woods on ground. Early July. Poisonous. 
hypopithys Fr. In woods on rotten logs and in cattle pastures. 
Fort Dodge. Late August. 
speciosa Fr. Numerous in open fields. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Late August. 
umbonata Pk. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early Sep-
tember. 
Pluteus cerviniis Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
cervinus Fr. var. albipes. In woods. Fort Dodge. White form. 
Edible. 
cervi1l(lls Fr. var. black brown form. In woods. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
cervinus Fr. var. petasatus. In woods and in pastures on rotten 
logs. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
(All these varieties of Pluteus cervinus have the same 
habitat.) 
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granularis Pk. Very rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late Sep-
tember. 
longistriatus Pk. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early 
July. 
salicinus Fr. Rather rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late June. 
Entoloma clypeatum Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
grayanum Fr. Found on golf course at edge of a grove. This 
species was identified by W. A. Murrill. Middle May. 
griseum Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge near Sanitarium. Late July. 
niderosum Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Mid-
dle October. 
peckianum Berk. In woods. Fort Dodge north· of Sanitarium. 
Middle June. 
rhodopoliiim Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle July. 
sericeiim Fr. In woods. Near Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Middle 
September. 
strictius Pk. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle October. 
(There are some good mushrooms in this genus, but 
there are others dangerous to eat and it is best to leave 
them alone.) 
Clitopilus abortivus B & C. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. Found only 
once. Edible. 
cacspitosus Pk. A rather rare fungus. Late September. 
orcella Fr. Not numerous. In Snell's addition to Fort Dodge. 
prunulus Fr. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late Sep-
tember. 
Claudopus nidul<ins Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Rare. Middle November. 
Amanita cothurnata Atk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Quite plentiful. Middle July. Suspected of being 
poisonous. 
elongata Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Latter 
part of September. 
flavoconia Atk. Rare. In woods. Near Fort Dodge. Latter part 
of JU'ly. Probably poisonous. 
frostiana Pk. At Wildcat Cave and north of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Latter part of July. Non-edible. 
phalloides Fr. (white form) Only found in two places. In Fort 
Dodge and North of Sanitarium. Deadly poisonous. 
russuloides Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Sus-
pected of being poisonous. 
velutipes Atk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
(Amanita contains a number of the most deadly poi-
sonous toad stools, and it is best not to use any of them 
for food.) 
Amanitopsis vaginata Fr. var alba. In Olson's Park, Fort Dodge. Edible. 
vaginata Fr. var. fulva. Common. In Olson's Park, Fort Dodge. 
Edible. 
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vaginata Fr. var. livida. Very common. In Olson's Park, Fort 
Dodge. Edib1e. 
volvata Pk. Not plentiful. Frequently found growing along cement 
sidewalks. Fort Dodge. Poisonous. 
Lepiota acutaesquamosa Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Scarcely to be dis-
tinguished from L. friesii. 
cepaestipes Fr. In woods. North of Fort Dodge. Rare. Latter 
part of August. Edible. 
clypeolaria Fr. More or less common. In woods. North of Fort 
Dodge. Latter part of September. Suspected of be-
ing poisonous. 
cristata Fr. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle of July. 
felina Fr. Quite common. In woods. North of Fort Dodge. Latter 
part of September. 
friesii Lasch. In woods. On outskirts of Fort Dodge. Edible, but 
of poor quality. 
morgani Pk. Found in open places in lawns, fields and prairies. 
Fort Dodge. Poisonous. (Some people are poisoned 
and some are not.) Middle to latter part of September. 
naucinoides Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Common, but never plen-
tiful. More scattered. Edible. 
naucinoides Pk. var. squamosa. Not common. In woods. North of 
Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Does not differ much from 
L. rubrotincta. Edible. 
procera Fr. A'bundant. Fairgrounds woods in north part of Fort 
Dodge. Edible. 
rubrotincta Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Not 
common, but scattered. Also in woods in north part 
of city. 
Armillaria mellea Fr. Very common. In woods. Fort Dodge; also north 
of Sanitarium, Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster 
County, and Olson's Park. Edible. 
Pleurotus corticatus Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late October. 
fimbriatus Fr. var. regularis. Not common. Found only once. In 
woods. Fort Dodge. Middle October. 
mastrucatus Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle August. 
ostreatus Fr. Quite common. Everywhere on rotten wood. Fort 
Dodge. Summer and fall. Edible. 
petaloides Fr. Small mushroom. Occurs on wood. Not common. 
In woods at Fort Dodge. Late July. 
sapidus Kalchb. In woods. Fort Dodge. Not as abundant as P. 
ostreatus or P. ulmarius. 
subariolatus Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early October. 
subpalmatus Fr. Rather rare. Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster 
County. Late September. 
ulmarius Fr. Common on boxelders; sometimes also on American 
elms. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. F all. Edible. 
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Tricholoma album Schaeff. In woods. Fort Dodge. Common. Early 
October. Unpalatab'le. 
brevipes Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle October. 
cinerascens Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Rather common. Late 
October. Edible. 
grave Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early November. 
melaleucum Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early October. 
nobt1e Pk. City limits of Fort Dodge. Snell Place. Early October. 
Suspected of being poisonous. 
personatum Fr. Common. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Under leaves. Also found at other points in 
woods at Fort Dodge. Found especially in late fall. 
Edible. 
sejunctum Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late fall. Edible. 
terreum Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
terreum Fr. var. fragans. In woods. Fort Dodge. This variety is 
fragrant. Middle September. 
transmutans Pk. Common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Early ·Sep-
tember. Edible. 
Clitocybe adirondackensis Pk. Not common. Found among dead leaves. 
In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Edible. 
cartilaginea Burf. In woods. Fort Dodge. Common. 
catina Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. Middle 
August. 
compressipes Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late September. 
decastes Fr. In Fort Dodge. Not common. 
eccentrica Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late August. 
f umosa Pers. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
illndens Schw. In woods. North of Fort Dodge. Found in two 
places. Rather common. Grows on decaying stumps 
and rotten logs, probably oak. This is a large mush-
room. Poisonous. 
infundibuliformis Fr. Common. In woods. North of Fort Dodge. 
Edible. 
laccata Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Not good to eat. 
laccata Fr. var. striatula. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late August. 
Not good to eat. 
maxima Fr. In woods. West of Fort Dodge. Very large species. 
Found only once. Early July. Edible. 
media Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late September. Edible. 
multiceps Pk. Common. Within city limits of Fort Dodge. Edible. 
nebularis Fr. In woods on ground. Fort Dodge. Middle Septem-
ber. Edible. 
odora Fr. var. anisearia. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort 
Dodge. Late July. Edible. 
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ochropurpurea Berk. Common everywhere m woods on high 
ground. Edible. 
phyllophilia Fr. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Early September. 
pithyophila Fr. Not common. In woods. North of Fort Dodge. 
robusta Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
s1Ubzonalis Pk. Common. Fort Dodge. 
truncicola Pk. Rare. Fort Dodge. Early September. 
Collybia acervata Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge west of Des Moines River. 
Resembles C. dryophila. July. Edible. 
alcalinolens Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Early August. 
dryophila Bull. In woods. Fort Dodge. In leaf mould especially. 
Does not grow thickly; more or less isolated. Late 
May. Edible. 
platyphylla Fr. Not uncommon. On rotten wood. In woods. Fort 
Dodge. Not edible. 
radicata Fr. Common. In woods and yards. Fort Dodge. Sum-
mer. Edible. 
velutipes Fr. Found growing in woods in great clumps. Fort 
Dodge. Not edible. 
M ycena atroalba Fr. In woods. Fort Dodge. Middle SepteIDlber. 
galericulata Fr. Rather common. In woods. Fort Dodge. On 
rotten wood. Scarcely edible. 
haematopa Fr. Non-poisonous, but scarcely worthwhile to collect. 
Middle September. 
inclinata Fr. Non-poisonous, but soorcely worthwhile to collect. 
Fort Dodge. Middle June. 
leajana Berk. Non-poisonous, but scarcely w-0rthwhile to collect. 
Fort Dodge. Early September. 
parabolica Fr. Non-poisonous, but scarcely worthwhile to collect. 
polygramma Fr. Non-poisonous, but scarcely worthwhile to collect. 
Fort Dodge. Early June. 
Omphalia oliva.ria Pk. In woods. Fort Dodge. Late August. 
Psalliota arvensis Fr. Not comm-0n. In open fields. Edible. 
campestris Fr. var. vaporarius. Common in greenhouses. Purely do-
mestic fungus. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
micromengetha Pk. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
placomyces Pk. Common. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
rodrnanii Pk. Along streets of cities near paving and sidewalks. 
Edi'ble. 
silvicola Vitt. Very COmplOn in pastures. Fort Dodge. Middle June. 
subrufescens Pk. In woods. North of Sanitarium, Fort Do.dge. 
Rather large mushrooms of reddish color. Middle 
July. Edible. 
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sylvatica Schaff. In woods. Fort Dodge. Not common. June. 
Edible. 
GASTEROMYCETES 
Phallaceae None of this family edible. 
Phallus impudicus Linn. Common. In lawns ·and strawberry beds. Fort 
Dodge. 
Dictyophora ravenellii (B & C) Burt. CQmmon in grasses and woods. 
Only found on the west side of the river, Fort Dodge. 
Mutinus bovinus Morgan. Rare. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Lycoperdaceae 
Lycoperdon constellatum Fr. Not common. Fort Dodge. Middle Sep-
tember. Edible. 
elongatum Berk. Common. On ground in woods. Fort Dodge. 
exipuliforme Scop. Rare. Fort Dodge. Summer and fall. Edible. 
gemmatum Batsch. Very common. Most common of all the puff 
balls. Scales fall off readily. Fort Dodge. Sumpier 
and fall. Edible. 
glabellum Pk. This puff ball is usually gregarious. One or two 
inches in diameter. Not common. Fort Dodge. Mid-
dle September. Edible. 
molle Pers. Olson's Park and woods north of Fort Dodge, and Dol-
liver Memorial Park, Webster County. SuIIlJliler and 
fall. Edible. 
pusillum Barsch. Woods Fort Dodge. Middle August. 
pyriforme Schaff. Abundant everywhere on rotten logs. Olson's 
Park and woods north of Sanitarium, Fort Dodge. 
Also Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster County. Sum-
mer and fall. 
rimulatum Pk. Not common. On rotten logs. Surface shaggy and 
recticulately furrowed. Fort Dodge. Middle Sep-
tember. Edible. 
turneri E & E. Not common. On rotten logs. Fort Dodge. Edible. 
wrightii var. separans B & C. Common. In woods and open spaces. 
Fort Dodge. Middle October. Edible. 
wrightii var. typicum L. On rotten wood. Fort Dodge. 
Calvatia craniformis Schw. In meadows. Not COlfimOn. Along Lizzard 
Creek, Fort Dodge. Summer and fall. Edible. 
caelata Bull. Not common. In woods. Fort Dodge. Summer and 
fall. Edible. 
cyathif ormis Bose. Quite cmnmon. In woodland pastures. Woods 
north of Fort Dodge. Edible. 
gigantea Batsch. Quite common. In pastured woods. Fort Dodge, 
and Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster County. Sum-
mer and fall. Edible. 
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Secotium acuminatum Mont. Not common. On ground in open woods. 
Fort Dodge. 
Bovista pila B & C. Common. In open places on lawns and in meadows. 
Fort Dodge, Dolliver Memorial Park, Webster County. 
Middle May. Edible. 
plumb ea Pers. Common. Woods and open places. Fort Dodge and 
Dolli vier M~morial Park, Webster County. Middle 
October. Edible. 
Geaster saccatus Fr. Common. In woods on ground. Fort Dodge. 
triplex J ungh. Common. In woods. Fort Dodge. 
Nldulariaceae 
Cyathus striatus Hoff. Woods. Fort Dodge. 
vernicosus (Bull.) D. C. Common in greenhouses. Fort Dodge. 
Crucibul1tm vulgare Tul. In woods two miles north of Sanitariupl, Fort 
Dodge. 
Sclerodermaceae 
Scleroderma cepa Pers. Common. In open woods. Fort Dodge. 
Mycenastrum spinulosum Pk. Fort Dodge. 
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THE RELATION OF OXYGEN TO THE GERMINATION OF THE 
CHLAMYDOSPORES OF USTILAGO ZEAE (BECK.) UNGER. 
(A Preliminary Report) 
By G. A. PLATZ• 
Accepted for publication November 30, 1927. 
From the Department of Botany, Iowa State College. 
That oxygen plays an important role in the life processes of plant 
celJs is well known. Its relation to the ·germination of the spores of certain 
fungi has been studied by various workers. Sanford (7) found that the 
spores of Actinomyces scabies do not geriminate without oxygen. Uppal 
( 8), in studying the relation of oxygen to spore germination in some species 
of the Peronosporailes, concluded that indirect germination of conidia, by 
means of zoospores, is possible in the case of Phytophthora colocasiae, P. 
infestans, P . palmivora and P. parasitica without the presence of oxygen, 
but that direct germination, by means of a germ tube, does not take place 
in any of these species in the absence of oxygen. He concluded further 
that the conidia of Albugo candida, Plasmopora viticola and Sclerospora 
graminicola, which germinate indirectly, as well as the conidia of Perono-
spora parasitica and P. trifoliorum, which germinate directly, require the 
presence of oxygen for germination. Jones (2) found that the spores of 
U stilago avenae do not germinate in suspensions exposed to oxygen-free 
atmospheres. 
Some spores, such as the uredospores of the rusts, germinate readily in 
water apparently obtaining therefrom sufficient oxygen for germination. 
It is a well known fact, however, that the chlamydospores of U stilago zeae 
(Beckim.) Unger do not germinate wiell when placed in water. Under at-
mospheric pressure and at 30° C., water absorbs only 2.6 per cent of oxy-
gen by volume, according to Olsen ( 5). It seemed possible that this amount 
might not be sufficient for the germination of these spores. A series of 
experiments, therefore, was planned to determine the relation of oxygen 
to spore germination in Ustilago zeae. 
Amount of oxygen essential to the germination of the chlamydospores of Ustilago 
zeae 
As a preliminary experiiment, an attempt was made to germinate the 
spores in the absence of oxygen. In this experiment, tomato juice and 
gelatin were used as culture media. The tomato juice was prepared by 
crushing ripe tomatoes to a pulp, adding water, double-distilled from glass, 
in the ratio of three parts of pulp to seven parts of water and filtering the 
solution through absorbent <.'Otton. The gatin-m0diU\lll was prepared by 
acidifying a 1 per cent solution of gelatin to a hydrogen-ion concentration 
of pH 5.5 with benzoic acid. The pores were dusted upon the surface of 
•The writer is indebted to Dr. L. W. Durrell, Professor of Botany, Colorado 
Agricultural College, for helpful suggestions on this problem, and to Dr. I. E. 
Melhus, Professor of Plant Pathology, Iowa State College, for suggestions and criti-
cisms in the preparation of the manuscript. 
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the medium in Syracuse dishes, which were subsequently placed in desic-
cators from which the oxygen was removed with an alkaline solution of 
pyrogallic acid. 
The alkaline solution of pyrogallol was prepared by mixing a solution 
of one part of pyrogallol by weight in three parts of water with an equal 
volume of a solution of one part of potassium hydroxide by weight in three 
parts of water. This solution, known as Berthelot 's solution of pyrogallol 
(9), absorbs 10 times its volume of oxygen when freshly prepared. Suffi-
cient amounts were placed in the desiccators to absorb from one and one-
half to two t~mes as much oxygen as could possibly be present in the air of 
the desiccators. As the cultures were kept at 30° C., the optimum tempera-
ture for the germination of the spores according to Jones ( 3) , the absorp-
tion of oxygen was rapid enough to prevent the formation of an appreciable 
amount of carbon monoxide. 
Readings of the amount of germination wern made microscopically 
after 24 hours. Three representative fields in the cultures were selected, 
each containing from 50 to 100 spores, and the number of germinated spores 
in the three fields was expressed as a percentage of the entire number of 
spores in the three fields. The results of five trials showed that the spores 
did not germinate in the absmce of oxygen, whereas the checks in air pro-
duced 80 per cent germination. 
As it was necessary to determine the amount of oxygen essential to the 
germination of the spores before attempting to correlate poor germination 
in water with a lack of oxygen, an experiment was pl.anned in which the 
spores were subjected to atmospheres containing different amounts of oxy-
gen. In this experiment the spores were dusted upon the surface of the 
media in small vials, which were subsequently placed in culture chambers 
containing known amounts of oxygen. The air was exhausted from the 
chambers by means of an air pump and the oxygen, admitted into the 
chambers from a gas tank, was measured with gas burrettes. The cultures 
were kept at 30° C. for 24 hours and readings on the germination were 
made as previously described. The results of five trials are shown in 
Table I. 
TABLE I. The relation of oxygen to the germination of the chlamydospores of 
Ustilago zeae. 
Medium 
10% solution of gelatin 
30% solution of tomato juice 
Atmosphere 
ck. in air 
6% oxygen 
4% .. 
3% 
2% 
1% 
No 
ck. in air 
5% oxygen 
4% . .. 
3% 
2% 
1% 
No 
Percent 
germination 
86.1 
83.2 
20.0 
15.0 
2.0 
Trace 
o.o 
81.2 
75.0 
61.8 
30.0 
16.0 
10.0 
o.o 
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By referring to Table I, it may be noted that atmospheres containing 
less than three per cent oxygen were not favorable for the germination of 
spores. In atmospheres con~ning five per cent of oxygen, however, the 
cultures on gelatin producecf3.2 per cent germination as compared wtih 
86.1 per cent in the checks in the open air. The cultures on tOjlllato juice 
showed 75.0 per cent germination, whereas the checks in open air produced 
81.2 per cent. It appears, therefore, that atmospheres containing at least 
five per cent of oxygen are required to support germination of the chlamy- v--
dcspores of Ustilago zeae comparable to that obtained in air. 
As the media used contain a certain amount of oxygen in solution, it 
seemed advisable to determine whether or not the spores would germinate 
when ~mmersed in these media. Susp.ensions of the spores were made with 
tomato juice and with a 10 per cent solution of gelatin acidified to a 
hydrogen-ion concentration of pH 5.5 with benzoic acid. Small vials were 
filled with these suspensions and were stoppered air-tight. In other tests 
the spores were fixed on microscope slides with an egg albumen fixative and 
were immersed by p'lacing the slides in open vessels containing the media. 
In no case did the spores germinate when immersed, whereas the checks, in 
which the spores were dusted upon the surface of the media, produced from 
80 to 85 per cent of germination. The immersed spores were not perma-
nently injured, however, as they germinated readily if placed under favor-
able conditions. These results indicate that the media do not contain suf-
ficient oxygen to support germination. 
Since the spores did not germinate when immersed in the culture 
,media it seemed possible that they might sink in water and dilute concen-
trations of other liquid media to such an extent as to be deprived of suffi-
cient oxygen for germination. An experiment was planned, therefore, to 
determine the effect of dilution of different media. Th culture media used 
in this experiment were tomato juice prepared as previously described, a 
10 per cent solution of gelatin acidified with hydrochloric acid, a 10 per 
cent solution of gelatin acidified with malic acid, a 10 per cent soluton acidi-
fied with salicylic acid and a 10 per cent solution of gelatin to which a defi-
nite amount of calcium benzoate (O.Olg. to 10.0 c.c.) was added. These 
media were subsequently diluted by adding distilled water which had b.een 
twice distilled in pyrex distilling-flasks. The spores were dusted on the sur-
face of the media and the cultures were kept at 30° C. for 24 hours. Germi-
nation counts were made as described above and Table II shows the results 
of 10 trials. 
Reference to TaJble II s-hows that when tomato juice was used as a 
culture medium, the spores germinated 'best in solutions containing at least 
30 per cent of the juice. When the juice was diluted to 15 per cent or less 
the germination decreased in proportion to the dilution. Likewise, when 
gelatin was used as a culture medium, whether acidified with hydrochloric 
acid, malic acid or salicylic acid, to the optimum acidity for these acids, 
the germination decreased with the dilution. The best germination, about 
80 per cent, occurred in solutions containing at least three per. cent of 
gelatin. In di'lutions containing less gelatin, the germination gradually 
ili;minished; in a one-half per cent solution only a trace of germination oc-
curred, irrepective of the acid used. Similar results were obtained when 
calcium benzoate was added to different dilutions of gelatin. Cultures in 
which .01 g. of calcium benzoate was added to 10 c.c. of a 10 per cent solu-
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TABLE II. The effect of dilution of different media upon the germination of the 
chlamydospores of Ustilago zeae. 
Medium Concen 
tration pH 
Tomato juice 30% 4.0 
" " 15% 4.0 
10% 4.0 
5% 4.0 
2% 4.0 
1% 4.0 
Gelatin acidified with hydrochloric acid' 10% 3.0 
U H H H 5% 3.0 
3% 3.0 
2% 3.0 
1% 3.0 
1h% 3.0 
malic acid' 10% 4.0 
5% 4.0 
31h 4.0 
2% 4.0 
11h 4.0 
1h% 4.0 
salicylic acid' 10% 5.0 
5% 5.0 
3% 5.0 
2% 5.0 
1% 5.0 
1h% 5.0 
Gelatin plus calcium benzoate (0.0lg. to 10 c.c.)' 10% 6.0 
.. 
" 
.. 5% 6.0 
3% 6.0 
2% 6.0 
1% 6.0 
1h% 6.0 
'Checks of gelatin alone produced less than one per cent germination. 
'Trace signifies less than one per cent. 
Percent 
germi-
nation 
80.6 
76.8 
49.0 
36.2 
21.4 
9.2 
65.0 
58.0 
42.0 
28.0 
10.0 
Trace' 
72.0 
67.0 
51.0 
38.0 
15.0 
Trace 
88.4 
74.6 
67.6 
57.4 
9.6 
Trace 
82.0 
76.0 
54.0 
37.0 
12.0 
Trace 
tion of gelatin produced 82 per cent of germination. When the same 
amount (0.01 g.) of calcium benzoate was added to 10 c.c. of more dilute 
solutions of gelatin, the germination decreased in proportion to the dilu-
tion, only a trace of gel')lllination showing in one-half per cent solutions. 
At first thought, it may be supposed that the effect of the dilution of 
the culture media is due to a diminution of some nutrient substance that is 
necessary for the germination of the spores. The data of Table II do not 
confirm this supposition. Since the spores in the check cultures of gelatin 
alone did not germinate, there appears to be nothing in the gelatin itself 
favorable to their germination. Moreover, the dilution of the acid media 
did not produce an appreciable change in the hydrogen-ion concentration 
of the cultures. Thus the effect of dilution cannot be due to a change in 
acidity. In the cultures in which calch11m benzoate was used, the same 
amount was added to each dilution of the gelatin. In was, therefore, not a 
difference in the amount of this substance added to the culture medium 
that produced the difference in germination. Furthermore, it has been 
found by Platz, Durrell and Howe (6) that good germination of these 
spores may be obtained on such non-nutrient media as silica jelly and 
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collodion. Nutrients are evidently non-essential to the germination of the 
chlai1nydospores of Ustilago zeae and the dilution effect must he attributed 
to some factor other than the diminution of nutrient subtances. 
It may be thought that a difference in the osmotic pressure of the vari-
ous dilutions of the media used accounts for the difference in germination. 
By the freezingpoint method the osmotic pressure of tomato juice diluted 
with 70 parts of water, a dilution on which 80 per cent of the spores germi-
nated, was found to be only three at..rnospheres ·greater than that of tomato 
juice d~luted with 99 parts of water on which only nine per cent of the 
spores germinated. · When one considers the magnitude of the osmotic pres-
sure of such oolls as the chlamydospores of U stilago zeae, it is not probable 
that a difference of three atmospheres would have much influence upon 
their germination. 
That a differenoo in the surface tension of the dilutions might be re-
sponsible for the difference in germination was considered. The surface 
tension of distilled water and of various dilutions of tomato juioo was de-
termined by the modified ring method described by Durrell, Person and 
Rogers (1). An average of 20 trials with each liquid is given in Table III. 
TABLE III. The surface tension of various dilutions of tomato juice and of 
distilled water. 
Medium 
Tomato juice 
" " 
Water (twice glass-distilled) 
Dilution 
30% 
15% 
10% 
5% 
2% 
1% 
Surface Tension 
54.4 dynes 
56.6 " 
57.6 
60.0 
61.2 
62.8 
69.2 
As shown in Table III, the surface tension of a 30 per cent solution of 
tomato juioo is only 8.4 dynes less than that of a one per cent solution and 
only 14. dynes less than that of distilled water. Noble ( 4) working with 
the spor.es of Urocystis tritici found no correlation between germination 
and the surface tension of the media used, though he used differences of 
surface tension as high as 34 dynes. It appears, therefore, that differences 
in surface tension ranging from 2.2 dynes to 14.8 dynes are too small to 
affect the germination of the spores of Ustilago zeae to any great degree. 
Whether the spores are injured by excessive im:bibition when placed in 
water or dilute solutions was also given consideration. The spores were 
fixed on microscopic slides with an egg albumen fixative. These slides w;ere 
placed under the microscope and the spores were flooded with water, tomato 
juice solutions ranging from 30 per cent to one per cent, and gelatin solu-
tions ranging from 10 per -cent to one-half per cent. The diameter of the 
spores was measured before and after flooding with the aid of an eyepiece 
micrometer. By using a 1.8 mm. oil-immersion <Jbjective and a 25x eye-
piece, the protoplasmic contents of the ·spores could be easily distinguished 
from the cell wall. No plasmolysis or excessive swelling of the spores was 
noted. In fact, no visible change occurred with the use of any of the 
liquids. 
As evidence that the lowered percentage of germination in dilute solu-
tions was the effect of a lack of oxygen, it seemed advisable to determine to 
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w:hat extent the spores sink in the different media, for the greater the 
extent of surface exposed to the oxygen, the greater the percentage of 
germination should be if the oxygen is the controlling factor. Since the 
sinking of an object, when placed in a liquid, is proportional to the differ-
ence between its specific gravity and that of the liquid, it was necessary to 
find the specific gravity of the spores and of the media. The approximate 
specific gravity of the spores was found by making suspensions of them in 
liquids of known specific gravity and noting to what extent they sank in 
these liquids. The liquids used for these suspensions were solutions of 
alcohol in water with specific gravities ranging from 0.85 to 0.99, distilled 
water with a specific gravity of 1.00, and solutions of sodium carbonate in 
water with specific gravities ranging from 1.01 to 1.10. As seen by Table 
IV, the specific gravity of the spores ranges from 0.95 to 1.05. 
In determining the specific gravity of the media, weighings with a 
specific gravity flask were made with water and the tomato juice solutions. 
The specific gravity of the gelatin solution was found with a hydrometer. 
The findings of these tests are shown in Table V. 
TABLE IV. The specific gravity of the chlamydospores of Ustilago zeae. 
Water plus ethyl alcohol 
,, " " ,, 
distilled 
plus sodium carbonate 
Specific 
Gravity 
0.95 
0.90 
0.95 
0.96 
0.97 
0.98 
0.99 
1.00 
1.01 
1.02 
1.03 
1.04 
1.05 
1.10 
Status of 
spores 
all sank rapidly 
all sank rapidly 
almost all sank rapidly 
4/5 sank 
3/4 sank 
2/3 sank 
1/2 sank 
1/2 sank 
1/3 sank 
1/4 sank 
1/5 sank 
1/10 sank 
a few sank 
none sank 
TABLE V. The specific gravity of various dilutions of tomato juice and gelatin 
as contrasted with that of distilled water. 
Liquid 
30% solution of tomato juice 
15% ,, " " " 
10% 
5% 
2% 
1% 
Check (distilled water) 
10% solution of gelatin 
5% " ,. " 
3% 
2% 
1% 
%% 
Check (distilled water) 
Specific Gravity 
1.0078 
1.0035 
1.0018 
1.0006 
1.0002 
1.0000 
0.9972 
1.0197 
1.0083 
1.0021 
1.0007 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9972 
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By comparing the data of Tables IV and V, it may be noted that the 
specific gravity of a 30 per cent solution of tomato juice is 1.0078 and that 
of a 10 per cent solution of gelatin is 1.0197, whereas the specific gravity of 
water is 0.9972. It also may be noted that the specific gravity of the solu-
tion decreases in proportion to the dilution. Since most of the spores are 
lighter than the more concentrated solutions of the culture media, it is evi-
dent that they will not sink as deep in these as they do in water. This was 
confirmed by actual observation. The spores were dusted upon the surface 
of drops of the various solutions placed on the edge of a microscope slide. 
This slide was fixed in a Barber pipette-clamp so as to be readily adjusted 
to such a position as to o'btain a focus on the spores floating on the surface 
of the dilution drops. By means of a Bausch and Lomb 8.5 mm. objective 
and a 25x eyepiece, the depth to which the spores sank in the various dilu-
tions could be seen. In water and in the more dilute solutions of t0JI1ato 
juice and gelatin, the spores sink to 0.8 of their diameter. When dusted 
upon the surface of the more concentrated solutions, they sink to only 0.4 
or less of their diameter. The difference of the exposure of the surface of 
3();urunf 
fqmafo juice 
Fig. 1. 
10 pt>rct'nl 
2~/afin 
the spores is graphically shown in Fig. 1. It is possible that this difference 
of exposure to the normal amount of oxygen in the atmosphere is sufficient 
to account for the poor germination obtained when the spores are placed in 
water or in dilute solutions of culture media. Thel'e is not enough oxygen 
in the liquid to support their germination and they apparently sink to such 
a degree as to be deprived of sufficient oxygen frQIIl the air. 
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SUMMARY 
The chlamydospores of Ustilago zeae (Beckm.) Unger do not germi-
nate in the absence of oxygen. 
The spores dusted on the surface of culture media did not germinate 
when placed in chambers from w!hich the air was exhausted by means of an 
air pump nor when placed in atmospheres frqrn w.hich the oxygen was re-
moved by the use of an alkaline solution of pyrogallic acid. 
Atmospheres containing at least five per cent of oxygen are required 
to produce germination eomparable to that obtained in the open. 
When suspended in water, tomato juice or gelatin and kept in air-
tight vials, the spores failed to germinate, apparently due to a lack of 
oxygen. ·: ;>J! I\ 1 ·..; 
When dusted upon the surface of water and dilute solutions of liquid 
media, the spores do not germinate as well as when dusted upon more con-
centrated solutions of the media. They sink deeper in the dilute solutions 
than in the more concentrated and apparently are deprived of sufficient 
oxygen to support germination. · 
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There has been much speculation as to the chemical function of vita-
mins, but little definite information is to be found in the literature. The 
work on record appears to be confined to the action of vitamin extracts 
upon enzyme activity. Thus, M. J. Villaroel (1) observed that extracts of 
vitamin B obtained frQm yeast, pancreas and testes augment catalase action 
of extracts of liver. These extracts were also found to accelerate oostor-
bean lipase and the amylolytic action of taka-diastase and of amylase. His 
suggestion that the vitamins function as accelerators of enzymes is not 
without criticism in the literature. U. Summartino (2) found that zymase 
activity was accelerated significantly by vitamin extracts. With identical 
extracts he observed slight positive acceleration of tryptic and diastatic 
action but no acceleration of peptic action. SUjiillllartino, unfortunately, 
does not state the kind of vitamin extract with which he worked. Tanaka 
Yoshio (3) made the observation that the action of castor-bean lipase was 
accelerated by additions of water extracts of the castor-bean seed. He 
ascribed the acceleration to the inorganic compounds and proteose present. 
None of these investigators carried their work to the stage that all factors 
other than vitamins were eliminated. 
The purpose of the work to be described is to determine whether vita-
min A is a factor in the acceleration of lipase action. 
THE METHOD 
Preliminary experiments showed that ether-extracted co~ercial pan-
creatin powder increases the rate of hydrolysis of ethyl butyrate sufficiently 
so that distiMa:ble amounts of butyric acid can be obtained in the course 
of a few hours. Advantage of this has been taken to note the effect of in-
creasing quantities of a vitamin A concentrate upon a medium containing 
pancreatic lipase. 
Early in this work it was recognized that the determination of the in-
fluence of vitamin A concentrates upon lipase activity hinges upon the 
completeness with which the butyric acid is distilled. This factor was 
tested as follows: Into each of four 50 cc. balloon flasks was introduced 
11 cc. of a dilute butyric acid solution and then 150 cc. of C02-fre~._:dis­
tilled water. The butyric acid was then distilled off as described later, a 
few pieces of plljlllice being used to prevent "bumping". When only a 
few cubic centimeters remained in the balloon flasks the distillation was 
stopped and the butyric acid titrated with 0.2117N sodium hydroxide. 
Phenolphthalein was used as indicat<Jl" ... ~' 
*This forms part of a thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Iowa 
State College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy. 
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In Table I are given data showing that with the technique used the 
distillation of the butyric acid is quantitative. 
TABLE I. Alkali (cc. of 0.2117N NaOH) required to neutralize 1 cc. of butyric acid 
in distillate and in the solution before distillation. 
Before distillation 
2.95 
2.80 
2.95 
3.13 
Distillate 
3.04 
2.99 
2.95 
To enhance the accuracy of the distillation the directions which im-
mediately follow indicate the use of 200 cc. of distilled water for dilution 
in addition to the wash water that is introduced during the transfer from 
the digestion flask to the distillation flask. Although the distillation of 
butyrc acid is quantitative it does not follow that the titration values of 
control tests should agree as closely as may be inferred from the above data. 
In fact such agreement would be very remarkable indeed considering the 
more or less heterogeneous condition of the reaction mixture which has 
been used in the test to be described. The general tendency of the results 
is deemed of most importance. This heterogeneity was overcome as much 
as possible in all cases by shaking the contents of each flask by hand as 
often as was convenient. 
Preliminary work showed that a mediUiIIl composed of 0.5 gms. of pan-
creatin taken up in 5 cc. of NaJIP04 • 12H20 solution (1 cc.= 0.15 gms. 
Na2HP4 • 12H20) readily hydrolyses ethyl butyrate. To this medium 
were added 0.5 cc. of ethyl butyrate and four drops of toluol as a preserva-
tive. In order to present as much surface of vitamin concentrate as pos-
sible, it was deposited from an ether solution on to a specially acid tr eated 
sea sand. Thus the variant of an experimental series was the vitamin con-
centrate sand preparation. After a four to eight hour digestion period, 
the contents of each flask was made acid with 5 cc. of sulphuric acid (10 cc. 
cone. H 2S04 and 88 ec. of water). T,he contents of each flask were then 
transferred to 50 cc. balloon flasks and diluted with 200 cc. of C02-free 
distilled water. The balloon flasks were then connected to a Reichert-
Meissl distillation apparatus. The collection of 200 cc. of distillate removed 
quantitatively the butyric acid from the digestion mixture. The butyric 
acid in each flask was then titrated with standard sodium hydroxide. The 
difference noted between the titer of the contrdl and the other flasks of the 
series was taken as an indication of the effect of addition of vitamin con-
centrate upon lipase action. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. The effect of vitamin A concentrate from butter fat upon lipase activity. 
The Sand Preparation. The method for making vitamin A concen-
trate the sand, according to Steenbock, Sill and Buell ( 4), is as follows. 
Special sea sand was allowed to stand for several hours in aqua regia. The 
mixture was filtered and washed with distilled water until free from chlor-
ides. The sand was then dried and kept in stoppered bottles. Three hun-
dred grams of the fat were treated with 600 cc. of a 20 per cent a:lcoholic 
potash. After four hours 2400 cc. of water were added and the solution 
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extracted three times with ether. The ether extracts were washed with a 
small volume of water and the extract evaporated on such an amount of 
the sand that the preparation contained 2.5 per cent of the vitamin A 
concentrate. 
In T8ible II are given data showing that the above preparation does 
stimulate the lipase activity. The digestions were carried out for 4.5 hrs. 
at 30° C. About nine drops of toluol weer added as a preservative. 
TABLE II. Effect of vitamin A sand preparation on lipase activity. 
Grams of sand 
preparation 
0 
0.500 
1.000 
1-500 
INo. cc. of O.lN NaoH required to neutralize the butyric acid formed 
I I (1) I II (2) I III (3) 
6.29 5.67 5.10 
8.44 6.12 7.69 
9.03 6.51 8.22 
10.39 6.79 8.93 
(1) 0.5 gms. Na,HPO •. 12H,O, 5 cc. of water, 1 cc. of ethyl butyrate 
(2) Same as above except 0.65 gms. Na,HPO •. 12H,O 
(3) Same as (2) except 0.4 cc. of ethyl butyrate used 
B. The effect of factors other than vitamin A in the sand concentrates upon 
the lipase activity. 
In order to determine whether the vitamin A is the sole stimulating 
factor for lipase action in the sand preparation it is necessary to study 
separately other constituents of the concentrate. There are five possibilities 
to be considered in the following order. 
1. The effect of an oil film upon lipase activity. For this purpose a 
film of cottonseed oil was deposited on the sand. The preparation contained 
2.5 per cent of the oil. The effect of this preparation is shown by data 
-given in Table III. The data show that the oil film did not stimulate thA 
hydrolysis. 
TABLE III. The effect of a film of cottonseed oil on sand upon lipase activity. 
Grams of activated sand I 
o.oo 
0.15 
0.30 
0.45 
0.60 
0.75 
0.90 
1.05 
1.20 
No. cc. of O.lN Naoh required for titration 
I (1) I II (2) 
2~ 8~ 
8.10 
2.60 7.77 
7.45 
2.20 8.17 
7.88 
2.15 8.40 
7.70 
1.58 7.82 
(1) Pancreatin and Na,HPO. absent. Digestion 4%, hours at 20° C. 
(2) Standard method used. Digestion 5% hours at 30° C. 
2. The effect of sea sand alone on the lipase activity. Data in Table 
IV show that the sand alone did not stimulate the hydrolysis, in fact there 
is a tendency toward depression. 
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TABLE IV. The effect of sea sand on the lipase activity. 
Grams of sand 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
I No. cc. of O.lON Naoh required for 
titration 
6.22 
6.18 
4.80 
5.04 
3. The effect of toluol upon the lipase activity. In Table V are given 
data showing that the addition of toluol does not increase the hydrolytic 
activity of the sand butter fat preparation but decreases the stimulation. 
The digestion period was for nine hours. 
TABLE v. The effect of toluol upon the stimulating effect of butter fat preparation 
for lipase activity. 
Flask I Sand preparation I 
0 0.00 gms. 
1 0.30 " 
2 0.30 " 
3 0.30 " 
4 0.30 " 
Toluol 
2 drops 
4 " 
6 " 
8 " 
10 " 
\ 
No. cc. of NaOH 
N/10 required for 
titration 
I 13.22 
15.28 
14.14 
14.68 
13.52 
4. The effect of cholesterol upon lipase action. Cholesterol and lecithin 
are common constituents of animal fats. E. F. Terraine (5) has shown 
that lecithin increases the activity of pancreatic lipase only slightly. He 
used monobutyrin as the substrate. It would be unusual, therefore, to ex-
pect lecithin to have great stimulating power upon lipase when acting 
upon ethyl butyrate as substrate. Cholestrol was found to have no appre-
ciable stimulation. 
5. The effect of sodium oleate !Upon lipase activity. COiIIlmercial oieic 
acid was treated with sodium hydroxide in such a manner that not all the 
oleic acid was neutralized. The resulting soap was then allowed to dry 
after which the excess oleic acid was removed by several extractions with 
ether. A small shaving of sodium oleate and sodium pa1mitate were ground 
up in a mortar with specially treated sea sand. Tables VI & VII give the 
TABLE VI. The effect of sodium oleate upon lipase activity. 
Grams of vitamin A concentrate 
sand 
0.00 
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
0.90 
No. of cc. of N/10 NaOH required to 
neutralize the butyric acid 
13.51 
12.77 
13.57 
16.55 
15.10 
16.90 
16.89 
16.61 
18.41 
17.90 
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data obtained. It is very apparent that the soaps increase the activity of 
the lipase. It may be that all soaps show this property. The pancreatin 
preparations used in the two experiments were not identical and evidently 
not of the same strengths. 
TABLE VII. The effect of sodium palmittae upon lipase activity. 
No. cc. Na Palmitate Soap (1) No. of cc. of N/10 NaOH required to 
neutralize butyric acid 
0.00 
0.10 
0.30 
0.50 
0.70 
0.90 
1.30 
1.60 
1.90 
(1) Sodium palmitate app. 1 Normal. No sand. 
11.55 
1.80 
2.29 
2.31 
2.65 
2.95 
3.50 
4.09 
4.10 
C. The effect of vitamin A concentrates made from sources other than butter fat. 
The acceleration of lipolysis noted in the previous experiments was 
caused ·by the addition of vitamin A concentrate made fr<>m butter fat. 
Similar acceleration should also be noted in the case of a concentrate made 
from cod liver oil as this ubstance has been shown by animal experiments 
to be rich in vitamin A. Similar concentrates made from cottonseed oil, 
lard and inactivated ibutter fat should prove not to stimulate lipase activ-
Type of 
Vitamin A 
Prep. 
Incubation hrs. I 
Gms. sand I 
Prep. 
0.000 I 
0.500 
I 1.000 1.500 2.000 
TABLE VIII. 
No. cc. of N/10 NaOH required to neutralize Butyric Acid 
Cod liver oil 
Vitamin A 
Preparation 
4 
3.38 
4.06 
5.00 
5.15 
5.44 
91h 
Cottonseed 
Oil Vitamin A 
Preparation 
4 
3.92 
3.90 
5.31 
4.81 
5.95 
101h 
I Lard Vitamin Al Preparation 
I 4 I 
I I 
3.03 
3.80 
5.09 
4.20 
I 3.98 
10 
Inactivated 
Butterfat 
4 
3,41 
4.90 
4.80 
4.20 
4.18 
Cncubation hrs. I 
Gms. sand ~l~~~~~~;--~~~~~-c-~~~~~~-;-~~~~~ 
Prep. 
0.00 4.80 4.87 5.20 4.52 
0.50 7.00 7.08 7.95 6.98 
1.00 6.06 6.06 7.05 4.57 
1.50 6.50 
------
7.90 5.90 
2.00 6.50 6.08 8.25 6.10 
o.oo 5.42 4.45 5.40 4.02 
2.50 6.20 6.85 7.40 4.79 
3.00 6.10 6.48 7.45 5.10 
3.50 5.80 5.73 7.75 6.33 
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ity if vitamin A is the stimulant. This reasoning has been tested out. 'rh~ 
experimental data are shown in Table VIII. 
The concentrates were prepared according to the method previously 
outlined. The butter fat was inactivated, i. e., the vitamin A was de-
stroyed, by passing air through the butter fat at 120° C. for four hours. 
It is apparent that all the concentrates stimulated the lipase activity. 
This is not in har,mony with the vitamin A content as determined by feed-
ing animals the fats used in the above experiments. It seemed advisable 
then to test the vitamin A potency toward rats of the concentrates prepared 
by the outlined ether extraction. 
D. Rat growth studies on vitamin A potency of concentrates from cod liver oil, 
cottonseed oil, lard, and inactive butter fat. 
The acceleraion of lipase activity caused by concentrates from cod 
liver oil, cottonseed oil, and inactivated butter fat as shown previously in 
Table VIII may be assumed to be due to vitamin A if these concentrates 
permitted animal growth at a parallel rate. 
The only condition under which the rate of animal growth would be 
parallel for concentrates made from cod liver oil, cottonseed oil and lard 
would be that the same amount of vitamin A was extracted in each case. 
This would imply that very nearly the same volumes of ether must be 
used in the extraction and that vitamin A be a substance rather insoluhle 
in ether. This supposition has support in the fact that vita.min A cannot 
be readily extracted with ether from plant sources. 
Rat experiments were therefore devised to determine the accuracy of 
this reasoning. Rats were fed a standard deficient diet until their growth 
was stationary, when concentrates from the various sources were added to 
the ration. The amount of concentrates was based upon a 5 per cent level 
of the original source. Control rats were fed the deficient ration plus 
5 per cent of the original source. 
The data obtained showed that only the concentrate from cod liver oil 
permitted animal growth. Steenbock, Sell and Buell ( 4) reported that a 
similar concentrate from butter fat gave growth. Addition of the concen-
trates made from inactivated butter fat, lard and cottonseed oil did not 
seem to improve the deficient ration. The fact that the animals lost weight, 
manifested soreness of the eyes, and eventually died is sufficient proof of 
this. The rats on the ration supplemented by concentrates made from cod 
liver oil fared somewhat better; three of the five increased their body 
weight , especially so after the concentrate had been added to the other-
wise deficient ration more liberally, approximately to a 30 per cent level. 
The rat growth experi,ments then indicate the following facts: Vitamin 
A in cod liver oil can be concentrated by the method used. Concentrates 
made from cottonseed oil, lard and inactivated butter fat are, as far as can 
be ascertained from the data, lacking in vitamin A. The increase in lipase 
activity by these same concentrates may be due in part to vitamin A, espe-
cially when this vitamin is present and also may be due to SOJile other factor 
as yet undetermined. It may be pointed out that fatty acids are present 
in the vitamin concentrates as they have been prepared and that these un-
doubedly constitute a source of acceleration. 
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E. The effect of the removal of fatty acids from vitamin A concentrates upon 
lipase activity. 
It has previously been noted that soaps cause an increase in lipase 
activity. This suggests that there may have been present during the diges-
tion period soaps or substances which might have given rise to soaps and 
hence caused the stimulation of the lipase noted above. Since the vitamin 
A concentrate was obtained by extracting with ether, a water, alcohol, 
potassium soap, solution there was, no doubt, ample opportunity for soaps 
being present in the ether extract before this was washed with water. The 
ether extract was, however, washed six or seven times 'vith distilled water. 
The last water gave no test with AgN03 , showing the absence of the fatty 
acids. The final product was also tested for the presence of ash by ignit-
ing a small portion. No ash could be observed. (A very delicate test for 
the presence of alkali in the ash under these conditions is the application of 
phenolphthalein and a few drops of water.) It is safe, therefore, to as-
sume that soaps were absent from the vitamin concentrate. The presence 
of fatty acids in the vitamin concentrate cannot, however, be precluded on 
the basis of these simple tests. As a matter of fact, soaps hydrolyse in 
water to give alkali hydroxide and fatty acids. A simple test using sodium 
palmitate showed that the fatty acid was readily extracted by ether from 
water solution. 
The removal of fatty acids from vitamin concentrates has been accom-
plished, but with some difficulty and probably with some loss of potency. 
A weighed portion of the concentrate as obtained according to Steenbock, 
Sell and Buell ( 4), and outlined above, was dissolved in absolute alcohol. 
A drop or two of phenolphthalein was added and the fatty acids titrated 
with anhydrous alcoholoc sodium hydroxide. Fro,m these data was calcu-
lated the required amount of alcoholic sodium hydroxide necessary to 
neutralize the fatty acids in a larger portion of the vitamin concentrate. 
TABLE IX. Efl'ect of fatty acid free concentrates on lipase activity. 
Type of Vita-1 
min A sand 
preparation 
Exp. No. I 
Gms.• \ 
Sand Prep. 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
Exp. No. 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
0.00 
2.50 
3.00 
3.50 
0.00 
on on 
Cod Liver ! Cottonseed ! 
I I IV I 
cc. of N/10 NaOH 
2.86 I 2.55 
3.25 
I 3.40 3.60 3.30 3.60 
111 IIll VI 
3.08 2.13 I 2.04 3.30 2.69 I 2.29 
3.59 2.88 2.46 
3.81 2.96 2.22 
3.79 4.87 2.20 
1.95 2.61 
3.40 3.65 2.75 
3.47 2.59 2.52 
3.31 2.33 
3.33 1.87 2.27 
*2.5% fatty acid free concentrate. 
Lard 
v 
3.50 
3.50 
4.12 
VII 
1.92 
2.71 
2.35 
2.43 
2.81 
2.25 
2.55 
2.53 
2.92 
2.23 
! Inactivated I Buter / 
Fat 
I VIII I 
I I 
2.81 
3.93 
3.65 
4.40 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Butter 
Fat 
IX 
1.80 
1.86 
2.49 
2.59 
2.12 
2.19 
2.49 
2.41 
2.55 
1.65 
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The neutralil'led concentrate was then evaporated by vacuum until all the 
alcohol and water were removed. The concentrate plus the soaps was then 
extracted with anhydrous ether. 
Vitamin concentrates made from butter fat, cottonseed oil, lard and 
cod liver oil were so treated and afterward tested for stimulatory power. 
The results of this work are ~bodied in Table IX. 
The concentrate used in Exp. III was shown to contain traces of fatty 
acids and this may account for the slightly higher results than is to be 
noted in Exp. IX in which a similar concentrate from butter fat was used, 
or the cod liver oil concentrate is richer in vitamin A. In Exp. II the 
concentrate was treated for the removal of fatty acids as already described 
and subsequently found to be free of these substances. It is to be noted in 
Exp. II that there was a gradual acceleration followed by a downward 
tendency. This is suggestive, especially in consideration of the irregular 
resu:lts obtained with concentrates frqm cottonseed oil and lard. In Table 
VII, it is shown that 1.90 cc. of approximately N-1 sodium palmitate gave a 
stimulation of 2.55 N/10 NaOH over the control. The maximum stimula-
tion in Exp. III is 2.74 cc. It is unlikely that there were present enough 
fatty acids in the amount of concentrate used in Exp. III to give soaps of 
the same concentration as existed in the experiiroents with sodium palmitate. 
It would seem, therefore, that not all of the acceleration obtained in Exp. 
III wras due to soaps. Exp. II bears this out. 
It is interesting to note that those concentrates giving most regular 
acceleration of lipase activity also support animal growth. 
SUMMARY 
1. A method for studying the effect of vitamin A concentrates upon the 
enzyme lipase has been devised. 
2. Several phases of this method have been studied to eliminate possible 
sources of acceleration other than that caused by vitamin A or si/:nilar 
concentrates. 
3. An acceleration of lipase activity by vitamin A concentrates has been 
noted and studied with a view to correlating this acceleration with the 
vitamin A content of various :fats and oils. 
4. Concentrates made from butter fat and cod liver oil have been found 
to accelerate lipase activity. A concentrate from inactivated butter 
fat was found to give very little acceleration. 
5. Concentrates made from cottonseed oH and lard were found to acceler-
ate lipase activity. These concentrates, however, have been shown to 
contain fatty acids which react with the medium to give soaps. 
6. Sodium oleate and sodium palmitate have been found to accelerate 
lipase activity. 
7. Vitamin A concentrates from butter fat and cod liver oil have been 
separated from their free fatty acid content and found to give measur-
able acceleration of lipase. 
8. Vitamin A concentrates made from lard and cottonseed oil were simi-
larly freed of their fatty acid content and found to increase lipase 
activity irregularly. 
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9. While there i·s no accurate parallism between the lipase stimulating 
activity of the vitamin A concentrates and their anti-xerophthalmic 
effect upon rats, there is indication that vitamin A timulates lipase 
activity. Further W!Ork is required to resolve this inconsistency of results. 
The author wishes to express thanks to Professors E. I. Fulmer and V. E. 
Nelson, who followed the progress of the work with much interest and gave the 
author valuable suggestions and guidance. Thanks are also due to Mr. W. W. 
Duecker and Mr. Leon Christem!On, who also gave the writer help and encourage-
ment. The author also appreciates the kindness of the Chemistry Department of 
Montana State College in permitting the use of their laboratory in confirming 
some of the results presented. 
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